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# EMANCIPATION

IN

## DISGUISE,

OR THE

### TRUE CRISIS of the COLONIES.

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TO WHICH ARE ADDED,

#### CONSIDERATIONS

UPON MEASURES PROPOSED FOR THEIR TEMPORARY RELIEF

AND

OBSERVATIONS UPON COLONIAL MONOPOLY.

SHEWING,

*The different Effects of its Enforcement and Relaxation,  
exposing the Advantages*

DERIVED BY

AMERICA FROM LOUISIANA:

AND LASTLY,

SUGGESTIONS

FOR A

PERMANENT PLAN

TO SUPPLY OUR

COLONIES WITH PROVISIONS

AND OUR

**N A V Y**

WITH CERTAIN

NAVAL STORES INDEPENDENT OF FOREIGN  
SUPPLIES.

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London:

Printed for J. RIDGWAY, PICCADILLY; and J. M. RICHARDSON  
No. 23, CORNHILL, opposite the ROYAL-EXCHANGE.

1807.

APPENDIX

TABLE

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## ERRATA.


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Page	5	line	7, read <i>least</i> for <i>lest</i> .
27	—	19,	read <i>desperation</i> for <i>desparation</i> .
44	—	14,	read <i>forcibly</i> instead of <i>forceably</i> .
69	—	5,	read <i>discern</i> for <i>descern</i> .
79	—	4,	r caret in <i>eroneous</i> .
ib.	—	21,	read <i>vague</i> for <i>vain</i> .
82	—	18,	read <i>naval stores</i> for <i>warlike manufactories</i> .
ib.	—	19,	read <i>naval stores</i> for <i>warlike stores</i> .
86	—	10,	<i>reins</i> for <i>reigns</i> .
126	—	12,	read <i>depreciated</i> for <i>depriciated</i> .
141	—	5,	c caret in <i>inacuracy</i> .
154	—	15,	read <i>inured</i> for <i>enured</i> .
182	—	11,	read <i>for</i> for <i>from</i> .

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## PREFACE.

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**T**HE following sheets have been some time written, and have been detained in the press by circumstances which the Printer attributes to his Workmen; and thereby this Work has been unexpectedly delayed, while every day has produced pamphlets and newspaper-communications, anticipating, in some degree, the consideration of some points that are herein more particularly commented upon. But, the Author, nevertheless, will not withhold those observations from the Public, which a long residence in the Colonies, and an intimate knowledge of their general interests and domestic economy have afforded him the opportunity of submitting with confidence, to impartial readers. More especially, as the view in which he has placed

the critical state of the Colonies, has not before been exposed, as depending upon *Emancipation in Disguise*, connected with the *Sovereignty of the Negroes* in the West Indies; nor has the plan of raising provisions in the West Indies, been so particularly and extensively made out, even by the pamphlet that has appeared since this *Permanent Plan* was first sent to press; although great praise is due to that Pamphlet for its suggestions, and great satisfaction was produced in the mind of the Author of this Work upon finding that his notions on a subject of such importance, were so well supported by an Author who certainly is well informed upon the occasion. The Author therefore trusts with the more confidence, that such parts of the permanent plan, recommended for adoption in the fertile and extensive Island here alluded to, as may be adaptable, will be the more readily attended to in all the other Islands also.

The consideration of the advantages that are, and may be still more extensively, derived by America from Louisiana, are of very in-

interesting importance in our present political situation with America: and the recent declaration of the Russian War, the consequences of which were anticipated while writing these pages, render the remarks, relative to the means of obtaining certain articles of Naval Stores independent of foreign supplies, of the highest importance to the British Navy at this eventful period.

If the Author has not done justice to the Subjects which he has ventured to treat, he may at least plead, that the danger of delay forbade him to lose any more time in an attempt at embellishment, lest the pernicious influence of certain popular publications should induce the adoption of measures that may draw down upon this Nation the ruin that is suspended by a very slender thread, and which may be too easily broken, should it take a wrong turn in our negociations with America.—The Author learns, with anxiety, that two Negro AMBASSADORS are arrived from Saint Domingo, but hopes, that the dangers which he has exposed,

as connected with the support of the revolted negroes of that Island, will avert the horrors of colonial Insurrection.

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# EMANCIPATION

IN

*DISGUISE;*

OR, THE

TRUE CRISIS OF THE COLONIES.

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THE distressed state of our Colonies, and of the different interests in Great Britain connected with and dependent upon them, have, for some time past, excited the attention, and called forth the inquiries, of several industrious essayists upon the subject. The effect is, that, minute investigations having been made into the causes and probable consequences of the present situation of West-Indian affairs, various plans are proposed for the relief of those who are the greatest sufferers: but, so opposite are the principles upon which many of these plans are recommended, that, without entering into

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a strict examination of them, so as to separate and compare the suggestions of contending interests, with the view to adopt those, only, which do not involve in them irreconcilable propositions: the mind would be almost so equally attracted in different directions, that a distracting perplexity would be produced, rather than any rational conclusions, upon which to direct that wise and liberal policy, which may be adopted with safety, and with certain benefit.

But, as the numerous publications which have treated of these subjects have almost exhausted the sources of information, in the minute details which they have exposed to the public, it would be useless to go the same ground over again: more especially, as I am not ignorant of the extensive view, which Mr Brougham has taken, of the "Colonial policy of the European Powers," nor of the valuable collection of authentic documents, which Sir W. Young has commented upon in so masterly a manner in his *West-India Common-Place-Book*, nor of the successive labors of Mr Bosanquet and Mr Lowe, who have amplified upon some points, in a manner very worthy of attention.

But, as there are others opposed to those works, which have a tendency to add to the inju-

ries which our Colonies have already sustained, under the plausible pretexts of *commercial interests, naval superiority, and national danger*; some comments may yet be made, without much form or method, that may lead to the detection of principles, the exposure of which may direct our attention to the true source of all our colonial dangers; and suggest the means of affording, not only an immediate, but a certain and permanent, relief to our friends in the West Indies; whose present distress and dreadful prospects none can so well conceive, as those to whom a residence in that country has furnished the means of an intimate knowledge of their lamentable situation.

The plan of permanent relief, which I would propose, will properly follow my more general observations upon the subjects which have occurred to me during my perusal of the different publications; among which those on the subject of the neutral *carrying-trade* bear the hardest upon the colonial interests. To the opening of the monopoly of the French colonial carrying-trade, the present ruined state of our own Colonies is boldly attributed, by the author of an eloquent work, called "War in Disguise;" who threatens us, also, from the same cause, with the ruin of our commerce, the loss of our

naval superiority, and the greatest danger to the empire. On the other side, he considers the *American carrying-trade* as a "war in disguise," contrived by the French government, and eagerly entered into by the Americans, to support the French Colonies, skreen the French commerce, and lay the foundation for a future French navy. The author of these assertions, at the same time that he founds his arguments upon premises which are inadmissable, carries them to an extreme extent; and, assuming every where too much, writes with an imposing confidence, which may be mistaken for the effects of conviction. For, certainly, the torrent of eloquence, which he pours in upon the reader, seems to carry every thing along with it, right or wrong, and hurries you on into a whirlpool of declamation, where he winds you round and round, until, as it were, the brain becomes confused and incapable of attending to the dangers of the situation into which he has led you; while he carefully avoids the exposure of the tremendous rocks below the surface, called "African freedom and African sovereignty."—It is, therefore, almost impossible to resist him at every turn, or to perceive, in his rapid course, whither he would conduct you: but, when a "crisis" or an "opportunity" exposes the dangers of the Colonies, in the plan for emancipation and "African

sovereignty," under the specious shape of a "war in disguise;" we ought no longer to suffer ourselves to be deluded into the plausible current of his popular opinions, which has hitherto carried away with it so many minds at the expence of reason. Let us, then, "look before we leap;" least, having once committed ourselves, we may not be able to stop before we become dashed upon his hidden rocks, and sink in this *black gulph*, never to rise again.

With a view to the investigation of the various points which are to come under our discussion, it is necessary, before considering the monopoly of the Colonies, and the neutral *carrying-trade*, to premise, that the civil war of St Domingo, the temporary emancipation of the slaves of Guadeloupe, and the charib and brigand wars in St Vincent and Grenada, encouraged, for a time, the extension of sugar plantations, by the deficiency of the crops of those Islands, in the European market; which raised and kept up the prices to a degree, that induced great speculations in West-India property: and it has been ably demonstrated, by works which are already before the public, that this rage for speculation, added to the productive nature of the Bourbon cane; the restoration of tranquility in St Vincent and Gra-

nada ; the temporary possession of Martinique and St. Lucie ; the conquest of Surinam, Demerara, and Tobago ; and the cession of Trinidad ; have, together, been a great cause of the depreciation of West-India produce. For it is shewn, by returns that may be referred to in the works I have mentioned\*, that the deficiency, which the disastrous states of these different Islands caused in the European sugar-market, has been more than made up by the increased cultivation of our Colonies ; so that we have, now, a superabundance, for which we shall require, in future, either an increased consumption, or exportation, for a very great amount above any quantity that ever before appeared in our market.

It is, also, clearly made out, that this state of West-Indian affairs has been rendered more ruinous by an addition of duties in proportion to the diminution of price ; which, also, has been produced by the exclusion of our sugars from the ports of Europe. Have we not here displayed causes enough, when added to the war-expences of our *own* carrying-trade, to explain the difficulties under which our planters labour, without referring them to the *American* carrying-trade.

\* Vide West-India Common-Place-Book. Bosanquet. Lowe.

The exportation of our colonial produce, to the ports of Europe, has been stated to be one-third of the whole imports from our West-Indies.— Sometimes, this exportation has decreased to almost nothing; and this decrease has been attributed to the American carrying-trade; which has, certainly, been extended to an unprecedented degree: but it does not necessarily follow, that the increase of the latter has caused the decrease of our exportation; on the contrary, this decrease, in which the Americans could not possibly use any influence, has naturally promoted *their* carrying-trade. Have we not exported, notwithstanding these carriers, whenever the markets on the continent were open to us, and our prices were low enough to afford the exporter his proper profit?

The Americans cannot carry more French produce, in time of war, than the French would carry for themselves in time of peace: and, therefore, if it be necessary to the support of our Colonies and Navy, that the sugars of the French Islands should not reach the continent of Europe in time of war; the same means of preventing the French colonists from shipping their sugars should be resorted to in time of peace; and, thus, we must have an eternal war



with France in order to ruin *two* Colonies, and monopolize the whole sugar-trade of the continent of Europe !

But this is too absurd. The ports of Europe *will* be shut against us. It is the fact even now ; and we may, therefore, blockade the French Islands, prohibit the Americans from carrying the French produce, allow drawbacks and offer bounties on the exportation of our own ; and make every other possible effort ; but what will it avail ? It will not avert the ruin of the planters ; for it will not open the markets of the continent to *our* sugars during the war : our warehouses will still continue filled with them, while their prices will become so low as not even to pay the storage. And what will it profit our planters, that the produce of the French islands shall be accumulating, crop after crop, in the same proportion ; while, in the mean time, a few adventurous neutrals will run all risks, and make their fortunes in the midst of danger ? And, even if peace can promise relief ; under such previous circumstances what will it eventually amount to ? — That, on the opening of the ports, there will still be only an unprofitable market ; for the accumulated crops of the French, as well as our own islands, will rush in, and glut all Europe,

And thus, even the much-desired event of peace will, at length, arrive without its attendant benefits.

It is evident that the present state of the British West-Indies depends on other causes than the continuance of the American carrying-trade, and it is taking a very forced view of this trade, to consider it as the effect of any *artifice* of France, or designed encroachment of America:—would not the French government prohibit the American carrying-trade to-morrow, could they protect the fleets of their own merchantmen, or were a peace to take place?—Would she allow neutrals to carry for her, in time of peace, when she can carry cheaper for herself?—Would France have ever allowed the Americans to be the carriers at all if she could have prevented it?—If she had a navy, would not the prohibition be her first and best policy in order to raise seamen for that navy?—Is not then the neutral carrying-trade, in a great measure, the natural consequence of our glorious victories over the French navy? Have we not destroyed their means of protecting commercial fleets? Ought we, then, to be astonished, or to consider it as an artifice, that they will not trust their merchantmen on the ocean unprotected, when their men of war cannot protect themselves? The neutral

carrying-trade is the natural effect of a cause so glorious to ourselves, that there will be less danger in reconciling ourselves to its temporary continuance, than in forcing our enemy to attempt the recovery of that state of commercial greatness and naval power, from which he was reduced at the incalculable loss of that immortal hero, whom we can no longer call to the performance of those feats of war, unparalleled in the naval history of the world; and than which nothing less could have averted the ruin of our Empire.

But, though the destruction of the French navy, by prohibiting their commerce, promoted the American *carrying-trade*, and thereby was one cause of the present flourishing state of Guadaloupe and Martinique; it was not the only cause of opening the colonial monopoly, on which the prosperity of those islands depends. For it is stated \* “that the principle of the rule of the war of 1756 did not apply to the whole extent of the existing neutral commerce with those Colonies;” (Guadaloupe and Martinique;) for that “their ports were open, to a considerable extent, to foreign vessels bringing necessary supplies,” before the war began: and it is owned

\* War in Disguise, p. 30.

that "this relaxation of the national monopoly was a mere temporary expedient, the result of distress, occasioned by civil war in the parent state and the consequent neglect of her transmarine interests in general.\*"

If, then, we suffered them, under such circumstances, *to open the monopoly of their colonial carrying-trade before the war*, it cannot, with truth, be asserted that the Americans are now "allowed a commerce with a belligerent, in time of war, which was not permitted in time of peace."

When such a trade became necessary, and was permitted on account of distress, civil war, and the neglected state of our enemies shipping-interest; the distress and necessity, which induced it, became still greater when the ruin of their commerce became complete by our glorious victories over their navy. When consequences are attributed to such causes in time of peace, why attribute the same consequences in time of war to causes so peculiarly different as a disguised hostility in our allies, and a state of commerce, which, of all other situations, is the very

\* War in Disguise, p. 32.

reverse of that which our enemy must desire as the only means of recovering the naval power of France. If the neglect of her maritime interest was one of the causes which rendered a round-about commerce necessary, the continuance of such commerce must increase the evil, by preventing the restoration of her marine; for, as a loss of commerce must be attended by a loss of naval power, so, without a navy in time of war, there will be no commerce. France cannot desire such a situation; and it is our advantage that she cannot improve it. America could not produce it, and will not be allowed to reap any benefit from it, when France can again exclude her from her Colonies.

Instead, then, of sapping the maritime resources of Britain, France has suffered the destruction of her navy, and has lost, for the present, the means of its re-establishment. Instead of America carrying on a "War in disguise," she has openly carried on a trade with our enemy; not contraband, and, therefore, innocent. Motives of justice, as well as policy, forbid our interference with such a trade. Justice forbids that the colonial cultivators should be designedly made to suffer by a warfare that ought to be rather directed against the *present*

government of France, which neither the royalists nor republicans of Martinique nor Guadeloupe established nor uphold; and whose measures or modes of warfare would not be altered in one jot even by the total ruin of these Colonies. Our policy, too, forbids that we should quarrel with the Americans for feeding the peaceable planters of these islands, inasmuch as it would also endanger the safety of our own.

Because we are involved in the disasters of war, ought we to desire that our American allies, whose geographical situation and political disposition render them more than ordinarily susceptible of the advantages of peace, should not profit by their peaceful state? It always has been, and always will be, the consequence of war, that those who can preserve themselves in a state of peace will profit by the disasters of their neighbours. We ought not to blame them for avoiding the calamities of warfare: and it is a miserable selfishness to grudge them those accidental advantages which we cannot ourselves enjoy. They do not contrive the state of distress by which they profit, nor do they profit by the disasters of war, because the disasters are *ours*. — They profit as much by the disasters of our ene-



my. And if, during the miseries of war, our enemy benefits, in some measure, by the peaceful state of neutral powers, while we obstinately refuse the same assistance, which they would as readily give to us, we ought not to lay the blame upon the neutral, because we "are labouring under great and increasing burthens" in our Colonies, while "those of the enemy, comparatively, are thriving \*."

The author of "War in Disguise," with more ingenuity than logic, argues the case of general freedom on a road, and the particular privilege of carrying the mail on that road, as analogically applicable to general freedom on the seas, and the privilege of the carrying-trade. But his analogy is fallacious.

To put this plausible point in a fair view, we may suppose the case of the general post and the two-penny post, forwarded on the same road by two different persons. In this case, though each man has the right of carrying his own mail-bag on this common road, he has nothing to do with the controul, or right, of carrying the other mail-bag: and should the one chuse to relin-

• War in Disguise.

quish his advantage of carrying his mail to a third person, because his horse became lame or died, what right has the other to complain while he retains the carrying of his own mail? And should it happen, that the third person carries the mail with greater advantage to the contractor, than he could carry it himself; and that the other may be somewhat benefited by this new carrier also, but obstinately will not so benefit himself; is it reasonable that he should complain of the benefit his fellow postman derives from the new carrier; or be jealous of the latter, because he affords that relief to the one, which he would also willingly afford to both. This is the true case. If the Americans were to supply our enemies with provisions in return for their produce, and at the same time were to refuse us the means of subsistence, and also refuse to take our produce off our hands, there would, then, be a just cause of complaint for an adherence to, and a partial support of, our enemy: but if they take away *all* our enemy's produce, it is because we will not let them have *any* of ours: if they carry provisions to the enemy in preference to us, it is from our obstinate refusal to barter with our produce, though we do not know how else to dispose of it. It is our fault, and not theirs, that our Colonies are starved and ruined with the means of plenty in

our possession, and that the Colonies of our enemy are well supplied and rich. For, in the American carrying-trade, French produce finds a ready market at a good price, and the planters supply their slaves with provisions at a low price on easy terms of payment.

But, France would never have injured her commerce, and weakened her navy, merely thus to benefit the planters.\* She was driven to the encouragement of her Colonies, also, by their

\* Another cause, which forced her to resort to neutral flags originated in the fallacious principles of our taxing policy: for, in 1795 and 1798, our national vanity induced us to imagine, that nothing could prevent us from monopolising the colonial trade, and, instead of being satisfied, as we ought to have been, we greedily endeavoured to make foreigners do what the "Crisis" (by the author of Plain Facts) has lately recommended, viz. "compel France to contribute to the support of our maritime strength," by preventing her from acquiring every thing she wants, "till a duty has been levied on it in some British port." But the folly of such presumption is now felt. We forced the carrying of colonial produce into other channels; and having once got into another plan, which they have found out to be the cheapest, we shall not persuade them to return to the ancient course; nor is it possible, wholly, to prevent the new one: and now we complain of the effects of our own greedy policy, and attribute it to the insidious plans of our enemy, and "the frauds of neutral flags." But this is neither new nor strange, it is an old trick, to lay our faults at other men's doors.

precarious state, as depending on the unstable disposition of her negroes. From this necessity she the more readily yielded up the monopoly of the colonial trade, in order to avert the almost-inevitable loss of her Colonies. They were on the very brink of ruin from the total failure of the credit, which her merchants very naturally withdrew, on the revolted state of St Domingo, and the temporary emancipation of the slaves of Guadaloupe. This situation of those islands so palsied the commercial faith, and checked the vital influence, of European credit, that the necessity of opening their trade to the Americans, (the only nation on earth that could save them from famine,) must ultimately have suggested itself, even if it had not been, so soon in the war, confirmed by our preventing them from carrying on their own trade.

But, the success of St. Domingo in resisting the French arms during the interval of peace; the abolition of the slave-trade during the late administration; and the exclusion of British West-India produce from the ports of Europe, have caused similar effects upon the commerce and credit of the British Colonies: so that, in our turn, we find our Planters and Merchants tottering on the brink of ruin, and in the very state from which Guadaloupe and Martinique

have so lately escaped. And because there is not a navy in the world powerful enough to destroy our commerce, and thereby force us to relieve our Planters by the same easy measure, we are hesitating about the policy of the means of relief, until famine will produce, in our islands, the fate of St Domingo.

That this will ultimately be the case, there is no doubt ; unless, foreseeing the necessity, we resort, before it is too late, to that temporary mode of relief of which the French have availed themselves in their open trade with the Americans.

The state of nations and policy of governments are not what they used to be. Under the ordinary circumstances of former times, the political rules of those times required to be constantly acted upon. But a new order of things has taken place, upon which new rules of action are necessary. The inconsistency, then, is, in acting always upon the same rules, when the circumstances requiring them are no longer the same. And, yet, we are so bigotted in our adherence to ancient principles, though no longer adaptable to the state of our affairs, that we shall involve ourselves in a certain evil of tremendous magnitude, to avoid one as inferior in

point of importance, as it is uncertain that it will ever occur.

When the politics of Europe shall return to their ancient course, we may consistently return with them : but let us not be led away, by the canting and ironical expressions of *fondness for antiquated British attachments*, to despise the natural suggestions of modern, extraordinary, and unparalleled, events. Unprecedented measures are justified by unprecedented necessities for them ; and, as it is fortunate when the evil suggests the remedy, so it is unpardonably stupid to refuse relief on no other account than from a bigotted repugnance to innovation.

To those who are uninfluenced by mercenary, political, or even more visionary motives ; to those who look through a moderate medium with the eye of reason, and who read with a desire to be convinced ; to those, alone, I address my arguments : which, I hope are calculated to dispel the mists of prejudice, expose the fallacies of party, and clear the way to a proper view of our own national interests ; regardless of the collateral advantages enjoyed by our peaceful allies ; and unaffected by that maddening jealousy, which sacrifices every thing magnanimous to a sordid selfishness.



Of such a nature is the recommendation of the author of "War in Disguise," who would shut out the Americans from the ports of our Enemy. He writes, too, of the "Enemy-planter and Enemy-merchant," as though we were at war with the French Planters and Merchants. Are we at war with the interests and opulence of these private individuals; or is it with the over-reaching ambition and gigantic power of the government of France that we contend? Would it not be a narrow, paltry, ignoble and unfeeling principle of war, to fight the battles of nations by distressing the peaceable Cultivator and the Merchant, instead of attacking the warriors of our Enemy? As well, in the case of a besieged city, bombard, in particular, the convents and the hospitals of the women, the children, the aged and the sick, in order to induce the government of the city, either to surrender, for the sake of these innocent and defenceless objects, or to give them up to such unfeeling malice and such a cowardly mode of warfare. Fie upon such unmanly propositions!

Would it have caused the surrender of Martinique had the Officer, in possession of the Diamond-Rock, captured every vessel, coasting from one part of the island to another, with the

produce and plantation-stores of the individual inhabitants? Certainly not ! But it would have greatly distressed, and even ruined, a great number of the peaceable Planters. And while the government of France would have been unaffected by it, such a mode of warfare would have rendered our navy, which is not now more feared than it is respected, as odious as it is powerful.

The humane and liberal will not agree with the philanthropic author of " War in Disguise," in recommending the plan of distressing, by famine, the Planters even of our Enemy. And every naval Commander, who possesses the magnanimity of a British warrior, will disdain the means of enriching himself in the ruin of the industrious and peaceable Cultivator of the land.

But let us inquire what would be the immediate consequences to the colonies of our Enemy, and the ultimate effects upon our own, even if we could perfectly carry into effect the blockading system against him, without also excluding the same means of subsistence from ourselves. The utmost effect, that can be desired by those who recommend such a measure, would be famine: and this dreadful calamity would be

first felt by the wretched slaves. How would the production of such a direful event be reconcilable to the humane regards, which we profess towards this oppressed race of people?

The French planters, although we are at war with them, would apply to the neighbouring Colonies for relief; and our speculating traders would readily supply them at the high prices which they would be willing to give.

But, as Planters have no means to purchase but by their produce, our Merchants must take that mode of payment; and they would demand a profit in proportion. Thus the Colonies of our enemy would be supplied by us with American provisions, instead of being supplied directly by Americans; who would receive in payment, circuitously, the French produce through the same medium. And thus the French would find agents in our islands to carry on the trade, which we should force them so to carry on, by our very attempts to prevent their carrying it on as they do now.

It is in vain to tell me, that our naval Commanders and colonial Governors would not allow them to be supplied from our islands; and that

the supplies and returns would be captured and condemned.

It does not follow, because they would be confiscable, that they would be confiscated. Those, who know the situation of the Colonies will acknowledge the impossibility of totally preventing the smuggling which such an extraordinary demand would encourage. The desperate state of the French negro-population, threatened with famine, would induce the French planters and their governments, to tempt the greatest risks and the great danger of such enterprises would meet with proportionate rewards. The safe arrival of one cargo would compensate for the loss of many unsuccessful voyages. But those who know the affairs of the West Indies, know better than to conclude, that such risks would be incurred.

Whatever may be the schemes of policy which European councils may, in their wisdom, folly, or madness, contrive and attempt to execute, there is a community of interest, a consideration of relative safety, and a sympathizing fellow-feeling, which, upon great occasions, will influence all the Colonies in one manner; situated as they are, all together forming one

neighbourhood, at a distance from the different and separate parent-states.

The humane and hospitable conduct of the inhabitants of Antigua, St Kitts, and Montserrat, will never be forgotten by the unfortunate sufferers of Guadaloupe. And when their own Rochfort squadron fired the town in Dominica, the inhabitants in Martinique, emulating British generosity and humanity, sent supplies of provisions and other necessities to the distressed people of St Ruperts. But, still later, and more in point, when the return of the intercourse-bill from America lately threatened a rupture with that country, the American merchants consequently discontinued their trading voyages under the apprehensions of capture: the effect was, that our Colonies, which seldom have even three months provisions in them, were in danger of starving, and received supplies from the island of Martinique, though the parent-states are at war!

The necessity of allowing such an uncommon intercourse between two colonies of states at war was so absolute, that, on the capture of a vessel laden with provisions from Martinique to Trinidad, the Governor of the latter requested the captain of the British cruiser to relinquish

his prize in consideration of the alarming state of the Colony ; both as to the want of food for the army, as well as for the other inhabitants.

It must not, therefore, be doubted that we should as readily return them these aids when starvation stares them in the face. No mandates from any power on earth could successfully effect so diabolical a purpose as that of preventing the Colonists, of whatever nation, from succouring their neighbours in distress ; even if a common interest in the peaceable state of the slaves were not, as it is, a paramount inducement to assist in feeding them, by mutually affording supplies in periods of want.

To exclude the American supplies from the Colonies of any nation, even if not an idle and impossible scheme, would be ultimately equally ruinous to our own, and to the Colonies of our Enemy, against which ever it might be attempted. Because it would excite insurrection, emancipation, and independence. And, in which ever island that may happen first, it would too soon be followed by the same events in the neighbouring islands.

But, who can doubt, when a parent-state shall be so indifferent to the subsistence of her

Colonies, that there will be much hesitation which to prefer, whether loyalty and certain ruin, or an attempt at independence in order to preserve life and property? \* And if, in such a disastrous state of colonial affairs, these islands must of necessity become independent, it will be more for the interest of the parent-state, and for the cause of humanity, that the masters, rather than the slaves, shall be the independent people. The former may be established without rapine and murder; but the latter must be effected by all the horrible means of negro insurrection, characterised, as it always has been, by the savageness of their nature, in acts the most brutally atrocious, with all the ferocity of long-cherished revenge, bursting forth in the madness of unexpected and licentious liberty.

\* The disposition of the West Indians was candidly avowed by Mr Baillie, in the House of Commons, on the 2d of April, 1792.

“The West Indies, Sir, is the most vulnerable part of our dominions, and being at a distance and having no interest in Parliament, is of course, the most likely to become an easy object of prey to artful and designing men. However, Mr Chairman, our brethren in those islands being the sons of Britons, and their forefathers having carried across the Atlantic ocean all the rights and privileges that pertain to British subjects, you may rest perfectly satisfied, that they will not tamely submit to being robbed of every thing that is near and dear to them.”



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Those who are well wishers to the slaves, will never coincide in a measure, that will exclude the means of their subsistence. How can Planters feed their negroes properly, when sugar is cheap and provisions scarce? — How can the abolition of the slave-trade be prevented from ruining the West Indies, but by promoting the propagation of the negro-species, by supporting mothers and raising children? and, under the present circumstances, how can this be done? — What will so soon excite insurrection as starvation? Then, while we are aware of this ultimate necessity for a more liberal, though temporary, colonial intercourse with America, let us not drive off the evil to that day when it must happen at any rate, and when the remedy may either be no longer within our power, or not adequate to the relief which the aggravated desperation of the case may require.

The poverty of the Planters *will* produce a famine among the negroes; which *will* be succeeded by revolt, and end in that eventful emancipation and “African sovereignty,” which, though to be purchased by the blood of thousands of our countrymen, relatives, and friends, the author of War in Disguise would teach us to look forward to “with satisfaction rather than

dismay." But, in this view none can join him but the most visionary enthusiasts. For though it may be true and to be lamented, that slavery has been maintained by the blood of thousands in that abominable trade, which is so wisely abolished; yet it is not more necessarily just, than it is expedient or humane, that their emancipation should be effected at the same expence. Nor could their freedom or sovereignty be effected by the destruction of the whole race of white people alone. The effects of such a rebellion would be horrible, even to the poor negroes; for, instead of a happy freedom, the lives of the survivors would be constantly embittered by the losses, sustained in their own contentions, — of fathers, — husbands, — and sons!

"M. Malouet reckons, that during the first ten years of revolt in St Domingo, the negro-population was diminished from 500,000 to 300,000, and that the loss was chiefly in males. — Laborie in 1797 estimated the reduction at much more than one half of the numbers in 1789; Edwards supposes it to have been two-fifths of the same numbers."\*

\* Brougham, v. ii. p. 111.

The view, which the "Inquiry into the state of the Nation" takes of the effects, which would be produced by preventing Americans from carrying home the sugars of the plantation to its proprietor, is founded in "a just and rational policy:" — it will not, indeed, promote the progress of "African freedom and African sovereignty:" on the contrary, it will preserve private property, by affording the proprietor the means of preventing the inducements to insurrection, massacre, and emancipation: it will prevent the discontents of hungry and naked negroes, by feeding and clothing them. Such a policy, in the neighbourhood of our own Colonies, is not only "rational and just," but humanely and wisely generous: for it is a sort of warfare that ill accords with the liberality of the English character, to induce rapine and murder among families and domestics, by the horrors of famine: and it comes most ill from those, whose philanthropy has so lately effected one great event in the affairs of the Colonies, to propose a measure, which can only portend evils more horrible than those, the repetition of which they have laboured twenty years to prevent.

But, if to exclude the Americans from the French Colonies would, in so much, be incon-

sistent with justice and humanity ; how much more unwise to exclude them from our own Colonies, whose inhabitants claim every thing from our humanity in common with the rest of mankind, but, in particular, have a right to demand it as our fellow-subjects, friends, and relatives. It is their misfortune, more than their crime, that they are owners of slaves ; for they are dependent on these slaves for the very subsistence of their families: and, surely, these families are entitled to a proper share of that consideration, from the philanthropic author of " War in Disguise," which ought to suggest to him a due regard to the hunger and nakedness of the masters, as well as of the servants.

The arguments of " War in Disguise" against the American carrying-trade would be cogent enough, if that trade were to be allowed for ever. But, as France will not allow it with her Colonies during peace, because she must encourage her own shipping-interest to promote the re-establishment of her navy ; and as we shall not want it, because all the European markets will be open to our ships ; so it is only necessary during war, and will even injure America at a peace ; for she will then have a great quantity of shipping thrown useless upon her hands.

On the other side, if that third of our West-India produce, which used to be exported, should now not find any market, the planter must necessarily diminish his cultivation, and manufacture less sugar; and, in that event, one third of our West-India ships will be as effectually thrown out of employment, as though we were to allow that third of our sugar, which is usually exported, to be carried by neutrals: and thus a bad effect will be produced, without any opposing good. Besides, that a diminution in the cultivation of sugar would render useless, at a peace, a third of our West-India ships, which otherwise may again be employed in the export-trade, when neutral carriers will be prohibited by the navigation-laws of France as well as England.

I have considered the case as a friend to our manufactories and Colonies, on which our commerce and shipping depend; and not as a "champion of neutral pretentions."\* I do not "contend for the rights of neutral nations to trade with powers at war, whenever and in whatsoever commodities they please;" but I contend, that they are not the cause of the war by which so much of the commerce of

\* War in Disguise.

Europe has been thrown into their hands : — the advantage is theirs, but not the fault ; and we unnecessarily extend this advantage, beyond the neutral, towards our enemy, by excluding the neutral from the same advantages in our ports, which are offered to him in the ports of our enemy : thus unintentionally and blindly benefitting our enemy, and injuring ourselves, from motives of jealousy, not more to him than to our ally.

It is asserted, that the “late vast apparent increase of (neutral) commerce is fictitious ;”\* and that the neutrals, in fact, carry on the trade of our enemies. This is a round assertion ; and, even if it be granted, it may with truth be replied, that it is less dangerous for us, and worse for our enemy, that neutrals should carry on *his* trade, than that he should be able to carry it on *himself*.

To prevent the neutral carrying-trade, we shall, ultimately, even benefit our enemy to injure our ally. We shall enforce *our* navigation-laws on the colonial trade of our *enemy* : but why are they enforced against our *own* ? is it not to encourage the employment of our own ships, and to raise seamen for our navy ?

\* War in Disguise.

Would it not also force our Enemy to employ his own ships and men? and having no navy to protect his fleets, every merchantman would be obliged to be fully manned and armed, in order to make running voyages, in the course of which, they would be often obliged to fight singly; and thus we should teach them, from necessity, to navigate and to fight, and force them to lay the foundation of a future navy. They would thus acquire the *means*, at the same time that they would incur the *necessity*, of a navy.

But the author of "War in Disguise" exults in the *necessity* which enforcing the colonial monopoly would produce, on the part of France, to build ships, raise men, equip fleets, &c. in order to protect the commerce into which she would then be forced! let us not forget, that our own naval greatness owes its origin to this very sort of necessity. Oliver Cromwell, during the common wealth, out of resentment to the Colonists, prohibited neutrals from carrying their produce. Our jealousy of the Americans, who carry the crops of the French Colonies, if we act upon it as we are advised, will produce the same effect on the marine of France. The extraordinary exertions of our enemy have produced wonders, at his command, on shore; and such a necessity may induce him to make gigan-



tic efforts to effect a more rapid re-establishment of an armament at sea, than we may be willing to believe possible. At any rate, to enforce those Laws to the advancement of the navy of our Enemy, which have been so effectually enforced to the advancement of our own, can never terminate in our advantage.

It is also said, \* that, " looking forward to a long protracted war, we must, before the close of it, lose our naval superiority, if the Enemy be allowed to retain, and still continue to improve, his present oppressive advantages." I ask, how can France, by the carrying-trade of America, cause the loss of our naval superiority? France must have seamen to have a navy; but the neutral trade will not give her seamen; on the contrary, it prevents her from raising them, and thereby confirms the inferiority of the French navy, and preserves, instead of endangering, the superiority of our own. But, admitting the fact, that the commerce of our enemy is carried on by the neutrals; " while, in the mean time, he is preparing the means of active maritime enterprises;"† it will avail him but little, to build ships of the line, while he has no fleets of merchantmen from which he can man them.

\* War in Disguise, p. 208.

† War in Disguise.

Nor can I conceive any thing more enfeebling to our Enemies naval power, or more invigorating to our own, than the very state in which our author seems to lament that both are placed; for, though in the mean time, the number of hostile ships "may be augmented;" yet, while they are obliged to be, as our author describes them, "nursed and reserved for a day of trial;" we shall have but little to dread from their raw fresh-water crews, on their suddenly emerging from their nursery, unpractised in maritime manœuvres, and unseasoned in sea fights, when opposed to our gallant tars, who have become invincible from the very cause that our author considers a hardship, viz. because they are constantly "sustaining all the most laborious duties of war."\* The conclusions drawn to our disadvantage, by this author, must be exactly reversed; for, nothing can more promote our present naval superiority, than the very circumstances of which he complains.†

Great stress has been laid upon the injury sustained by our shipping-interests, in the neutral

• War in Disguise.

† Mr Bosanquet has, with much cleverness, exposed the conclusions which this author draws by his "most extraordinary inversion of all political calculation."

*Thoughts on the Value of Colonial Trade.*

carrying-trade, and of the decoy which the neutral service is to our seamen. The fallacious representations of the decrease of shipping has been exposed by the returns of Sir William Young, in his West-India Common-Place-Book.

The ship-owners say, that the planters ought not to complain, for that it is their fault if they produce more sugar than the market can dispose of: forgetting, that if the planters are obliged to limit their cultivation, there will be not only less freight for ships now, but even at peace; as the re-cultivation of abandoned estates is not the work of a day, even in those instances where it is possible at *any* distance of time.

The planters may as well retort upon the ship-owners, that they ought not to build more ships than they can man with British seamen; and then they would not have to complain that the Americans can rival them in the carrying-trade, and navigate cheaper, on account of the high wages which British ships are obliged to pay, to obtain neutral sailors in time of war.

But this complaint of the high expence of our navigation, is, on other occasions, to serve a purpose, contradicted; for our seamen are said to be enticed into the American service by

greater wages than they can get in our own merchantmen. However, it is not true that the Americans give higher wages than is given in British ships. Their wages may be higher than in our ships of war, but so, also, is the pay of our own merchantmen. So far are the Americans from having any want of men, that their wages is much below ours : from eight to twenty dollars is the rate at which they pay, for lads and landsmen up to the skilful and able seaman.

It is a fact, that no ships, that sail the ocean, give such high wages as is given in our merchant-service in time of war. It is to avoid the *confinement* and *discipline* of our ships of war, that British seamen go into neutral employment. To support their families liberally, at a moderate expence, may be another motive ; for mariners are not the only class of people who are driven from British employment : it is to avoid religious intolerance, the burthen of taxes, and the enormously-increased expences of living, that so many thousands, annually, go into an unwilling exile from their native shores.

When, by an unwise and overbearing policy, we drove the North-American Colonists to desperate resistance, which terminated in their sepa-

ration from the parent state, we became reconciled to the event, by finding, that, with the loss of sovereignty, we had not lost our commerce; but, on the contrary, that it has increased; so that we have the profit of a trade without the expence of supporting it. Yet, still it was unreasonable not to count upon those evils which are necessarily opposed to the good of every event.

While the American shipping was a nursery for our navy, we did not feel the evil of its being a refuge and an asylum for our deserters. This is one of the irremediable evils inseparable from the new situation into which we have forced them. And are we to quarrel with the American government, because \* *our subjects* will apply to "The landlords of public-houses for fictitious certificates of naturalization†?" or because they sell them to each other for a "measure of ale or grog;" or erase a name from a true certificate, to insert the name of an English sailor? These things are unavoidable; they will happen always, and every where, as long as there is wickedness in the world.

\* Such causes of war among nations remind me of the high strain of ridicule in which Dean Swift indulges, on such occasions for war, in his *Gulliver*.

† War in Disguise, page 238, N.

While we cry out against our seamen being employed in foreign service, which certainly is an evil at any time, but of most magnitude in time of war; we ought not to forget, that, in time of war also, we are giving great encouragement to the sailors of neutral powers. Let it be asked which is the greatest crime, *that neutrals should employ, in peaceful trade, the subjects of powers at war; or that we should entice, by high wages, the subjects of nations at peace, to enter into our service while at war?*

I do not mean to say, that both are not evils in certain relations; and that as much as we can do, with justice, we ought to do, to remedy the evil which is suffered on our part; but, it is not candid to say, that *we* have the only right to complain of the evil. For each Englishman that is in the American service, there are, in time of war, at least fifty neutrals in the service of Great Britain.

It would, then, be wiser to try to remedy the evil, by humane treatment and more liberal pay: for, while the high wages of our merchant-service entices foreigners into our trading ships, the inferior pay of our navy induces the *malcontents* to prefer the freedom of neutral employment.

When I speak of humane treatment, I should be sorry to be understood as intending, even in the least degree, the relaxation of that discipline on which our naval superiority, especially, in battle, so materially depends; nor would I be understood to impeach the general conduct of our naval commanders. On the contrary, there are many vessels that scarcely ever lose a man by desertion; and whose crews are so rivetted in their affections to their commanders, by their generous, humane, and yet manly treatment of the seamen, that they would make great sacrifices rather than be obliged to leave their ships; and to be *turned* over the side of such a ship would be considered as an indelible blot in the character of a British sailor.

But there are, also, other ships, and I wish the number of them were small, from which the desertions, that are continually taking place, can only be accounted for by the exercise of an unfeeling severity, and indiscriminate despotism. And, when such treatment is added to small pay, and a continual absence from family and friends, who can wonder at desertions, or that the discontented seamen should seek refuge in the asylum of neutral trade? There is, therefore, no necessity to attribute their desertions to any attempts on the part of the Americans, to



debauch our British sailors. It is evident enough, that there is no need to decoy them into the only ships on the ocean in which they can be associated with men of the same origin, the same manners, the same language and religion.

It is more impossible for the American government to prevent such evils, than it is for our own to obviate it, in some degree, by general good treatment, and more liberal pay to our fighting-seamen.

If to quarrel with America could force, or enable, her to prevent the evil complained of, it would, even then, be a matter worthy of serious consideration to calculate, whether the advantage to be gained would more than counterbalance the mischief which we should incur in our Colonies. The advantage to be gained ought to be very great and certain before we risk the occurrence of an evil, the magnitude of which, to the interest and safety of our colonies, and even to the empire, is almost beyond calculation.

But if quarreling with America will only leave us where we began, with the evil as we found it; while the attempt to enforce a remedy will induce convulsions more alarming and fatal than the original complaint, would it not be as bad

as strangling a patient in the attempt to force the intended remedy down his throat?

Of such a nature are our present efforts, in the attempts to support our own navy, by insisting upon the search for Deserters on board the navy of America. She does not dispute with you the right to search either for merchandize or men in her trading vessels. She does not expect of you any of those "concessions" which you have been told would be the "Bane of Britain:" she only requires, that her Flag and Officers shall not be provoked by those insults to which, if our Officers were to submit, we should punish them with disgrace or death. She rightly reasons as though there were a community and equality of national rights: and, while we only search their merchant-ships during war, we act only up to the rights which the law of nations have permitted to belligerent powers over neutrals. But in exercising a power over the armed ships of a nation at peace, which we would not submit to, ourselves, under the same circumstances; and for the exercise of which there is no precedent\*, nor law of nations, to

\* When I say there is no precedent, perhaps it will be recollected, and objected to me by some, that the search for Men in armed ships was enforced against the Dutch, in the tyran-

sanction us, is exercising the right of power, but not the right of justice. Let it be granted, that there are even thousands of Englishmen in American merchant-ships, are there not also thousands of Englishmen on American farms? and yet we do not think of quarrelling for these; nor need we quarrel for our Sailors, as they do not refuse the search of their trading-vessels for them; and what farther advantage ought we to demand, unless it be the exultation of insulting them, because their navy is so insignificant? But the brave and the magnanimous never triumph over the weak!

It cannot be, that our naval superiority is endangered by desertions to their ships of war. Naval discipline is irksome in every Man-of-war. There may be inducements to desert to trading vessels, and we may pursue and punish them there: but there is no inducement, and, there-

nical reign of James the Second; but, surely, none of us can wish to see the tyranny of those times restored, whether to be exercised upon ourselves or our allies. — The despotism of the strong, exercised over the weak, can never amount to a precedent for a right: and reason and justice will not admit of saying more, than that the use of such a power, in the tyrannical reign of James the Second, was equally wrong, though not so inconsistent, as the exercise of such an overstretched power under the more wise and liberal policy of the reign of George the Third. •

fore, there is so little risk of our *good* sailors deserting from *our* navy to any *other* navy, that, in the whole navy of America, which does not consist of more than "a dozen frigates and a score or two of gun-boats," there is not, probably, as many English deserters as they have armed ships\*.

It is complained, that, "because our commanders have successfully enforced the right (the "power" would be a more proper term) of search to recover deserters, they have denied to our ships the common rights of hospitality." This is too absurd. What! if a man should enter forceably into my house, and add insult to intrusion, am I to be accused of a breach of hospitality, if I do not ask him to sit down, and take a glass of wine with me; or refuse it to him, when he would take the liberty of helping himself? And is it not an insult, when a foreigner goes on board a national armed vessel, and *orders* her men to be turned upon deck, to be examined by that foreign officer? Will we allow such a thing to be done on board of our Men-of-war? Cer-

\* And those few consist of rebel Irish, or conditionally-pardoned felons, whose odious characters render their situations so irksome among the more honest fellows who do credit to our ships, that their mutinous dispositions actually make their desertion more desireable than their service.

tainly not! — Then we would use the law of power, and not the law of justice.

But, let us examine a little into the state of our West-India nursery for Seamen, and see how far the American carrying-trade, by being even allowed, in time of war, to diminish the employment of our ships to the amount of one-third, can possibly endanger the superiority of our naval power; and, if it be possible that it do produce such an evil, how far, and by what means the evil can be remedied.

It is stated, that our West-India ships employ about 17,000 Seamen; but, as by the 21st Geo. III. c. 11, merchant-ships are allowed to be navigated by a crew, of which not more than one-fourth need be Englishmen; and, as Men-of-war will press every able English sailor, they can get at, above the number necessary by law for the navigation of the ships; it may be presumed, that on an average, three-fourths of every crew are foreigners. So that, if by *allowing* the American carrying-trade, one-third of our West-India ships were to be laid up for want of employment, the number of truly British seamen less employed, being only one-twelfth of the number employed, would only amount to 1416. — This diminution in our nursery for Sea-

men, is of trifling comparison to the injury which our Colonies would sustain in an attempt to obviate it, as well as to our manufactories; which, by any injury done to our Colonies, would be so affected as to employ less people; which want of employment would check the progress of population, and thereby our army-recruiting service would be also injured.

It is evident, also, that, by allowing the crews of our merchant-ships to consist of three-fourths neutrals in time of war, the greater our commerce, the more sailors we raise for neutrals; as it is a matter of course, that, by employing that number in our ships during war, it encourages that number of young neutrals to become sailors; thereby enabling them to learn British naval tactics, and to man, with greater advantage, Danish, Swedish, and Russian ships of war.

But, if instead of allowing this pernicious means of making Seamen for the neutral navies, which may some day be opposed to us; we were to enforce our navigation-acts, so that instead of three-fourths, only one-half of neutrals should be allowed to sail in our ships; it is evident, that, by that means, one-third more British Seamen would be employed than are now employed,

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even though one-third less ships were to be in the West-India service, than are now in it. Therefore, if our navigation-acts were enforced, in respect of manning our ships with half Englishmen, our navigation-laws might be relaxed in respect of the colonial monopoly; and, instead of injuring our nursery for British seamen, it would be improved; while the navies of the European powers would seriously feel it: for, at present, we certainly very wrongly encourage their navies, by promoting the raising of Seamen for them, in the service of our merchantmen. And thus, also, the great objection which the ship-owners of England pretend to entertain against a more liberal intercourse between our Colonies and America, would not only be obviated, but their clamours having no longer the dangers of our naval superiority for their ostensible object, would be confined to the real ground on which they would run the risk of ruining our Colonies; viz. the partial and temporary inconvenience of their own interest! But, Sir William Young has shewn, that facts do not bear them out in their complaints; and that, to enforce the monopoly of the English carrying-trade, would only serve the ship-owners for one season. "*British-built* schooners, and other small craft of Bermuda," would be wholly employed, navigated by negroes and neutral seamen, so that



neither the English shipping-interest, nor the navy, would be benefitted by enforcing a scheme, that, in the mean time, would ruin the West-India Planter.

But, which is of most consequence to the nation in general, that one-third of the West-India ships, should, *pro tempore*, be otherwise employed, or even laid up, in order that all our Colonies should flourish, our merchants remain whole, and our manufacturers employed; or that the reverse of this should be the effect of our listening to the partial and unfounded\* complaints of a few

\* In July, 1806, in the debates of the House of Commons on the American-Intercourse Bill, it was forcibly urged, "that the carrying-trade being reduced, and, as apprehended, further diminishing from year to year, during a long period of war, it would be difficult, from deficiency of shipping, to resume it on return of peace; as, whilst the old merchant-vessels were falling into decay, and many yet were out of employ, the ship-builders would have no orders, and no vessels be ready, or even on the stocks, preparing to supply their place."

The worthy members for the city of London supported these allegations, by petitions from the ship-owners, stating their heavy losses from ships out of employ: and by others from the ship-builders, representing that their business was on the decline; that for the year 1806 scarcely any orders for building had been received; that the few ships built on speculation, and to retain their workmen, had been sold at a loss, or remained on hand. (Sir W. Young's West-India-Common-Place-Book, p. 248.)

Ship-owners, who consider only their immediate profit, though at the expence of ultimately ruining the Colonies, and in course, with them, the whole, *instead of a part*, of the West-India shipping concerns? the comparison will not bear; and the clamour of those, who seek for popularity from the English enemies of America, as well as from the avowed enemies to the whole system of the West Indies, ought to be exposed.

Let the motives be examined of those who raise this cabal against the relief which the opening of the West-India monopoly during a convenient period would give, and perhaps it may be found, that the author, who saw nothing alarming to our naval superiority, in putting

But this attempt to impose upon the Parliament, in order to support the clamour raised against the temporary opening of the colonial monopoly, is exposed by Sir William Young, who gives us the return which was made to the House of Commons, on June the 24th, 1806, by which it appears, instead of a decrease, "under every consideration, the addition of 28,380 tons of shipping, in 1804—5, or above 14,000 tons by the year, more than was built the year preceeding the war, may be presumed hitherto, to have kept up the compliment of British shipping, and to have preserved the mercantile basis of the British navy, yet unimpaired. So far the public mind may be relieved from anxiety, as to the actual state of this national resource." (Sir W. Young's West-India Common-Place-Book, p. 251.)

out of employ so many African ships, would see nothing alarming in producing the same injury to the West-India shipping-interest, if it favoured the principles upon which he supported the abolition of the slave-trade. Let us look closely enough into the clamour against allowing our Colonists to barter their produce, for the means of liberally supporting their slaves, by a plentiful supply of American provisions, and we may find, that this is only an oblique blow at the Neutrals, intended for the destruction of the Planter.

Are these naval alarmists, those, who felt no alarm of the sort in abolishing the African carrying-trade? if they are, then the ruin of the Colonists would be no matter of regret to them. Is not the author of "War in Disguise," also the author of "the Crisis,"\* and "the Opportunity;"—and, does he not say in the latter publication, that "St Domingo whatever course we take, will one day be mistress of the Western Archipelago;" that "the shocking slavery of our Colonies cannot much longer be maintained is sufficiently certain;" but, "*by a just and rational policy, we might be enabled to look forward to the progress not only of Afri-*

\* Of the sugar Colonies.

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*can freedom, but of AFRICAN SOVEREIGNTY, in the West Indies, with satisfaction rather than dismay*\*"!!! Does the author, who takes this view of our colonial, mercantile and manufacturing interests, hold any personal regard for our Planters, or any consideration for their welfare? or, rather, is it not clear, that he estimates both so far below the value of "African freedom and *African sovereignty*," that he can look forward to their progress "*with satisfaction rather than dismay*." And yet is this Author's alarm-bell to be five times rung in our ears, to put us on our guard against "a War in Disguise," the ostensible object of his work, while the real one is negro *Emancipation*. But it appears to be his opinion, that, even in such an event, our ships would, nevertheless, be employed to bring us the sugars which would be required for our home-consumption. If we concede to him so much of the argument, then, in that case, there would be employed only two-thirds of the ships in the West-India trade, and that third which he now deplors the loss of in the American trade, would still be not employed, and yet he does not threaten us in this case, with any consequent danger neither to the Navy nor the Nation.

\* "The Opportunity," page 42.

Let his naval *insensibility*, when “African freedom and *African sovereignty*” are in the scale, be compared with his naval *apprehensions*, when the prosperity of the slave-owners is proposed by a temporary relief from the Americans; *who*, by the way, *as slave-owners*, he equally abominates. When his feelings are thus brought to the balance, the preponderating scale exhibits the partiality; and it is plainly perceivable, that his objections to the carrying-trade of the Americans, while they are apparently dictated by a commercial jealousy, and a political tenacity of our naval superiority, are as strongly prompted by a contempt for that government, which, while ostentatiously boasting of freedom, maintains absolute slavery among its inhabitants; as by that secret satisfaction, which the present state of the West Indies affords to those who look forward with pleasure, to the progress of negro emancipation and *negro dominion*. For, if the impending ruin, which at present threatens the Planter, be allowed to fall on him, by an obstinate refusal to open the monopoly, out of spite to the Americans; who can doubt, that it will hasten the progress of these events? what is so likely to excite insurrection, and the consequent assertion of “African freedom,” as the state to which the Planter will be soon reduced?—a total want of the means of feeding and clo-

thing the slaves, by whose labor alone he is enabled to feed his own family.

When the negroes shall find their masters no longer able to support them, self-preservation justifies them in adopting the means of supporting themselves: and, as to what means, and how to adapt them to their situation, they are not at a loss, with the example of St Domingo before their eyes! then will arrive that eventful period in the West Indies, to which our author, by his "just and rational policy," would teach you "to look forward with satisfaction rather than dismay." Then, indeed, will our author's prophecy, too soon become verified!--for under such circumstances, we may assert in his own words, it "is sufficiently certain, our Colonies cannot much longer be maintained," and "St Domingo will, one day, be mistress of the western Archipelago!"

To this state of colonial distress, I cannot look forward but with extreme horror and dismay, instead of satisfaction: notwithstanding which, I confidently assert, our author himself does not more lament than I do, that Great Britain ever allowed a state of slavery to exist under her government; nor can he rejoice more at the



abolition of that trafic for slaves, which was so wicked and abominable in all its stages. But every rational mind must dread the evils and tremendous excesses which are the concomitants of great revolutions among mankind; however much we should rejoice to see so many millions of our fellow-creatures emerge from the gloom of despotism, to assume their proper rank among the nations of the earth, were it possible to effect it, without violating the laws of nature, or injuring, among other men, the rights of society.

The sentiments of Mr. Lowe are so accordant with mine, that I can scarcely express myself in language different from his own. With him I can honestly declare, that I have "no personal interest in the cause which I plead." — I am neither Merchant, American, nor Planter. I have none of the views which may be attributed to those persons whose hardships I would recommend for relief. I, also, "join my individual voice to the national approbation of the abolition of the slave-trade:" but, as "it is one thing to annihilate this odious traffic, and another to deny the industrious Planter the reward of his labour," so it is also one thing to clip the wings of a rival commercial State, and another



to ruin our whole colonial interests, in order to  
 "forward the progress of African freedom and  
*African sovereignty* \*."

It may appear too harsh to assume, as a fact, that this author is influenced by such motives *alone*; and his reputation for humanity should encourage the presumption, that, as he ought not, he does not desire to see the events described. On the contrary, that he too would feel horror and dismay at an emancipation to be accomplished by such a calamitous state of poverty and want, as must shortly exist, if the principles he proposes be too promptly put in practice. But, while we give him credit for his sincerity in favor of "African freedom and *African sovereignty*," if we are, also, to give him equal credit for humanity towards the Planters, in the means by which he would effect it; how is it reconcileable to reason, that a man possessing such mental powers should not readily perceive, that, by refusing, under the present state of the West-Indies, to relax the monopoly, we shall produce events that will hurry on the slaves to a sudden attempt at emancipation, which must inevitably involve the plantations in all the horrible devastations and crimes of St. Domingo. And such are the

\* "The Opportunity, page 42."

events with which he threatens us, in his "Opportunity," unless we form an alliance with the negroes of that island. Events which, in his own words, are described as "dreadful indeed in their effects upon individuals, and pernicious to the nation at large."

But, whatever may be the justification, which he may think himself morally and religiously capable of offering, in support of the extensive and bold means by which he would accomplish the favorite object of his high enthusiasm, we must neither suffer ourselves to be carried along with him, nor even tacitly stand by and see him hasten the progress of such a tremendous revolution. We must rather endeavour to remove the medium through which he sees the object so falsely; or, at least, so to place it before those who see with their own eyes, that they may no longer be so wrongly affected by his fallacious views.

The ingenious construction of his positions, his elegant declamation, and finely-finished periods, are dangerous illusions to those readers, who rather seek the gratification of their literary passion, than to judge impartially between contending interests. To analyse the composition of such palatable, but poisonous, preparations for the

public taste, is a task of delicacy, when we hold the knowledge and abilities of the composer in high estimation, and equally respect him for his moral virtues; among which his philanthropy is said to be pre-eminent. But, however we may esteem his heart, we cannot but wonder at, and warn our readers against, the wrong direction that his powerful mind has given to a train of arguments, which, if any farther acted upon in the political economy of our Colonies, must sink them, irrecoverably, in the chaos of negro-revolutions.

But, he is not, at the same time, the only prophet in West-India-revolutions. Mr. Brougham, whose knowledge of colonial policy is so extensive, as well as profound, says\*, "that the negroes are truly the Jacobins of the West; they are the anarchists; the terrorists; the domestic enemy: against them it becomes rival nations to combine, and hostile governments to coalesce." And, that, "of all civil wars it (a colonial one) is, perhaps, the most to be looked for †." Nor will they be denied, from mercenary men, every means of effecting their freedom and sovereignty. For, although the government of America anticipated us in the abolition of the slave-trade; yet, on the earliest notice of insur-

\* Vol. II. p. 311.

† Vol. I. p. 104.

rection in any of our Colonies, there are wretches among the American merchants who will be induced by the expectation of enormous profits, as they were in the revolutionizing armament of MIRANDA against the Spaniards, to send out, to the revolted negroes, ample supplies of arms and ammunition; for which they will be paid in the produce to be seized on the estates of the Planters; who will be murdered, in order thus to obtain the means of trading for such articles, as well as the provisions with which they will be supplied from the same hands.

The author of "War in Disguise" will not, on this point, urge his reliance on the honor, justice, and humanity, of the Americans, as he does when he urges that they will not confiscate the property of British creditors in the event of a war: for he knows the American traders would supply the revolted negroes, because he knows they did supply "the illustrious Tous-saint \*," and his people of St Domingo, with warlike stores: and in his arguments before the Right Honourable Court of Appeal, instead of considering such assistance, on the part of the Americans, as either unjust, cruel, or dishonorable, he virtually recommended the encouragement of

\* Opportunity, p. 41.

it, by arguing for the repeal of the sentence of condemnation, and a restoration of such contraband property to the American owner. It is true, he recommended it as a measure of policy, and very plausibly represented "that the negroes of St. Domingo are in a totally-new political character; being neither our allies, our enemies, nor neutrals; but that, as they are the enemies of our enemy, it might be good policy to allow our American allies to assist them to annoy that Enemy." Their Lordships, very wisely, rejected such dangerous sophistications by confirming the condemnation of these warlike stores.

But, after such a perversion of the principles of policy, to serve the favorite scheme of supporting the "freedom and *sovereignty*" of the negroes of St. Domingo, what faith can we have in the purity of the policy recommended in that specious publication which professes to expose a "War in Disguise?" When a trading people are carrying only *provisions* to barter for the produce of the Planters, the jealousy of our merchants is roused by the threatened annihilation of our commerce; and a whole nation, whose highest pride is the superiority of its navy, is thrown into alarm at the dangers that await the country in the insidious designs, which even our

Allies are accused of contriving to sap the foundation of our maritime greatness. But, when the "freedom and sovereignty" of the negroes of a revolted colony are to be supported, then the same allies may, with impunity, be allowed not only to carry innocent articles of merchandize, but even every thing that is ordinarily deemed the most contraband, such as warlike stores of the most dangerous description; and no injuries are to be apprehended from such an unprecedented licence in neutral trade!

Can there be any thing more insulting to common sense, than to propose, as good policy, such glaring political inconsistencies? What! will this revolutionizing centre of attraction have no influence on the surrounding bodies of negro people? What will so effectually extend the revolutionary spirit to our own Colonies, as allowing the neutral powers to assist in confirming, within sight of our own slaves, the "freedom and sovereignty" of the slaves of St Domingo? And will the loss of our Colonies not endanger our commerce, and thereby our navy?

I assert, there is nothing that will so certainly bring on the destruction of our own plantations, as the measures which the author

of "War in Disguise" has recommended. Listen to him and adopt his advice, all ye, who can "look forward to the progress of African freedom and *African sovereignty* with satisfaction rather than dismay." Prevent Americans from bartering their provisions for West-India produce, and allow them, at the same time, to carry arms and ammunition to the revolted negroes of St Domingo, and you will soon have an "opportunity" to rejoice in the *Emancipation* of the whole negro-race. Suffer the people of St Domingo, by the assistance of mercenary merchants, to establish a depôt of military stores, and it is all that is wanted to fulfil the prophecy of the "Opportunity:" for it will confirm *the sovereignty* of the negro-nations over the whole western Archipelago. The people of St Domingo *must* look forward to a peace in Europe, as another period for the renewal of attempts at their subjugation. They well know, that against them it is the interest of "rival nations to combine, and hostile governments to coalesce;" that the only prospect for the confirmation of their own freedom is in promoting the *Emancipation* of their fellow-creatures, from the yoke of every European power; and when, by the proposed prohibition of the American provisions, famine shall excite discontent, then will they seize the opportunity to avert the dangers



of a coalition against themselves, by distributing among the discontented negroes in the neighbourhood, the arms and ammunition with which they would be furnished by the Americans; whom, in the mean time we would condemn, for carrying the sugars of the white Planter.

The description of the consequences of such a policy, is given in terms so true and touching, that it would be an injustice to my argument not to quote it.

“ \* It is indeed no common fate to which European settlements in the Charaibean sea will be left, if their parent-states desert them by suffering the French negroes to triumph in St Domingo. “ It is not to the peaceable yoke of some civilised nation nor the quiet transference of dominion by treaty or conquest, nor the miseries of long-contested invasion by regular troops, nor the hardships of blockade and famine, nor even to the anarchy of jacobin law. The worst of these calamities, which may be dreaded from the preponderance of France in the colonial system, is nothing compared with the warfare of the African labourers. Hordes of blood-thirsty

\* Colonial Policy of the European Powers, Vol. ii. page 308.

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savages, intimately acquainted with every corner of the Planter's house, every retreat into which his family may be driven, every crevice in the whole country; mad with unnatural rage against all that deviates from the sable hue of their own ferocious brethren; pouring over each spot where European life exists; scattering on all sides, not destruction, for that would be mildness, but every exquisite form of ingenious torment; only stopping, in moments of satiety to lay aside the sword for the torch, and, in the intervals of mercy alone, exchanging torture for murder; marching against the parent with the transfixed body of his butchered infant as a standard; sacrificing the weaker sex to their brutal lust, amidst the expiring bodies of husbands and kinsmen; and enacting other deeds of such complicated horror, that it is not permitted to the pen of a European to describe or to name them. — These are a few features of the picture which wretched eye-witnesses have given us of negro warfare; and it is to scenes like these that we shall inevitably expose thousands of our countrymen, if we sacrifice the security of the Europeans to gratify either a foolish jealousy of our rivals in the West-Indian commonwealth\*, or a still less excusable tender-

\* Edwards's History of St Domingo, chap. vii.

ness for the barbarians who have unhappily been poured into the French islands.

“With the greatest sympathy, then, for the unmerited sufferings of the unfortunate negroes; with unmingled detestation of the odious traffic to which they owe all their wrongs, and the West-Indian Colonies their chief dangers; the consistent friend of humanity may be permitted to feel some tenderness for his European brethren, although they are white and civilized, and to deprecate that inconsistent spirit of canting philanthropy, which in Europe is only excited by the injuries or miseries of the poor and the profligate, and, on the other side of the Atlantic, is never warmed but towards the Savage, the Mulatto, and the Slave.”

Were it even possible to pass over, without reflection, the dreadful means by which revolutions are accomplished, or accompanied, surely we should not neglect to consider what would be the effects, upon our own national interests, of the political phenomenon of *negro sovereignty* in the West-Indies.

The commerce which we hold with the West-Indian Colonies is of the most valuable kind to Great Britain, because “it replaces two

capitals \* ; the trade is domestic ; both ends are British †." But, if that policy which has been so strongly recommended as "just and rational ‡," were to place the Colonies of Great Britain under "*African sovereignty*," they would no longer be obliged to continue that commerce with us which is equal in its advantages to our "land and domestic trade;" for they would receive from the Continent of Europe, French, German, and other manufactures, together with American provisions, in exchange for their colonial produce ; and Britain would only supply what could not be obtained to greater advantage from other nations. What, then, would become of our manufactures, our population, our commercial and shipping interests, and our navy ? — All — all would decline, and with them the wealth and the power of great Britain !

If it be replied, that all this was threatened by the separation of North America from the

\* Vide Brougham's Colonial Policy, Vol. i. pages 149 and 168, for much accurate reasoning and knowledge upon this subject.

† Also Bosanquet's Thoughts on Colonial Trade.

‡ "The Opportunity," by the Author of "the Crisis of the Sugar Colonies."

mother-country ; and that, instead of any decrease in our commerce with those Colonies, it has, on the contrary, increased ; I say, though our commerce has increased, yet it is no proof that we are not losers, in comparison with what our commerce would have been, at this day, had not the separation taken place. But, in no degree will the comparison hold between the independence of our Countrymen, and commercial connexions, in the American colonies, and the “ freedom and *sovereignty*” of the Africans in the West Indies.

Although the political convulsion in North America *did* rend and tear asunder the political connexion of those Colonies with the Parent State ; yet, the children of both having one common origin, the same language, the same religion, the same habits, the same commercial, and, to a great extent, even domestic connexions ; it is easy to understand, that when once the political disputes were settled, the old intercourse of the trading-people would be renewed ; which, though violently, had been involuntarily interrupted ; and, that the old commercial connexions would be generally preferred to those which must otherwise be commenced with strangers, in another language, and under the difference of new usages and habits,

But upon what can we calculate of this sort with the African freemen and *African sovereigns* whom some persons so much desire to see in possession of our Colonies, as separate and independent states? There will not be, between us and them, any of those ancient and common ties of attachment. On the contrary, we rejoice that we are different from them in our origin, our religion, our habits, education, and language; while these poor wretches, in their freedom and *sovereignty*, would recollect nothing but the difference between despotism and slavery; and, instead of coalescing with their former masters in the mutual benefits of commercial intercourse, would prefer such a connexion with every nation upon earth, to a connexion with those from whom they would apprehend only an inward and unrelenting hatred: for such is the disposition which *they* would expect us to entertain towards them; whilst *they* would look back, with horrible remembrance, at the state from which they had emerged at the expence of blood and desolation; and would throw every advantage of trade, which their productions and want of manufactures could afford, into the hands of any power most likely to protect them against the restoration of *our* government, whose re-establishment they would never cease to apprehend as their greatest calamity.

Is not this exactly the case with the people of St Domingo at this moment? Is there any thing they so much dread as the power of *their* mother-country? Is there any thing to which they have so much repugnance as an intercourse with Frenchmen? Do not the publications called the "Crisis" and the "Opportunity" enforce, by arguments upon this principle, the advantages of protecting, and even of forming an alliance with, the negro-sovereignty of St Domingo? Nor can it be doubted, that the repugnance which those people feel towards their former masters, and which it has been proposed to encourage, would be as naturally felt by our negroes, and as readily encouraged and supported by our Enemy.

But it does not follow, even *if we can* derive any advantages from a commercial intercourse and alliance with the negro-government of St Domingo; or from the policy of encouraging negro-freedom, and supporting *negro-sovereignty*, against our Enemy; that we should derive equal advantages from "African freedom and African sovereignty" in our own Colonies. On the contrary, our Enemy would derive, from these new Negro-sovereigns, the very advantages, which are so erroneously promised to us, in the



dangerous expedient of such an alliance with St Domingo.

I call it a *dangerous* expedient ; for there is cunning and intelligence enough among English slaves to discern, that our enemies will be as much benefitted by a negro-revolution in our Colonies ; and, therefore, that they will be as ready to aid and assist them, as we have been to aid and assist the revolutionists of St Domingo : nor will they fail to calculate upon the political revenge which our enemies will desire to gratify upon us, for the encouragement which we have given to their revolted slaves.

But, to those who propose an alliance with the *black Sovereigns* of St Domingo, there appears no evil in all this ! In their arguments against the African carrying-trade, they saw no diminution to our naval nursery : in the loss of our Colonies, they see no loss of our commerce : in their objections\* to a free assembly in colonial governments, they do not see the enslaving of their own countrymen ; and, in the *freedom* of the Slave, they are blind to the *murder* of the Master.

\* " The Crisis of the Sugar Colonies."

Such are the delirious views of these visionary Philanthropists, that, when they balance the *emancipation* of the ill-treated negroes against the fate of the unfortunate Planter, they shut the account of sin without allowing the means of expiation; they hurry on death before repentance; and crying aloud for justice, they become forgetful of mercy!

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If it can be an object worthy of our attention to affect the neighbouring islands, it is an additional reason for relaxing our navigating monopoly; for, while it will relieve our own Colonies, it will depress the sale of produce in the others, lessen the supply of provisions to them, and, in a great measure, throw them into the very state of distress which our own now suffer, without so completely effecting their ruin, as to force France to make any extraordinary efforts to navigate and trade on her own account.

We ought, certainly, to turn the carrying-trade of America to our advantage, by letting them carry all the sugars we do not consume, and are not allowed to carry to the continent of Europe. By this means we shall the most effectually injure our Enemy: — it would be fighting him with his own weapons, instead of promoting the

prosperous state of his Colonies, by driving the Americans into his ports, in excluding them, to a certain degree, from our own. By this exclusion *they* are not injured, because the Enemy can give them as much produce as they want. We only injure ourselves by it, while we benefit our Enemy. But if we would, for a certain time and to a certain degree, open the monopoly, by which *we alone* are injured, the Americans would bring us cheaply all we want; and, in return, take the produce which we cannot now get rid of. As we are the masters of the seas, they would naturally prefer our ports to the French and Spanish ports; for, instead of being interrupted in their voyages, often detained, and sometimes condemned by us, for carrying enemies property; receiving the produce in our ports, they would not only be safe from our Cruisers, but would be protected by them from every other power.

It may be impolitic to allow Americans to carry enemies property, but it would be also unjust not to allow them to carry a return-cargo equal to their outward-cargo of provisions. No return for any thing *not the produce of America* need be allowed. This rule, rigidly observed, would prohibit the carrying of the French or other European manufactures, wines, &c.; which would be a heavy blow to the commerce of

France, and the markets for European manufactures, without affording cause of complaint to the Americans; for they would, even then, be allowed a greater trade in time of war than either England or France would permit in time of peace.

But it is a question worthy of serious consideration, how far a rigid observance of such a rule may be politic, with respect to manufactures that are not contraband; since we must expect it to be retaliated upon us, with justice, by every manufacturing nation, whether they are disposed to be our enemies, or are only forced to such a temporary measure, by the common Tyrant of Europe. For, certainly, we cannot expect that neutrals will be allowed to carry *our* manufactures, when we prohibit them from carrying those of *other* nations. That such a means of exporting our goods is necessary to our prosperity in time of war; and, therefore, that a certain degree of relaxation in the monopoly of the carrying-trade is beneficial, instead of injurious to Great Britain, and always has been allowed, instead of being an innovation; is candidly stated by Sir William Young: who says, "it is indispensable to the fair competition and sale of British produce and manufactures, that they should pass to the foreign market clear of

those surcharges of freight, insurance, convoys, and demurrage, which in times of war, are necessarily imposed on cargoes conveyed by British ships; and, that in case of naval warfare, a proportion of the carrying-trade hath *usually* passed over to neutral bottoms, as a *temporary* resource of commercial *economy*, and therewith of national interest \*."

If, instead of turning the neutral carrying-trade to our advantage as a piece of commercial economy in the saving of war-freights, war-insurance, war-wages, &c. and in getting a market for our surplus sugars, which now lying on hand ruin the Colonists and all persons concerned with them: if instead of converting this trade to our advantage, and drawing them off in part, from affording advantages to our enemy alone, we are to consider the Neutrals in wartime as our enemies in disguise; then we had better at once make a peace with France, and thereby turn these Neutrals out of their trade, and restore the colonial monopoly to its ancient state.

If our object be to punish the Neutrals, a peace would punish them without injuring ourselves: but a war with them, would in-

\* West-India Common-Place-Book, page 246.

jure us, more than it would injure them. A war with America might distress our French enemies, by preventing their supplies of provisions, and the sale of their colonial produce; and the capture of Enemies vessels, and American cargoes, would certainly enrich some of our Cruisers, but it would afford no immediate relief to our Colonies while all the markets of Europe are shut against our sugars. In the mean time, the sudden exclusion of American provisions from our plantations before other means of supplying them could be devised, would involve them in immediate ruin at the very moment they are crying aloud for immediate relief.

It is in vain to talk of our islands being supplied with American provisions through the markets of the neutral islands;\* viz. the Danes and the Swedes; it is evident that they would be captured, to whatever port they might be bound; and thus a stop would soon be put to that channel. But, what neutral port shall we now hear of as a medium through which to obtain such supplies? the Danes are no longer neutral, and the Swedes are actively at war. The ports of both these powers would be shut

\* War in Disguise, p. 249.

under the present politics of Europe. There can be no neutrality among the European powers ; so that no comparison can be made between a war with America in this day, and the effects of the war in which they were once opposed to us.

By some it is asserted, and by others it is denied, that the provision carrying-trade can be effectually prevented.\* If it be asserted that no declaration of blockade, nor even a war with America can prevent the smuggling directly or circuitously, which the high prices will encourage ; then the blockade, or the war, will be an odious, without being a beneficial, measure. If, on the contrary, Neutrals can be excluded ; then famine, and all the horrors in its train, will succeed, and produce the direful effects before described. But whether we can exclude Neutrals, or cannot exclude them, by enforcing the colonial monopoly ; or, by going to war with America exclude her from the colonial and European ports also ; we shall, in either way, completely answer the views of Buonaparte ;

\* " It will be found, that a constant and effectual blockade of them, is impracticable." — " To keep even the Windward Islands completely blockaded, is impossible."

*Concessions to America, p. 41.*



as we shall thereby most effectually do for him, what all his ingenuity and power have been hitherto ineffectually exerted to accomplish. We shall, ourselves, exclude our own produce and manufactures from the ports of both the continents; and then his plan of ruining our commerce will only want the destruction of our Colonies to render it perfect.

But a war with America would not shorten our war with France. The ambitious schemes of Buonaparte will never be interrupted by the want of sugar to sweeten coffee. His resources for carrying on war do not depend on Guadeloupe and Martinique; and the prosperity of those islands, if on that he depended, would be more injured by counteracting their sales of produce to the Americans, in the admission of them to a sugar-market in our islands, than by any attempts to exclude sugars from the ports of Europe.

Those who urge the advantages of war with America, in preference to the permission of a relaxation of the colonial monopoly, endeavour to lessen the amount of the evils which may be the consequence of such a war, in order to dissipate the fears of the commercial people concerned with that country.

But, in calculating the evils of a war with America, it would be the extreme of folly to rely upon the safety of the property of our Merchants who are in that country, or in this, from any notions which the credulous may be encouraged to entertain of the wisdom, the honor, or the justice, that the people of America would observe, towards their British creditors, upon the breaking out of hostilities with them.

However "opprobrious\* a measure" the confiscation of British property would be; however "subversive of all future faith and confidence between herself and the merchants of Europe;" or, however much it would "stain her character, and materially retard the growth of her commercial interests, in every part of the globe;" we have no more reason to conclude that she would hesitate to seize upon, and confiscate, every thing that is British, than that Denmark would do it, who so lately not only confiscated all British property, but also arrested the persons, of every British subject or agent.

If we attack America, we force her into a confederacy with France, which will open to

\* War in Disguise, page 216.

Buonaparte the door of the American councils; where he will not neglect to inspire them, with all his energies, to the performance of those strong and mischievous measures, in the imagining of which, his mind is as fertile, as his direction of them, in general, is prompt and decisive.

We ought, therefore, rather to calculate upon the certain confiscation of British property, and the consequent ruin of the merchants trading to America. Nor would the immense "property under the American flag, which would be then exposed to our hostilities in every part of the world,"\* save either the Planters or Merchants from ruin; which is the end we ought to fight for. The crews and agents of our public and private ships of war, with a few speculators in prize-ships and cargoes, would at first benefit by the politics which they would therefore willingly provoke; while they would look around with exultation on the extensive ruins, from which they would collect the materials to lay the foundation of individual opulence, in the midst of the destruction of Planters, Merchants, and Manufacturers.

\* War in Disguise, p. 217.

Nothing can more clearly prove the fallacious principles upon which the author of "War in Disguise" has made his calculations, than the erroneous notions he had formed of the dispositions of the Americans, to succumb, from avaricious motives, to any thing that threatens them; and that they would smother every warlike feeling, rather than incur the inconveniences of war.\*

Since the affair of the Chesapeake, it is evident, that neither "the commerce," nor "the interior state of the country," would prevent them from engaging in a war with England, should the other circumstances of their situation require it.

If, then, a war with America be an event from which the benefits that may be derived are not as certain as they ought to be great before we should venture upon it, it would be madness to adopt the measures which are recommended, upon the vain presumption, that America is too prudent, or avaricious, to venture upon hostilities.

There is no doubt that America is very repugnant to a war with Great Britain. She has

\* War in Disguise, p. 218.

abundant cause for such a repugnance. She has no Navy: and it is her best policy, at present, not to have a Navy. She has Seamen, it is true; but her situation with a Navy would be very different to what it is now, as it relates to the other Powers of the world. At present she is in amity with all the world. She supplies every nation with provisions, &c.—She is useful to all, and ought not to be an object of jealousy to any. But if she had a Navy she would be watched with a suspicious eye by every maritime Power. Her costly armaments would involve her in debt only to add ships of the line to our fleets whenever we should quarrel with her. Her merchantmen, that now sail singly and safely all over the world, would fall into our hands by fleets.

We should then have inducements to quarrel with her, to put down her Navy, to prevent her rising greatness on the ocean, and to hinder her fleets from coalescing with our Enemies. What would she benefit, and how much would she not lose, by a Navy? — She would be involved in European wars, which would be ruinous to her as an infant nation: while, on the contrary, in the present state of her naval power, she enjoys a peace she never could command, and holds a commercial intercourse with every trading

country in the world, instead of being confined to the hazardous trade of our Enemies alone: for, during war, she would be excluded from the ports of our allies as well as our own; and her trade with our Enemies would be interrupted in every direction. It will be our fault if she should ever have a powerful navy. The very attempt to build ships of the line ought to be a cause for a declaration of war.

It is, therefore, more to her advantage that she should have no navy at present, in order that she may continue to rise as a commercial and agricultural nation\*.

\* As nations in every age have had their ambitious propensities, America, without interfering with Europe, or requiring fleets, may, and no doubt will, gratify her natural ambition by carrying conquest into South America. No power on earth can so easily accomplish the conquest of South America, and the emancipation of its miserable inhabitants. Mexico, Chili, and Peru, will, probably, belong ultimately to the government of the United States; while the Isthmus of Panama may form the boundary between those and the provinces which we may emancipate to the southward and the east: for, an opening to that part of the continent will be as convenient to our Colonies, and as desirable for the commerce of the parent state, as the more distant and western Spanish provinces would be to the North Americans.

But, having now no navy, why should we presume that she can wish to go to war with us from any thing that has occurred in her present situation? — Yet, what evils are there that human nature may not be induced to bear, rather than to suffer insult and injustice? Death is often preferred to disgrace. Let us not, then, drive them to a state of desperation; for though they cannot equal us in the contest, we must share with them its evils. How should we be gainers upon such terms, even putting justice out of consideration. We may bully America into a war by our insults; but she must wish to avoid it, as an event which would be very contrary to her interests. What would become of her ships when they would be no longer allowed to navigate the ocean? What would become of her warlike manufactories and her farmers, when no longer allowed to export her warlike stores and her provisions? It is true, then, that she would suffer, though not so much as ourselves. The shutting of her ports would, in a great measure, have the same effect on us, as though our Enemy were to blockade our own ports. We should neither get provisions for our own use, nor employment for our manufacturing people, who would thus have two causes of starvation at once; want of money, and dearness of food.





The injuries the Americans would receive would not lighten our own ; and, therefore, would be a childish ground on which to reconcile the evils of a war with them.

The reciprocity of mischievous consequences ought to beget mutual efforts to preserve peace ; for if, on both sides, the evils are calculated which will be produced to each ; and if the disposition to war, in both, will be in proportion to the evils each will sustain ; then, there must be inducements to war on both sides ; because both parties must be greatly injured. It is in vain, therefore, on such principles, for either country to calculate on peace, from the repugnance to war which, it is supposed, its evils will beget in the opponents.




Yet on such vague principles do some men found the recommendation of their plans : while, from the other \* publications of the day, which are contrived to promote their own sale at the expence of reason, truth, and peace, as the the purchase-money of popularity, we have continually dinned in our ears the expressions " recently contraband, — extensive and destruc-

\* " The Crisis, by the Author of Plain Facts."





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tive commerce, — ancient and acknowledged rights, — ascendancy of the British trident\*,” &c.

What is all this jargon? examine it, make the most of it, even in the pages where it is worked up with merely mechanically-connecting sentences; and where it is not found to be an unmeaning *farrago*, we shall find that national mischief is risked for literary fame or profit: while “War in Disguise” is continually extolled as a political oracle, and is so received by all those, who, like them that extol it, are ignorant of the situation and true interests of the Colonies; or who, if they do not think of the evils which are suffered there as dreams, or imaginary tales, do worse; they think of them as trifles when in comparison of “*negro-sovereignty*,” even though that would be destructive of the very ends which they intend to promote.

Every thing is alledged, which ingenuity can suggest, or suspicion lead to, in order to enrage the public against Americans, as well as West-Indians. “False Bills of lading and false oaths” are said to be commonly made. No doubt, they *are sometimes* had recourse to under neutral flags.

\* The Crisis,” by the Author of “Plain Facts.”

Certainly where these are detected they justify condemnation. But what can we argue from the cases in which they are, to the cases in which they are not detected? Are we thence to conclude, that all neutral bills of lading and neutral oaths are false? As well draw the same conclusion in the transactions of our own custom-houses; where, it is beyond doubt, there are sometimes false oaths taken, and false manifests received. But this would be straining the argument beyond all reason, and delicacy, and justice. Because it is sometimes the case, that a perjured evidence is detected in the Court of King's Bench, are we therefore always to conclude, or even to suspect, that every oath taken there is also an act of perjury? Would not this end in the rejection of all evidence, and the subversion of all justice? and so it is in the commercial case. But as the one must be received unless contradicted by facts; so the other must not be so cruelly stamped with universal falshood, as these writers would represent to be the case.

Lamentable, indeed, would be our situation, if in ours, as was the case in some ancient governments, the measures to be pursued in the preservation of the state were to depend on the

voice of the multitude: for under such an influence as the extravagant language, and wild speculations of our pecuniary, and even philanthropic pamphleteers, would produce upon the public mind, political madness would distract the state; while, now, the calmness of reason, and deliberations of experience, prevent the evils, and promote the goods, which present themselves to the minds of a few Individuals who are entrusted with the reigns of government; and who, it is to be hoped, will not suffer themselves to be affected by the senseless clamour of popular prejudice, to overlook, in a pitiful jealousy of a weak, defenseless, and trading power, the most serious interests of the country, as connected with the present dangers of the colonies, and the commerce and manufactures dependent thereon.

What can we call those\* propositions, but extravagant and absurd, which "would not suffer a neutral bark to float upon the seas;" or that would "compel France to contribute to the support of our maritime strength," by preventing her from acquiring every thing she wants, "till a duty had been levied on it in some British port."

\* "The Crisis, by the Author of Plain Facts."



Owen Glendower could "call spirits from the vasty deep;" but "would they come?"

It is easy to talk of doing what is proposed to be done with neutrals and with Buonaparte: but, to propose and to perform are vastly different.

Some of these publications have recourse to the most dangerous sophistications, to reconcile the expediency of repelling wickedness by wickedness, under the plausible pretext that "the ravages of this cruel spoiler are only to be resisted by the weapons which he himself employs:" and, that "what in him is the basest and most wanton depravity, is reduced in us to nothing more than justifiable retaliation \*."

Merciful God! forgive the man, and correct his heart, who can wish to involve our country in the imitation of those crimes which have already been made the scourge of our guilt! May we be deaf to those devilish delusions, which will only plunge us deeper and deeper by such vain attempts to extricate ourselves!

In every publication, by the author of "War in Disguise," an antipathy to the Colonies is

• "The Crisis, by the Author of Plain Facts."

every where most anxiously fomented. In one place they are nothing but a military grave:— in another, a source of expence without profit. — He states our army to be exhausted in the West Indies, almost faster than it can be recruited.\* Even under the cloak of arguing in favor of young recruits, he points the dagger at the Colonist. — He says, “the British army, from its fatal employment in the West Indies, has, alas! not much longevity.” From my own local knowledge, I must subscribe to the protest of Mr Bosanquet, who has, with much spirit and truth, repelled these insinuations;† as well as those relating to the unprofitableness of the Colonies.

\* Dangers of the Country, p. 7.

† “I do again protest against the injustice of imputing to the Colonies, the sacrifice of British troops and treasure, in the various expeditions which have been fitted out for conquest. Was any benefit intended to the British Planter from the expedition under Sir Charles Grey, or that under Sir Ralph Abercrombie? Were not Granada and St Vincent sacrificed to foreign conquest; and have not the British Colonies been long smarting under the effects of this grasping system? It is sufficiently humiliating to receive injury at the hand of a friend; but to be accused of inflicting on others the wounds under which ourselves are sinking, surpasses human patience.”

*Bosanquet on the Value of Colonial Trade, p. 70.*

The value of our American commercial connexions has never been denied; but it is evident, that our own colonial commerce is still more valuable, because it will be continual; while, with America, it may be interrupted by war, or by their ultimately establishing manufactories of their own: which they may, too soon for our advantage, be obliged to do; for besides the want of our manufactures, the want of a market for their raw materials, will induce them to work up their own cotton, &c. into manufactures for their own use. This we ought to calculate upon as a natural event, if we go to war with them, or otherwise exclude them from the ports of Europe: but unless we force them into such a measure, prematurely, it is probably at a great distance.

For, although manufacturers are continually emigrating to America, they soon find it more advantageous to obtain lands, and cultivate them. Where labour is dear, and provisions are cheap, a great proportion of the earnings of daily labor may be saved: which, accumulating, affords the means of purchasing lands: and, in a country like America, where the territory is immense, and the distant lands from one half, to a dollar per acre, the daily savings of one year's labor, will make a labourer a

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*Colonial Trade, p. 70.*

freeholder of a hundred acres of land. Under such circumstances, although more labourers are imported every year, there are as many leaving the labor of servitude, for that of freedom: so that labor is never lowered by the arrival of more laborers; and, although the population of America doubles in twenty-five years, yet, as cultivated land is every year increasing and produces more food than is required to feed the number of people which its cultivation employs; so provisions, in such a country, instead of becoming dearer in proportion to its increasing population, will become cheaper in proportion to its increasing cultivation: and this must continue to be the case with America for ages to come; although the period *may* be *calculated*, however extensive may be its territorial boundaries.

Thus, agriculture is preferred to manufacturing in America; which still wonderfully increases in population, above the increase of population of Great Britain; where its increase will be always found to be more promoted by manufactories, which require more laborers than lands: therefore, where the land is so limited, as it is in the British isles, the increase of population will be the sooner checked, by the earlier approach of complete cultivation to those boun-

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But, the increasing population of America will constantly require more of our manufactures; which will consequently employ more people in our manufactories: and as our population, in the present unwisely-limited state of our agriculture, cannot be wholly fed by our home produce, we must get it from abroad; in return for which our manufactures will be taken: and thus, as it were in a circle, our population will be increased, and will be supported, by the demand which the increasing population of America will create for our manufactures.

It will be to the advantage of America to feed us, in order that we may clothe them: for they will be cheaper clothed by us, and we shall be cheaper fed by them, than either will be done by the other; and we shall only require food from them, for the people we employ to manufacture for them. We shall always have a greater population, than they will have, in proportion to our quantity of territory: and, therefore, we shall always have a more ready and less-ruinously disposeable force: for our manufacturers may be employed to defend us, while our cultivation may proceed: but, in a

country which is mostly agricultural, the raising of an army prevents the raising of the food for its subsistence: as the laborers must cease to cultivate, in order, to defend the country.

These considerations lead us to place a high value upon our American commerce; and ought, in proportion, to deter us from a rupture with that country, as long as it is possible to avoid it. But, however valuable such a trade may be, our colonial trade is more so; for, it is like our domestic trade, profitable to the nation at both ends: which used to be the case, but is now unfortunately no longer so, with the trade of America.

Messrs Brougham, Bosanquet, and Lowe, have demonstrated and amplified upon these points with great success, against the erroneous notions of other authors.

“The amount annually paid into the public treasury, by the West-India trade, is equal to more than one half of all the permanent taxes, imposed on Great Britain, since the French revolution.”\*

\* Lowe's Inquiry, p. 14.

But the event of "African freedom, and *African sovereignty*," to which the author of "War in Disguise" could "look forward with satisfaction rather than dismay," would annihilate this valuable trade with our Colonies which has annually paid half the interest of our national debt: thus two hundred millions would be added to our already nearly-insupportable burthens in the loss of the means of paying so much of its interest.

In raising the means, however, to pay the interest of our enormous debt, it is a cruel hardship upon the Planter, that the duty upon sugars, has been, hitherto, on the continual increase; while the price of sugars has been continually decreasing. And this increase of the duties has been the effect of an opinion, that British sugars commanded, and would continue to command, a market on the continent of Europe. This delusion is at length exposed by the changes in the affairs of Europe. We no longer can command a market on that continent, and we refuse the market of America. The reason then, for increasing the duties, no longer exists. But, a reason for diminishing them has taken place of it; which, though of the most serious importance to our Colonies, and therefore to our revenue, has



not yet been laid before the public, and it is probable is not even *known*, much less *considered*, by the ministers who have filled the office of the colonial department.

Great stress is laid upon the increase in late years, of the exportation of sugars, &c. from America to the continent of Europe: and reference is made "to a statement of the imports into Amsterdam alone, from the United States of America, in the year 1806, amounting to 34,085 hogsheads of coffee, and 45,097 hogsheads of sugar."\* From which statement a conclusion is drawn, as to the advantages, which the hostile colonies derive from the relaxation of that principle, which prohibited any trade from being carried on with the enemies colonies, by neutrals, during war, which the enemy himself would not permit, to those neutrals during peace.

This report is also supported by the partial representations, and erroneous conclusions, of the different parties, that are formed to promote *African sovereignty* in the West Indies, and to foment the ancient animosities against the

\* Report of the Committee delivered to the House of Commons, July 24, 1807.

United States. But, with due respect for the Committee who made the report, I will communicate to them a fact, that will shake the strength of the conclusions, which they think their premises warrant; by shewing them, that the great additional quantity of West-Indian produce, as it is all called, which America has of late shipped to the continent of Europe, need not be necessarily attributed to the "frauds of neutral flags."

It has been wholly overlooked, by those who have caballed against the Colonies, and must have been unknown to the authors who have written in favour of the Colonies, that *the cession of LOUISIANA to the American Government has been a great cause of the additional exports of sugar, from thence, during the few last years*; for, by the report of a Committee of Congress, January 12, 1803, under the article "Imports and Exports" of Louisiana, the export of produce is stated to be 20,000 bales of cotton of 2 cwt. each; 45,000 casks of sugar, 10 cwt. each; 800 ditto molasses, 100 gallons each.

By this report it appears, that very wrong conclusions have been drawn as to the amount of the injury, which our shipping-interests are

said to sustain, from the neutral carrying-trade; inasmuch as a quantity, at least equal to, if not more, than all that is reported to be imported into Amsterdam, may be accounted for, without a hogshead of it being brought from the Colonies of our Enemy, under "the frauds of neutral flags:" and not one hogshead of which would, at any rate, have given freight to our shipping.

But, under the encouragement, which such a valuable acquisition must meet with from such an enterprising people as the Americans, the produce of Louisiana must have annually increased since they obtained possession of it in 1803; and will account, in a great measure, for the additional exports from America since that period.

There is no doubt that the produce of the fertile soil of this valuable territory will continue to increase; for the Americans will well know how to appreciate it, in the event of our excluding them from the West Indies, whether by the enforcement of the colonial monopoly, or by going to war with them.

If, then, we have been guilty of an error, in which, by wrongly attributing the whole Euro-

pean imports of sugar to neutral covering, we have nearly fallen into a war with the Americans, which, while they have not so much deserved as it was supposed, would ruin our Colonies, Manufactories, and Commerce; it behoves us, when we see that error, to avoid others which will be equally fatal. It is now plain, that America would be still much less injured by a war than we should be.

With LOUISIANA in her possession, the period will arrive when she will no longer depend upon the Colonies of any European power for sugar for her home-consumption, and perhaps not even for exportation.

I do not know to what extent the produce of Louisiana has increased since its cession to the government of America; nor how much sugar the whole of the United States consume: but, whether they already receive from Louisiana more than their own consumption requires, there can be no doubt that the cultivation of sugar will be encouraged at any rate, until that necessary supply is accomplished; and then, if they do not already, the Americans will go on to cultivate in order to supply the markets of Europe.

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The effect, therefore, of enforcing the colonial monopoly, or of going to war with America, will be, that she will render herself independent of the West Indies, not only for sugar for her home-consumption, but for exportation to Europe; where she will obtain in return such manufactures as she may want; and thus she will become independent of us both at home and abroad.

But it may be opposed to this, that we will prevent her from carrying her sugar, and from returning across the seas with European merchandize:—granted.—The effect of that would be, that having forced her to be independent of your Colonies, you will force her to be independent of Europe also; and thereby prevent the necessity of ever returning to the British manufacturing market, in the event of quarrelling with her friends on the continent of Europe.

For, by the want of manufactures, their price will be so enhanced, that the temptation of high profits will induce enterprizing speculators to establish manufactories. It is true, that all this will be the case ultimately, whether we exclude her from Europe, and from the Colonies, or do not exclude her. It is not, however, in the mean time, to our advantage to

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America will, by degrees, less want our sugar  
and our manufactures, until she will not want  
them at all; so we ought to take the advantage  
of protracting, as long as possible, that event;  
in order that we may, in the mean time, pre-  
pare ourselves as gradually for such a change  
in our relative situation, by planning the means  
of supplying our Colonies with provisions in-  
dependently of the United States; in order that  
our own Colonies, at least, may be preserved, to  
encourage our manufactures and colonial com-  
merce, when the final separation from America  
shall in the natural course of events take place,  
or be more suddenly produced by an unavoidable  
war with her. But as we are now situated, such  
a sudden rupture before we are prepared with  
any means to subsist our Colonies, would, as  
I have demonstrated, scarcely injure America,  
while it would sap the foundation of our navy  
and our commerce, by the ruin of our Colonies;  
and would raise America to a degree of wealth  
and power, at least equal to that, to which we  
should be reduced by the same means.



From every view we can take of our situation, it becomes more and more obvious, that it is our policy to render it as little as possible advantageous for the Americans to cultivate sugar, by opening our West-India ports to them, at least, as far as goes to the amount of the supplies we want from them. Our Planters will begin to prosper when they get a market for their surplus sugar, and a plentiful supply of provisions at a low rate.

This is one mean of affording an immediate relief. Another is, to open the markets of Europe by a general peace. The former is the easier and the safer measure; for much consideration is due to the expediency, and the safety, of making a peace at this time: but to those who know the situation of the Colonies, as well as the politics of Europe, there can be no hesitation as to the safety, the expediency, and the immediate necessity, of *a temporary relaxation of the colonial monopoly*.

I have formerly suggested the impolicy of completely excluding American provision-ships from the Colonies of even our Enemy, as famine in those islands, would produce insurrections among the negroes, which would be dangerous in the neighbourhood of our own:



and for other reasons founded in justice and humanity: but a rigid prohibition of every thing that is not an article of common food; and a condemnation of any thing in the return cargo above the amount of the cargo outwards; may be enforced by a blockade of all the ports of our Enemies as far as blockade can be effected. The difficulties accompanying such an intercourse with the Colonies of our Enemies while we are masters of the seas, and the facility and protection which the Americans would, on the contrary, experience in a more liberal trade with our Colonies, would soon turn the balance of colonial prosperity in our favor: while, to exclude the means of subsisting the poor negroes, in the Colonies of our Enemies, totally, would excite a revengeful enforcement of prohibitory laws against every thing British in Europe; which might not be so violently enforced, as long as we allow the Planters of our Enemies a partial benefit in the American provision-market, as well as our own.

Other means of immediate relief have been proposed:—such as, introducing the use of sugar into our breweries and distilleries;—laying more duty on the consumer to pay a bounty to the Planter on his exported sugar:—and more remote relief is recommended by encouraging the

cultivation and the commerce of our own North-American possessions.

All these plans have already undergone very considerable discussion. I can, therefore, add only a few observations without going over again, the approbation or objection which they severally merit: and then I will proceed to add to those recommendations for an immediate relief, the suggestions for a plan of more *permanent* relief, to be directly acted upon, and continually encouraged, in order to render our Colonies safe from insurrection, and independent of the precarious resource for supplies, from which America can cut us off at any time, when either necessity or caprice may induce the American government to adopt such a measure.

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All the writers upon the subject of West-Indian affairs have treated, only with the greatest diffidence, of the expedient of relaxing the colonial monopoly; excepting the author of "War in Disguise," who universally reprobates it: but most of them anxiously endeavour to promote some means of relief adequate to the distress of the Planter: and several of them consider, that great relief may be afforded by

means of an additional duty on sugar consumed at home, to be returned to the Planter by a bounty upon the sugar exported.

One\* recommends, that the bounty should be equal to the additional duty; and that both bounty and duty shall be absolute; as the *conditional* addition of duty is not productive of revenue to government when the prices are below a certain sum, viz. 50s.

Another† recommends, that the bounty on exportation shall be double the *additional* duty on the home-consumption; as the sugar consumed at home is double the quantity of that which is exported.

The Committee, in their report of July 24, 1807, recommended an increase of bounty; and that for every 2s. that sugar falls in price below 80s. per cwt. one shilling of duty shall be taken off.

But those recommendations which tend to diminish the public revenue, are not likely to find advocates among the Officers of govern-

\* "Concessions to America." † Lowe's Inquiry."

ment, while our debt is great, and war adds to our expences.

If a market for exported sugars could be guaranteed, then some such proposals might be listened to, and that of Mr Lowe would be preferable; as "an additional duty of 3s. per cwt. on home-consumption, will supply a fund adequate to the payment of fully 6s. per cwt. on exportation; because the quantity consumed is double the quantity exported," page 66. But, as the present precarious state of our Colonies will not admit of experiments, or uncertainties, any more than it will admit of delays, so I am afraid that these proposals must not be trusted to as adequate to the relief required. What will it avail to add 3s. duty per cwt. on the quantity consumed at home, to be returned by double that amount in bounty on sugar exported, if the price of sugar do not rise, and if a market be not found to which we can export? for it is admitted that " \*were sugars not to rise, this duty like all the late duties would be a dead loss to the Planter;" and who can say that they will rise? This would only hasten the Planter's ruin; for if the duties have already been increased so

\* Lowe's Inquiry, page 67.

high, as to have greatly injured the Planters, no risk should be run of adding to their burthens. If 3*s.* per cwt. be added to the duties on the home-consumption, with the intention of returning it by 6*s.* per cwt. on the exportation; and, after all, the ports of Europe should continue to be effectually shut against British produce, the experiment will be fatal. We lay on 3*s.* per cwt. absolutely, it must be paid. We offer 6*s.* per cwt. bounty, but it may never be received: for what avails it, to offer inducements to export, if all the ports of Europe are shut against you? and even though some sugar were to be exported; yet, if the proportion exported be not one-third of all our West-Indian produce, the 6*s.* per cwt. bounty will not cover the 3*s.* per cwt. duty; and instead of being paid on the whole, or even a part, it is not likely to be paid on any; as the policy of our Enemy is our total exclusion from Europe. But, *any* deficiency in the exports would involve the Planter in the loss of *as much* additional 3*s.* per cwt. duty; and thus it appears, there is more danger of additional mischief, than any chance of adequate relief for the Planter, in the proposal for increased duties and countervailing bounties.

But, as it must be the intention of the different plans which have been proposed, to adopt

means of relief, which shall be equally distributed and felt by all ; and as the distress of different Islands is unequal, because the duties on the produce of different Islands are unequal ; so the mode of relief must be varied accordingly ; or equal relief will not be afforded.

The Island of BARBADOES, and all the LEEWARD CHARRIBEE ISLANDS, pay a duty of four-and-half per cent. on their produce in these Colonies ; and, notwithstanding, they do not pay less duties in Great Britain than the produce of those other Islands that do not pay any colonial Duty at all.

In consequence of the inequality of these Colonies in respect of the four-and-half per cent. duty paid on produce in the Island, all those Colonies, that pay this impost, have been more and more unprosperous for some years past. Purchasers of sugar-estates prefer those Islands in which no such duty is paid ; because those Islands get a profit of four-and-half per cent. upon their crops, when BARBADOES and the LEEWARD ISLANDS, by paying the four-and-half per cent. colonial duty, get nothing : and, of course, it is only when the exempted Islands make *more* than four-and-half per cent. profit upon their crops, that the taxed Islands make so much above nought.

But when prices become so low, that even those Islands, which are exempted from the four-and-half per cent. do not get even a common interest for their capital, but are sinking every day, then BARBADOS, and the LEEWARD ISLANDS, must be four-and-half per cent. worse, than the ruined state to which even the other Islands are reduced !

But in a still worse state is the island of TRINIDAD, which not only pays *three-and-half* per cent. upon its own produce, but also upon such produce of South America as, when bartered for British manufactures, is exported to Great Britain; besides, that all the imports, whether British manufactures or provisions, also pay *three-and-half* per cent: so that, this impost is equal to a duty of *seven per cent.* as it is paid both upon exports and imports.

The glaring impolicy of a duty upon our own manufactures, and the oppression of it upon the agriculture of such an important, though infant settlement, is fully exposed by its effects there, as demonstated in the \*account of that Island.

That such a tax has been continued so long, is the more astonishing; as it appears, that not a

\* Vide Political Account of Trinidad, page 68, et seq.



shilling of it has gone into the treasury of Great Britain: and if, as Mr. Brougham states it, out of £326,529 sterling, the total value collected of the four-and-half per cent. no more than £140,032 is paid into the Exchequer\*, it is not to be expected that even so much as that proportion of the *seven* per cent in Trinidad can have been expended in that Colony. For if, where there are proper persons, as in Great Britain, to examine into the expence of collecting, fees, &c. considerably more than one-half of the whole amount collected is squandered away, or never reaches the Exchequer, have we not a right to conclude, that a much greater proportion of that sum which is collected in Trinidad, upon the imports and exports, has not been applied to the useful purposes of the Colony; where there are no examining officers, or auditors of accounts, to repress the extravagance, or check the frauds and impositions, which are generally carried on to a shameful extent, even under the very eye of suspicious inspection, and in the very tests of authorized investigation.

That the duties alluded to are not so productive as they ought to be, and would be, were they laid on and levied by the representative

\* Colonial Policy, Vol. i, p. 552.

Assemblies of the Colonies, and expended for the benefit of the Colonies by those who impose them, is evident from the statements of Mr BROUGHAM, as well as known to ourselves. The four and-half per cent, which *is said* to be expended in the service of the Colonies, ought to be strictly applied to the expences of those Colonies, *alone*, in which that duty is levied. I do not agree with the author of "Colonial Policy," in his strictures upon Mr Burke's inveighing against the division of this fund: for it matters not whether this fund be applied to the payment of pensions like Mr Burke's, or the expences of Colonies that do not contribute to it. The hardship on the Colonies is, that the amount of the four-and-half per cent. duty levied *in* them, is not expended *upon* them, but on those Colonies that contribute nothing to the four-and-half per cent. fund.

Certainly, if the four-and-half per cent. which is collected in each island, were expended on each of those islands, only, in which it is collected, it would defray the expences of those islands, which the Colonists are now obliged to provide for otherwise, besides paying the four-and-half per cent; while other Colonies have a part of their expences paid, out of the four-and-half per cent. fund, though they contribute

nothing towards it. It ought to be so arranged, that, at least, each Colony should raise the means to pay its own expences; rather than that the expences of the one should be paid by the contributions of the other: as is the case with Granada the Bahamas, Bermudas, and others, that do not contribute to the four-and-half per cent. fund.

After what has been stated it must be evident that justice demands in the relief to be applied to the distressed state of the Planters, a proper consideration, as to the greater degree of relief by decrease of duty or addition of bounty, which the Colonists require, who pay the four-and-half per cent. duty, above that degree of relief, which may be sufficient in those islands, that do not pay any colonial duty.

But there is another hardship which I think also requires consideration in respect of the duties upon sugar. The duty is not now paid *ad valorem*, but upon the quantity; so that bad sugar pays a greater duty, in proportion to its price, than good sugar.

I know that there has been much discussion upon this point at the meetings of West-India Proprietors and Merchants at the London Ta-

vern, and that much ingenuity has been exercised upon the question, by *those* who possess; or have mortgages upon, or are otherwise *concerned with* plantations in our *ancient Colonies*, in order to raise objections to the principle of duties *ad valorem*.

Not having any thing of the sort to bias my mind, and therefore taking an impartial view of the subject, I cannot help perceiving the hardship of the case, which the owners of estates in new Colonies labor under.

That I have not neglected the interests of the old Colonies is evident from what I have stated relative to the four-and-half per cent; it is only fair, then, that I should propose for consideration, the peculiar hardship which the new Colonies in our possession labor under, in paying a duty on their inferior sugar, equal to that which the higher-priced sugar of the old islands pays.

It is an incontrovertible fact, that any specific quantity of bad sugar is manufactured, and appears at market at a greater expence than the same quantity of good sugar.

The quantity of liquor received from plant-canes, is greater than the quantity received from

the rattoon-canes; more especially in the new sugar Colonies; where the land is rich, and the rains very frequent during a great part of the year.

But this great quantity of liquor does not produce so much sugar, as the *same quantity* of liquor from either plants or rattoons in long-cultivated islands: and as it requires a greater quantity of temper-lime, its colour is as inferior as its body; and therefore it is less marketable; while, at the same time, more animal labor is requisite to cut, carry, and grind the canes necessary to produce any quantity of such sugar, than the same quantity of sugar, of a finer quality, from canes in the old sugar Colonies. And, to boil this inferior liquor into sugar, more *fuel* is also necessary: *which* is a consideration of great moment in any manufactory: add to all this, that when this inferior sugar, at double the expence of labor, is manufactured; any quantity of it in value requires double the expence of casks, cartage, portorage, storeage, freight, insurance, &c. &c. that the same quantity in value of finer sugar requires; and as the duties are now paid, such inferior sugars pay double the amount of duty upon their value; because, according to their value, they are double the quantity of the same value of finer sugars.

The error of this system must be very evident, and the hardship very great upon our new sugar-plantations, after encouraging by conquest, the investing of large British capitals in the cultivation of new lands: and all the ingenuity and sophistry of those gentlemen, who have an interest in ruining the *new*, from a possession of property in the *old* Colonies, will not destroy my conviction, that a duty *ad valorem* is the most equitable, and ought to be a principle consideration in the equality of relief to be afforded to the Planters.

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*One* of the means of relief to the Planter has been proposed in a reduction of the duty on rum; and it is stated, that this "would relieve the Planter without loss to the revenue; which would be indemnified by an increased consumption of that spirit."

As a friend to the cause of morality, I would not recommend a reduction of the duty on rum in order to increase the consumption of that spirit. That would be an unwise and wicked expedient indeed. I know not any thing upon a parallel with it; excepting the measure of supplying the slaves in the West Indies with arms and ammunition by the hands of the

American through the medium of St Domingo. To reduce the duty on rum would be to debauch the morals, and destroy the constitutions of some millions of our labouring people, in order to indemnify the revenue in the relief of the Planters. No, the use of rum instead of brandy in our whole navy and army, would very considerably benefit the Planter, without doing injury in any other direction: and, certainly, justice towards the Planter, and policy towards our enemy, ought to induce us to use the produce of our own plantations, rather than the produce of the country of our enemy.

The introduction of sugar into our breweries and distilleries, by the prohibition of the use of grain, is recommended by some, as *another* mean of affording temporary relief to the Colonists; as well as a mean of consuming the future additional quantity of sugar; the increasing production of which, our late erroneous system of conquest and colonization has encouraged. This measure has its opponents among the British land-holders; and is decidedly objected to in the report of the Distillery-Committee, February 17, 1807. But I am satisfied, that the effect upon the land-holder will not be such as is apprehended: and so far as that evil is the only objection, the measure may be adopted with safety. I do not see, that the relief it would



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afford to the West-India Planter would be only  
 “ *at the expence*” of the British farmer ; for by  
 taking off the restriction upon the exportation of  
 flour to the Colonies, the farmer would not be  
 discouraged in the growth of grain ; as he may  
 grow wheat instead of barley : and this encou-  
 ragement for the growth of wheat would ren-  
 der the danger of famine less likely to occur  
 even at home : and certainly, it would not be  
 any more unjust towards the land-holder, to en-  
 force the use of sugar in our breweries and dis-  
 tilleries, by prohibiting the use of grain in them,  
 in order to feed our fellow-subjects in the Colo-  
 nies ; than it was, to enforce that measure in  
 order to feed our fellow-subjects in the parent-  
 state, when scarcity threatened us with fa-  
 mine.

The farmer might then export his grain in  
 the form of flour, to feed the Planters and their  
 labourers, to the amount of 431,504 barrels of  
 that article, which they are now obliged to pro-  
 cure from America ; on whom they are there-  
 fore dependent for food. But at present, our  
 farmers are prohibited by statute from exporting  
 more than thirty-two thousand barrels of flour,  
 because our own consumption will not allow,  
 with safety, of a greater exportation ; least  
 scarcity at home should be the consequence. And

as a proof, that under our present state of agriculture, we are unable to allow of a greater exportation than by statute is allowed, it is shewn, that during ten years, Great Britain supplied the Colonies annually with only 1570 barrels of flour. "Whereas, the quantity of bread-flour required by our Colonists and garrisons in the West Indies, and actually furnished in the year 1803 by the United States of America exclusively amounted to 431,504 barrels of flour and meal!"\*

According to the calculation of the author of "Concessions," the import of the British Colonies from America, may be computed as equal to 300,000 quarters of grain. And, he calculates, that the use of sugar in the breweries and distilleries, by the prohibition of the use of grain in them, will leave "360,000 quarters of wheat applicable to the subsistence of the people,"† in the West Indies.

If this prohibition could, as certainly and as beneficially succeed with our Colonies, as it would in the case of scarcity at home, it would have several other good effects to recommend it,

\* Sir W. Young's Common-Place-Book, p. 137.

† "Concessions, &c." p. 21.

besides feeding our Colonists: for it would prosper our Planters to a certain degree, at the same time that it would feed their slaves: it would serve our ship-owners by promoting exportation; and the encouragement of exportation would promote the cultivation of grain; which would provide for times of scarcity.

But it appears, that the prohibition of grain in our breweries and distilleries, though it would afford the supply of such a great quantity of flour to our Colonists, would not sufficiently relieve them in the consumption of their sugars; since according to the report of the Distillery-Committee, February 17, 1807, "it does not appear probable that more than 12,000 hogsheads of sugar, even at the reduced prices (therein stated,) would be taken out of the market, by the permission being given at this time to the distillers to use that article in their trade; even if the use of grain were entirely prohibited."

It is true, that as one of the means for consuming the additional quantity of our West-India produce, which requires a market to an amount so much greater than formerly; the prohibition of the use of grain in fermented liquors will have a sensible effect, though not to half

the amount necessary ; for it appears, that besides the one-third of West-India produce which used to be exported, an additional quantity of 30,000 hogsheads annually produced, requires, either an additional home-consumption, or an additional exportation in future, independent of the immediate relief required. And it is considered, that, “\* the sugar-market is to expect a proportion of influx from Trinidad, from Tobago, from St Vincent, from Granada, and above all, from Jamaica.”

In exposing the insufficiency of relief as arising from the greatly-increased production of sugar, I do not hold out an objection to the introduction of it into our breweries and distilleries: on the contrary, it is an additional proof of the absolute necessity of adding that expedient to every other measure that can be devised to promote the market for our surplus sugar; and therefore, that it ought to be adopted along with the temporary relaxation of the colonial monopoly, as well as a bounty upon sugar exported to the continent of Europe: for as the relief of this increased home-consumption will only be partial; and the effect of bounties on exportation, and a more liberal intercourse with

\* Sir W. Young, p. 24.

America must, from the politics of Europe, be uncertain; it is absolutely necessary, to adopt *all* these measures with a view to some degree of immediate and certain relief; and there is no doubt, although the opening of the European markets is necessary to the *full* prosperity of our Colonies, that an increase of the home-consumption, and allowing the Americans to take a part of our surplus sugar, will avert the *present* danger which threatens the Colonies.

But, however beneficial the expedient of using sugar in our breweries and distilleries would be to the Planter, in the consumption of his produce; the attempt to supply him wholly with provisions, either from Great Britain, or the British provinces in America, will be found to be impracticable, and particularly in time of war. How can we spare provisions to the Colonies under our present agricultural state, when our market offers a constant sale for American provisions? which would not be the case, if it were the fact that we produce even only enough for our home-consumption: \* and that we do not

\* Great Britain does not in all seasons grow corn sufficient for the subsistence of its own inhabitants." — *Sir W. Young*, p. 92.

"We see Great Britain, notwithstanding all the improvements in agriculture, at present unable to supply the demand

produce that sufficiency is evident, because we are obliged occasionally to give bounties to encourage the importations of flour and rice.\*

But even if we could be satisfied, that by the prohibition of grain in breweries and distilleries, *and also by an increased cultivation of grain in new inclosures of our waste-lands*, a sufficient supply could be spared for the subsistence of the Colonists, yet such an attempt would be attended with very great difficulties, arising from the circumstances of large and numerous cargoes arriving in great fleets, after long delays in waiting for convoys. Every intelligent mind must be sufficiently aware of the precarious nature of such supplies, as the effect of glutted markets at one time, and starving scarcity at another; the former state so lowering the prices as to involve the English shippers in such disappointments, if not even ruin, as to prevent future consignments

of her population within one million of quarters of grain per annum. — *Bosanquet's Value of Colonial Trade*, p. 12.

\* During the thirteen years, ending in 1804, Great Britain, according to documents laid before Parliament, paid more than thirty millions of money for foreign corn; her supply of which now depends on her Enemy, who holds those countries under his controul from whence four-fifths of it were received."

"*Concessions, &c.*" p. 21.

of such supplies ; and the latter state rendering it necessary, even at the risk of incurring disease, to distribute provisions, which, as the remnant of glutted markets, must, from long storage in the Colonies, become stale and insalutary. To this state would the Colonists be most liable in war-time ; which is the very period when our Enemies Colonies would be enjoying from neutrals, all the advantages, of continually-repeated supplies, in small and choice cargoes, of the most fresh food \*.

It must be recollected that our Navy and Army in the West Indies are now fed with such salutary food : and if under the advantage of these American supplies the mortality in our West-India Navy and Army is great, what can be expected from that precarious supply, and necessarily less-wholesome diet, which only, the risks of war would admit of being received from Great Britain, but a still greater mortality among those veterans on whose health and energies the Colonies depend for protection against the colonial forces of our Enemies ; who might, by the double encouragement of *their* plenty and *our*

\* "For the supply of provisions, a direct trade between America and the West Indies is to the latter a trade of absolute necessity." — *Sir W. Young*, p. 90.



wants, harrass the Colonists by machinations among the negroes. And what should we not have to apprehend from the state of discontent which could so easily be excited among them when ready to sink under the pressure of "*labor without reward,*" and *hunger without food.*

But while I point out the difficulties which attend the supplies from Great Britain, I do not mean to object to the *attempt* of supplying the Colonies with European provisions. I only intend to deter those who would be too sanguine in their expectations, that the mother-country could *wholly* feed her West Indians. In time of war such a resource for supplies is not at all to be depended upon; but in time of peace, much may be done to render the Colonies independent of the United States; and it might be done with great advantage to Great Britain: for Ireland can supply all the beef and pork, and Newfoundland, with the home-fisheries, could furnish all the fish necessary for the Negroes. And certainly the flour that could be spared by the use of sugar in our distilleries, would, by the occasional supplies in single ships during peace, go a great way towards the subsistence of our Planters. But on the occurrence of war all the difficulties will recur; and we shall still find the

necessity of other co-operating means of producing a more certain dependence, than a total reliance either on Great Britain or the United States.

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There are sanguine minds, that turn, with great expectations, towards our provinces in America. But I apprehend, that little relief is to be received from that part of the world immediately: and even when, by great encouragement, the raising of provisions shall become considerable; still there will be less dependence, than perhaps, in any other resource that can be mentioned.

From Sir William Young's Reports, we have several convincing proofs. — The exportation of sugar and rum from the West Indies to the British Northern provinces, was in 1803, less than one-eighth of the former, and one-fifth of the latter of those articles exported from the West Indies to the United States.

But as to the supply of flour immediately; the Canadas cannot even supply Newfoundland with enough of bread-flour: and therefore it was, that the 25th George III. c. 1, was passed, to

admit from the United States the necessary supply of flour for Newfoundland\*. And in 1788, instead of supplying the West Indies, Nova Scotia could not spare staves enough for the use of Newfoundland: and in consequence, 25,500 staves were exported from the West Indies to that settlement to pack the fish †.

By the returns of 1793, and 1803, it appears, that the British Northern provinces may produce a large proportion of plank and fir; but that staves will always be very deficient ‡. He also demonstrates that West-Indians must prefer the trade of the United States to that of Nova Scotia; because the population of this last will not take off enough of West-Indian produce: besides, that the voyage is longer and more perilous; and that frost lays a certain embargo during many months of every winter.

But, when the impossibility of conveying the supplies from that country to the West Indies during the winter-months is urged, the case of our supplying our wants in England from the Baltic during the summer-months is given as an answer; and that we could do so too from Canada during the months when there is no ice.

\* Sir W. Young, p. 118.    † Ibid.    ‡ Ibid. p. 122.

Though this argument is good as it relates to the *Baltic* and *England*, it will not hold good in the case of *Canada* and the *West Indies*. We do not import grain from the *Baltic* in summer, to use it in winter when the frost prevents our bringing it from the *Baltic*; but we consume it as we import it, while the grain of our own country is growing; and our own crops supply us in winter, when we cannot get it from the *Baltic*.

This is not the case with the *Canadas* and the *West Indies*; where they do not grow grain in one part of the year to be used in the other. So that, if *Canada* could supply the *West Indies* in summer, when her waters are open, what would the *West Indians* do in winter, when the *Canadas* are frozen up?

But even if *Canada* could supply, in summer, as much provisions as would feed the *West-Indians* both summer and winter, it would not answer; for in a warm and moist climate, like the *West Indies*, provisions would not keep so long.

Even under the circumstance of the present frequency of supplies from the *United States* in small quantities, trifling delays in the voyage, or

‡ Ibid. p. 122.

in the sale after arrival, so materially damage the cargoes of these perishable articles, as to hurt their price, and even render them unfit for use. Nor will such an uncertain trade be worth the attention of the persons who might engage in it under the high expence of war-freights, of war-insurance, of war-wages, and of the other expences of navigation in war-time ; which would add so much to the price of every article used on estates, that the loss of the Planter in that way, would be almost as ruinous as the present depreciated price of his produce : and the evil is equally to be dreaded, whether it arise from the low price of sugar, or the high expence of producing it. If, then, we can resort with advantage to our British provinces in America only during peace, recurring to other resources for supplies during war ; those Colorists will never find it answer, to cultivate for our West-India Islands at one period, when the uncertain events of another period may prevent the disposal of their crops.

But how short-sighted are those, who calculate upon raising our West-India supplies in the British provinces in America ; or how forgetful are they of the probability of losing those possessions altogether, in the event of a war with the United States ? which is the very event that those pro-

vinces are supposed, by some, to be capable of providing against.

When it is recollected, that the French have numerous connexions in those provinces; and that while an American army would not require a naval force, and fleets of transports, to convey them to the scene of action; we could not have any force there to defend our possessions, but by those very means, which would be excluded by nature a great part of every year: how can we imagine that the American Government would neglect the immediate conquest of them; which could be so readily accomplished, by the numerous army that might easily be poured in upon them? And should we, in the mean time, relying upon those provinces, not provide any other source of supplies; in such an event, from whence could we derive food for our Colonies\*?

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\* To insist that the Colonists and their Negroes in our Islands, should be dependant for their *provisions* exclusively on the British provinces in America, would be to lay a direct embargo on their subsistence, and to endanger not merely trade and produce, but the very root and stock of all, — the maintenance and safety of our people throughout the Islands!" page 119.

"No benevolent man, no considerate statesman, no friend to his Country and its Colonies, will require that they should



Having now considered the various measures which have been recommended for adoption, in order to relieve the Colonies *immediately* ; I will recapitulate those which will most *certainly*, as well as most immediately, avert the impending ruin with which they are threatened.

Each writer upon this subject has had one favorite proposal to recommend and support : but I have endeavoured to show, that a total reliance upon any *one* of them, will be succeeded by disappointment ; as *neither* of them are adequate to the relief that is required. And our Colonies are not in a situation to admit of risking the events of uncertain experiments : and delay will be still more dangerous than incertitude.

But why should we wish to confine ourselves to one mean of relief, only for the sake of saying, that the plan has the merit of simplicity. It is true, that nature never does by two causes what can be as well done by one : but, like nature, we must deviate from this rule occasionally : and the present is an occasion, on which all the means, that can be used together, will not be

depend for provisions, that is for food and life, on supplies to be furnished exclusively by and from the British provinces in America." page 120. — *Sir W. Young*.



more than powerful enough, if they will be *even sufficient*, to remove the great and various difficulties, which the present peculiar politics of the world have thrown upon us.

The MEANS that may be *immediately* resorted to, and with a *certainty* of relief, are the following :

1st. Relax our colonial monopoly to Americans bringing only certain enumerated articles of food ; restricting the return-cargoes of West-Indian produce, to the colonial value of their cargo of American supplies.

2d. As the *first* means would not take off enough sugar to relieve the Planter of his surplus produce ; introduce sugar into our *distilleries* by prohibiting the use of grain therein. I would not recommend the introduction of sugar into our *breweries* ; because it would not merely make a less palatable, but also a less salutary beer. Its strong disposition to fermentation would render it injurious to health ; and-would prevent the exportation of those quantities of beer which we now send to all parts of the world : for it would become, like the *American porter* made from molasses, *ropy*, and unfit for use, before it could reach its place of destination. *Not* to use it in

beer would also less alarm the land-holder; and as it would also less relieve the West-India Planter, —

A 3d. means would be the more felt, in suitable bounties given for the encouragement of exports to any markets of Europe, that may be, or remain open. But, as all the Islands are not equally situated in respect of colonial duties, let the sugars of those Islands *only* that pay the *four-and-half per cent.* receive the bounty on exportation: and this measure will perform the justice of most relieving those who are most oppressed; without making any difference to the government, or reducing its revenue. And, also, as there is another inequality in the circumstances of the Colonies, in respect of the value of their sugars; let the duties be collected in England *ad valorem*, and then the duties will be felt more equally by all.

4th. Let RUM be used in the whole of our Navy and Army; and lay such duties upon *Brandy* as will amount to a prohibition of its importation: but do not *lessen* the duties on rum; both because it would injure the revenue, and promote bad habits among the vulgar. Rather *increase* the duty on the private consumption of rum to indemnify government in the payment of

bounties on sugar; and the increased consumption of *Rum* in the Navy and Army will still give great relief to the Planter.

5th. Take off the restriction upon the exportation of flour to the Colonies.

As the bounty on fish from Newfoundland has already produced a good supply in the West Indies, —

6th. Give a bounty on other salt provisions, and on flour and meal, from the British North-American provinces.

All these six means would give our Colonists *an immediate, a safe, and a certain relief*. But they may be thus divided, as to the necessity of *their duration*.

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|--|---|
| 1. Relaxation of the colonial monopoly.                | } To be continued only during war-time. |
| 2. Bounty on sugars exported.                          |   |
| 3. Bounty on articles from British northern provinces. |   |

- |  |                    |
|--|--------------------|
| 1. The use of sugar in our distilleries.   | } To be permanent. |
| 2. The removal of restriction upon the exportation of flour to the Colonies; and also upon oats and beans. |                    |
| 3. The use of rum instead of brandy in our whole Navy and Army.  |                    |

Therefore the three last means, although enumerated among those for immediate relief, also belong to *the plan for permanent relief*: but *their operation alone*, will be insufficient to produce our independence of the continent of America: which we ought to establish against the occurrence of difficulties in future wars; and most especially against the events of a war with the United States.

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Towards the plan for *the PERMANENT support of the West Indies*, proposals have been already made. MR FARQUHAR, it seems, has anticipated CAPTAIN LAYMAN, in the *public* proposal to prevent the evils of decrease in the number of West-India labourers, as a consequence of the abolition of the slave-trade, by the importation and settlement of CHINESE: and

both of these gentlemen, particularly the latter, have communicated so much good information upon the subject, that, at least, as *one* of the means, 'a fair trial ought to be given to it, in the plan for *permanent relief* : but, like those which have been recommended for *immediate* and *temporary relief*, the *Chinese* plan is too precarious to be *solely* depended upon.

In stating the suggestions which arise from my notice of these publications, I shall be led to my own train of thoughts upon the plan for *permanent relief* ; but the subject is so extensive and so fertile, that more than *an outline* will be beyond my powers : — the finish must be performed by a more able hand.

Until my last communications from the West Indies, I entertained sanguine expectations of seeing a great aid given to the plan for *permanent relief*, in the adoption of the recommendations of those who would introduce the *Chinese* people to cultivate the West Indies. But those who planned and executed the scheme, so far as it went, ought to have been made to know, that it is not only necessary to the success of the plan, that *each* importation of Chinese people, should, after arrival in the island, be kept together to work in one body ; or if too nume-

rous for one gang, that at least they should be settled together in the same part of the country; but, also, that instead of being left to the direction of the Planters, who consider it their best plan to make every measure fail that is different from the one so long in practice, in order that the means of continuing the old plan may be again resorted to, the Chinese people ought not to have been at all in their power; but ought to have been employed upon a lot of land belonging to Government, which COLONEL RUTHERFORD, the *Surveyor-General*, caused to be cleared and planted with provisions in a very healthy situation near *Arima*: and had that Officer been in the Island at the time of their arrival, he would, no doubt, have recommended this measure.

There they might have been employed under the inspection of persons who would not have considered themselves *interested in the failure* of the scheme: and these labourers might have reimbursed Government, by raising provisions for the use of the troops, as well as *Rice* for their own use: for the *upland* rice is cultivated to advantage in Trinidad by the few who have been wise enough to try it: and there can be no doubt of the possibility of raising the *lowland* or swamp rice, where there are such swamps.

By thus keeping them together, and allowing them to work or be idle, at such times, and in such manner, as might best please themselves, provided they did but perform the quantity of work allotted to the whole gang, they would have been contented, and would have worked : but to insist upon their working in a manner contrary to their customs, and in any weather, fair or foul, is too rigid and arbitrary a plan to succeed with any human beings, excepting the poor Africans; whose spirits must be first broken by *chains* on-board ship, and the *cart-whip* after their arrival, before the few who survive such treatment, can, with advantage, be reduced to "passive obedience." It is not only necessary, that these Chinese Colonists should be associated in their labour; but also, that *Batavian* cultivators of cane, and manufacturers of sugar, who understood their language, manners, and dispositions, should be introduced with them.

It is unreasonable to expect, that they will succeed, either when placed at work with people so different as the Negroes are, in *almost* every human characteristic; or under the management of persons, who in general have no notion of any mode of managing but one; and that, indeed, too often unsuccessful even with the Negroes. Besides, that by introducing the *Batavian*



cultivators and manufacturers of sugar, the process might be carried on at that very low expence at which it is done in Batavia ; but which could never be introduced by any man who had not been taught the art in that country. Batavian implements of husbandry should also be brought with the people : and, certainly, as *many* Chinese *women* as *men* ought to be obtained ; and all the other particulars of Captain Layman's plan, should be seriously considered, as they may be carried into effect with safety, and with every prospect of success.

The ill success of the attempt in Trinidad must be attributed to the want of proper preparation for their reception, and proper plans for their commencing operations. It ought not to deter government from adopting a better plan in future : and a time of peace will be more favorable for the attempt, as Government will then be able to devote a proper attention to an object of so great magnitude.

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As *the value* of the *labor* of *free* labourers must be an object of great consideration in that part of the plan for *permanent relief* and support by means of such free labor in the West Indies ;

CAPTAIN LAYMAN's calculations, and remarks, come properly under our contemplation in this place.

He has calculated, that, at the original cost of £80 sterling the annual cost of a slave is £14 sterling: \* "but as the annual number of workers, i. e. able-bodied men and women, is not computed, even on a well-conducted plantation, to exceed one-third of the whole number on the estate, the owner is at the expence of maintaining three persons to obtain the labour of one, at an apparent annual charge of £42: but with every allowance for the work of negro-artificers, the labor of boys and girls, &c. at an actual charge of not less than £28."

He also calculates the expence of breeding a slave at £100; and hence concludes, in favor of what is said to be "proved from experience;" that, "the expence of the labor of purchased slaves, enormous as it has been for the last seven years, is cheaper than that of negroes bred upon plantations."

Captain Layman calculates, upon the evidence delivered to the Lords Committee of the Council,

\* Capt. Layman's plan for cultivation and defence of the West Indies, page 14.

as to "the average-duration of the laboring period of a slave's life:" but a long residence in the West Indies and an immediate intercourse with Planters, has convinced me, that, as it is their interest to represent favorably the state of new slaves, and the success in preserving them, in order to weaken the objections very justly made to the slave-trade; so their representations are to be taken with great allowance for their partiality.

I am of opinion that the average-duration of the laboring period of a new slave's life, may be more fairly stated at ten years, than at sixteen: for the greatest mortality among the African slaves in the West Indies is within the first five years after their importation: and, of the number that die in that time, the majority die in the second and third years: and of the proportion that survive five years, the period of labor is to be considered less by the time in which indulgence is necessary to be shewn to them immediately after importation, as well as during the time in which they are suffering under diseases by which creole-slaves are seldom afflicted. And even those that survive five years, do not reach the old age of creoles: for that imbecility which comes on only gradually with creole-

age, arrives prematurely in the case of the friendless African.

I am therefore satisfied, that by adding the cost of those who die to that of the survivors, which is the most fair mode of calculating the price which they cost in the accounts of the plantation; and by dividing the sum by ten years, instead of sixteen; "the expence of the labor of purchased slaves" will far exceed the expence of £100;\* which is calculated as the expence of *breeding* a slave: and in so much is the abolition of the slave-trade justifiable even where the Planters themselves would oppose it. And, instead of "the expence of *hired* slave-labour being still more considerable," it is not more than the outside sum at which the labor of the able-bodied slave is calculated, on those estates where only one-third of the whole gang are *workers*.

It is true, that a porter-negro will earn a dollar per day, but that is not a certain employment: and negroes employed on *public works* will earn sixteen dollars per month. But these are not fair cases for a calculation of hired negro-labor in general, and much less for agricultural labor.

\* Captain Layman's Outline, &c. p. 17.

What can be done on plantations with gangs of hired negroes, all being *able-bodied*, is the case for consideration. I know not as to Jamaica, but in the Windward and Leeward Charibbee Islands gangs of working-negroes may be hired for the field at the rate of four to six dollars per month; and in those Colonies in which labor is the highest, not more than eight dollars are given; to which sums, must be added, the expence of feeding and medical attendance. Now, taking the greatest of these sums, viz. eight dollars per month, at 4s. 8d. the dollar, we have £22 8s. per annum; and adding the sum which is allowed\* for even clothing, as well as food and medicine, which is £4 4s. the whole annual hire of a laborer in the field is not more than £26 12s. which is less than the annual hire of either a new slave or one bred in the Colonies, according to Captain Layman's calculation; and £10 less than the calculation he has given of the expence of hired slave-labor. But that those whose great interest it is to breed and raise young slaves may not be depressed by the calculations which are given of the expence of raising negro-children; it must not be passed over, that some great mistake must have been made in charging the cost of

\* Captain Layman's Outline, &c. p. 13.

raising young negroes to the age of twelve years, at £8 per annum; when the "expenditure of food, clothing, medical attendance, and contingencies\*" of adults, is charged at no more than £4 4s. per annum. Here must be an inaccuracy.

Some authors who have written upon these subjects consider, that the maintenance of one man is equal to that of four children: and a soldier's child is allowed *the fourth* of one man's rations in our own regiments. And even on those plantations, which are most liberally supplied with provisions never more than *half* the allowance of an adult is measured out for a child; which allowance there is no doubt is an abundance, if care be taken that it be food properly adapted for the nourishment of children. I cannot, therefore, understand how it can be made out, that the annual cost of raising a child to twelve years of age can be double the sum which, it is allowed, is annually expended in the maintenance of a working negro. This must be one of those partial representations which have been made to the Lord's committee of Council, to make the

\* Captain Layman's Outline, p. 14.

comparison strong, between the expence of raising and importing negroes, in order to favor the slave-trade.

It is, however, too true, that the expence of raising children, however small, added to their incapacity for labor during several years, has prevented the *value* of children from being properly estimated. The *labor* of an adult has been a certain gain to the slave-owner, while it is uncertain that the children may live to yield any profitable labor. Therefore the *present labor* of the *mother* is preferred to the *future inferior labor* of the *child*.

Yet in America, *children* at a very early age are capable of *valuable labor*, and are cherished in order to be put forward in the habits of industry, so as to assist in maintaining the family of which they are members. But in the West-Indies, hitherto, a woman with child got *more curses than care* when she was likely to increase her family; for, by pregnancy and child-birth, her work was lost for a certain time. Instead of promoting the health and growth of the rising generation as a source of wealth to the owner, children were neglected and considered as an expence without a return of profit.



A new order of things, introduced by the abolition of the slave-trade, will gradually induce a new sort of calculation upon these points, and new methods of economy: and we shall see, "*that what could not be gained from humanity, will be wrung from avarice.*" Women will be as valuable if not more so, than men; particularly breeding-women will be most valuable, where they were before least so: and on the very estates where children were the least valued before, they will be most cherished now: for, the rising generations having been the most neglected *on such* estates, more exertions to encourage breeding will become necessary to keep up the stock; and perhaps, the effect of all this will be, that, *polygamy*, which has not hitherto been prohibited, or at least not prevented, will now be even promoted and encouraged: so that evils will arise even out of the ashes of those which will be destroyed. And thus it will always be found, that a system originating in *evil*, cannot be easily, if ever, made to terminate in good.

But to conclude what I have to state upon the *comparative value of labor*. It is a fact, that as far as relates to the value of labor, provisions may be raised as cheaply in the West-Indies as in America; for labor is about the same

price in both countries. It is the value of *lands* that makes the difference, added to the superior value of the produce of the West Indies, which North America will not produce. Land in America is so cheap, that its produce compensates for the high price of labor, while it produces that high price. And while one acre of land in the West Indies will yield a quantity of produce much more valuable than the produce of the same quantity of land in America, or in the West Indies, when planted in grain or other food; West-India Planters will prefer to plant sugar, and buy provisions and lumber; because a profit remains after feeding their slaves and repairing their buildings.

But if sugar remain during a considerable time at such a low price, that the produce of an acre in canes will only equal the value of the produce of the same land in grain, then the Planters will raise food for themselves, and the Colonies will no longer be dependent upon America: nor will the markets of Europe be glutted with sugar. As much sugar will still be produced as the consumption of Great Britain and Ireland require; because the demands for that quantity will afford a fair price: but the quantity which used to be sold to pay for the subsistence of the slaves, will be no longer manufactured; and the land which

produced it, will be planted in provisions. It is not, then, the expence of slave-labour which has caused "provisions and lumber to be purchased of America," but the superior price of West-India produce above American produce; and, in time, that evil will cure itself: but some time will pass away, and much intervening inconvenience will require temporary relief, before that cure can be performed by the natural course of events. And if we provide for these intervening inconveniences, we may rely upon it, that without any violent change, or abandonment of estates, much of the evil will be cured even by time. I will endeavour to demonstrate this point.

Our home-consumption is stated to have been, upon an average of five years to 1795, 123,274 hogsheads, of 13 cwt. each; and it increased annually during sixteen years ending in 1806 to 185,380 hogsheads; which is an annual increase of 62,106 hogsheads in our home-consumption.

in sixteen years. But the importation of sugar  
in 1806 was . . . . . 293,475 hhds, of which  
only . . . . . 67,587 were exported,

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therefore leaving . . . . 225,888 of which for  
home-consumption . . 185,380 were required :

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leaving . . . . . 40,508 hhds. This ba-  
lance being unappropri- . . . . . ated, give to the  
distilleries what the Com- . . . . . mittee states  
they could use annual- . . . . .  
ly, viz. . . . . 12,000 and then there

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remain . . . . . 28,508 hhds unappro-  
priated. It has been proposed to allow Ameri-  
cans, during war, to take sugars from our Colo-  
nies in return for provisions; and as it appears  
by Sir William Young's Reports\*, that even  
under the restricted state of our colonial inter-  
course with the United States, 113,447 cwt. of  
sugar, or near 8726 of 13 cwt. hhds, were exported  
in 1803, there is every probability, that by allow-  
ing the temporary relaxation of our monopoly  
of the colonial carrying-trade, the remainder of  
the 28,508 hhds, after deducting the 8726 hhds  
which are exported under licence by proclamation,

\* Sir W. Young's Common-Place-Book, p. 143.

that is to say 19,772 hhds, would be taken off hand by the Americans in return for provisions supplied to the Colonists: and thus the surplus would be all disposed of. I think there need not be any hesitation in admitting, that a liberal colonial intercourse with America would give a sale for the 28,508 hhds surplus sugar, when it is recollected, that we import, and pay for now *by other* means, 431,504 barrels of flour annually; which, at twelve dollars per barrel, will *more* than pay for *four* times the quantity of unappropriated sugar, if we use the 12,000 hhds which may be consumed in the distilleries: and, indeed, the whole residue, after exporting what little has been lately exported and what we consume at home, — that is to say the whole 40,508 hhds balance unappropriated, would not more than pay for all the flour which we annually import from America; leaving out of consideration every other article of necessary food which we are thence supplied with.

Thus, the quantity of sugar at present unappropriated would be disposed of; until the *home-consumption*, continuing to increase in the same proportion in which it has increased during the last 16 years, would in seven or eight years gradually require all that is now superabundant, more especially as since the abolition of the

slave-trade more cannot be produced, but rather the quantity will decrease; and in twelve or fourteen years the gradually-increasing consumption will require as much above the quantity now produced as will amount to, at least, our present surplus quantity. But before the expiration of even the first seven years, a *permanent plan* of relief may be carried into effect. The high price of provisions, or the low price of West-India produce, or both happening at once, will induce the Planters to cultivate the provisions necessary for their use.

A *sudden* privation of supplies from *usual* resources, could not however be quickly enough followed by the adoption of means to avert the evils which would so suddenly succeed: therefore the Colonists must not in the mean time be abandoned to the evils which threaten them, while the temporary means of relief which have been proposed are in our power: nor would it be wise, nor is it necessary, to trust, for *permanent* relief, to the natural return of West-India affairs to their former level, while means may be adopted with certainty and safety, which, added to the temporary relief, may confirm its benefits to the Colonists, and thereby bring about at an earlier period, and with less intervening sacrifice, that more prosperous state of the Colonies which

they once enjoyed ; and to which they *might* indeed *possibly* be restored, even by allowing, at the *cost* of *great* intervening *sacrifice*, that the present evils should work out their own slow and *expensive* cure. Quitting, therefore, these unfeeling and lingering plans of cure by abandonment, which must be fatal to some, even while others revive, I shall proceed with more consolatory consideration, to state, that,

Upon the principle of *permanent relief*, suggestions for the cultivation of the Cape of Good Hope have also been submitted to the public. The fertility of the soil, and the facility of cultivating it by the use of the plough, added to the greater ease with which labourers might be procured and employed *there*, are facts which appear to favor this recommendation. But the distance from our West-India Colonies, and the uncertainty of supplies in war-time, with other objections that suggest themselves after all that has been written upon those points, do not encourage a reliance upon this proposal, as long as more certain and local means may be proposed : and more especially as fertility of soil, abundance of vacant lands, and the facility of using the plough, are advantages to be found more immediately among the Colonies requiring relief.



It may be thrown in as an objection here, that *more* lands cannot be cultivated now, nor in future ; as the increase of labourers necessary for an increased cultivation is not to be found since the abolition of the slave-trade.

I regret, that I must acknowledge the validity of this objection to a certain extent, in consequence of the failure of two great means which I had calculated upon in the plan for that *permanent relief*, which it is absolutely necessary to establish, in order to render our Colonies independent of the United States. I mean the failure of the first attempt to colonize Trinidad with *Chinese* labourers ; and our disappointed scheme of establishing posts on the continent of *South America*. But as it is evident, that the plan for a Chinese Colony in the West-Indies has failed, only because it was not properly conducted, and therefore we may expect a more judicious attempt will yet be made ; so I would still encourage a hope, that the unmerited neglect of GENERAL MIRANDA'S services, and the causes of the failure of our attempts in the RIO DE LA PLATA, will be taken into consideration, in due time, and under such favorable auspices, as *yet* to be productive of events, that may realize our grand views of commerce with the people of South America ; as well as to afford the means

of assisting in the cultivation of our West-Indian Islands.

If Government were serious in the plan of making an establishment upon the Continent of South America when the expedition against Buenos Ayres was undertaken, it could not have been more effectually promoted, than by assisting *General Miranda* at the same time, to divert the attention of the Spanish *Commandants*, by his attack in the neighbourhood of the Caraccas ; and nothing could prove the feasibility of the project more than our first success at Buenos Ayres, and the progress which *Miranda* made with his small force. And if General Beresford had been instructed to give freedom to the people, as they proposed ; and General *Miranda* had been supported in his attack, by British forces, making the same proposal ; the whole Continent of South America would have been opened to our commercial view ; and the abolition of the slave-trade would never have been felt, in any deficiency of labour to cultivate our sugar-plantations. But, General Beresford was not *well instructed* ; and General *Miranda* was *not at all supported* ; and *other* circumstances conspiring, I am afraid the confidence must be much shaken, which is necessary to induce such an immense mass of people to permit any future innovations on our

part, whatever they may attempt themselves. Yet I am of opinion, that something might still be done by a *properly* concerted plan, *preceded by proposals for their emancipation, instead of attempts to conquer them* : and by making the attempt at many places at once, in order to distract the attention of the Governors of different districts.

But, whether such attempts may be ever made again, or, if made, succeed ; *Labourers* may be easily induced to go over to the Island of Trinidad, where great numbers of *Indians* already go from the Continent, to clear lands, plant provisions, and cut canes for the sugar-mills.

In a *permanent plan* for supplying the other Colonies with provisions, the ISLAND of TRINIDAD merits the serious attention, and fostering aid and protection of Government.

Hitherto these harmless, docile people who are called *Peons*, and are the peasantry of the South-American Continent, have not been encouraged, but have been rather deterred from the advantage which the extensive cultivation of new plantations offered to them, by too rigidly enforcing the *militia-laws*, upon those who ought rather to be allowed to come and go at their ease, when they have earned what satisfies them, and with

which they would willingly return to their families on the Continent. This facility would produce a constant succession of labourers; and a mild and generous treatment of them might induce great numbers of these valuable cultivators to emigrate from the country in which the Spanish yoke is almost intolerable: but such emigrations are not to be expected, while, instead of the boasted liberty which they have looked for under the British flag, they have hitherto seen more intolerance than that, to which, from being habituated under a Spanish flag, they are more willing to submit.

A higher value will now be set upon these labourers, since the abolition of the slave-trade; and, no doubt, suitable protection will be afforded by government in future; so that by encouraging them to domiciliate in great numbers in Trinidad, they may be engaged, through their connexions there, to emigrate, *via* Trinidad, to the other islands, to assist in taking off the crops, or to perform such labour upon plantations, as may be performed by *tasks*; which is a mode of labouring best calculated for these people, who, like the Chinese, are not to be *driven* to work, but *will* do their *job* at their own rate.

In the encouragement of the Spanish *Peons* there are none of the difficulties attending the new colony of Chinese. There are none of the great expences in their conveyance to the island : they defray that expence both going and returning. No stock of provisions is required to be collected for them : they are a hardy race, accustomed to the climate, and to the soil, from which they obtain all the food they require, excepting salt fish, of which they are very fond. They are frequently employed to build huts in preparation for newly-purchased negroes, and being very expert at this sort of building, they are never at a loss for habitations ; but as they are more enured to the climate, habitations are less necessary to them, than to negroes ; and therefore, in travelling they frequently swing their hammock from tree to tree, and, covering themselves with a blanket, repose till morning ; when they pursue their journey or their sport. Even negroes could not do this, and, I suppose, much less could the Chinese.

The *Peons* are also accustomed to the same food that the negroes eat, and know, even better than the negroes, how to cultivate it. None of the precautions that are necessary in the introduction of the Chinese are requisite to

be observed with the Peons. They are acquainted with the characters of the negroes, and do not hesitate to associate and to work with them; nor do they seem averse to living separate; nor is it at all necessary that they should; for they may indulge their inclinations in that respect, as there are several *Indian towns* in which some hundreds of them associate, and there are nearly *two thousand* of these *Indians* already settled in Trinidad.

All the difficulties of commencing colonization are overcome, and nothing is now needful, but by a just, wise, and liberal policy, to encourage their emigration from the continent, to settle in such numbers in this island, as that they may in due time, if not greatly assist the cultivation of sugar in the other islands, at least be employed in raising part of the provisions to feed the negroes of each Colony.

But, what I am convinced is practicable, *they may ultimately raise as much food in the island of TRINIDAD, as would feed all the negroes of our Windward and Leeward Charibbee islands, Jamaica excepted, which has vacant land enough to cultivate provisions for its own population.*



That this is possible with regard to provisions, need not be doubted; since Sir William Young\* gives the following account of this island's capacity.

“TRINIDAD, — if fully settled, *might produce a quantity of sugar equal to that of all the other Windward and Leeward islands.* It already returns 12,000 hogsheads.” But it appears, that this island is *already* more productive than this statement makes it to be: for, the “Political Account of Trinidad,”† reports the crop of the year 1805, to be equal to 29,725,044 lbs. of sugar, which in hogsheads of 13 cwt. amounts to 22,865 hogsheads. This return, in proportion to the number of negroes, gives double the quantity per negro, of the produce of Jamaica; and one-sixth more, than the most fertile of the other sugar-islands, viz. St Vincent.

As a proof that this valuable island is capable of becoming *a sufficient provision-plantation for all the other islands* belonging to Great Britain in the West Indies, it may be stated, besides that the productiveness of the soil is so great, there are *about fifteen hundred thousand*

\* West-India Common-Place-Book, p. 22.

† Page, 100.



*acres* of land in this island, all of which is capable of cultivation, and therefore it is not difficult to calculate its capacities in the plan of providing the necessary food for our other Colonies.

Of these fifteen hundred thousand acres, lots of land have been given, to private individuals, by the Spanish government, to the amount of 400 grants, each lot being upon an average 100 carées, or 320 acres; the granted lands, therefore, in the whole, amount to about 128,000 acres. Now it appears from the reports of Sir W. Young,\* that the lands in Jamaica which are cultivated in sugar, coffee, provisions, pasture, and pens, do not amount to more than 130,000 acres, of which not more than 105,232 acres are cultivated in sugar; so that without granting any more lands in Trinidad to be cultivated in sugar than are already granted, Trinidad may cultivate 13,980 acres in sugar *more* than there are now cultivated in that article in Jamaica, even after allowing the same number of acres to be deducted from the whole, for provisions, pasture, and pens, as are cultivated for those purposes in Jamaica: and then there will remain to be cultivated in the island of Trinidad, thirteen hundred and se-

\* West-India Common-Place-Book, chap. 2

venty-two thousand acres of the most fertile lands.

To this valuable Island then let us devote our serious attention, with a view to that *permanent relief* which may render our other Colonies independent of America; after having taken the precautionary steps for their immediate and temporary relief.

Those lands that are already in the possession of private individuals will be continued in their present state of cultivation by the negroes already settled upon them, assisted by such labourers as can be procured, whether Indians of South America, Chinese, or other free labourers: and, excepting a few of the last-imported slaves, the necessity for preserving the health of negroes, since the abolition, will cause such a degree of care and kindness to be bestowed upon them in every situation, that I doubt not, after a fair time for adopting new plans, the numbers will not diminish. And every proprietor will see the necessity of raising as much provision as he possibly can cultivate, without abandoning the usual cultivation of produce for Europe.

As every means ought to be adopted that can save animal labour, the use of the *Plough*

and the *Steam-engine* ought to be encouraged. In a country like Trinidad, where rock and gravel are even more scarce than rich soil is in many of the other islands, the plough may be used with great ease and advantage, to the great relief of labourers, and to the great profit of the planter. As, also, the steam-engine has been applied with so much success in Jamaica and Trinidad, its use will no doubt become more general in those islands; and its advantages becoming more generally known, great relief of animal labour will be gained in every island where Planters are not too bigotted in ancient customs to give themselves the opportunity of trying this useful power.

With a view to cultivate this Island as a *provision-plantation*, the disposal of the lands must be conducted upon principles very different to those on which the Crown-lands of other Islands have been disposed.

Upon former occasions it has been the practice to sell the Crown-lands; and it has been suggested that the sale of Crown-lands in Granada and Trinidad would "after paying the annual expences of the latter" yield a considerable annual revenue. That suggestion arose before the abolition of the slave-trade: but, under such

circumstances as now exist in our Colonies, it would be a cruel measure, were Government to sell the crown-lands in Trinidad in order to pay the expences of the civil government of that or any other Colony. Indeed there is not now any probability of purchasers appearing in a market for West-India possessions; and were purchasers to be found in such a market, the proceeds of the sale of crown-lands might be better applied if allowed to constitute a fund for certain beneficial purposes in the plan for *permanent relief*.

For Instance. As there may appear persons desirous of settling upon easy terms on new lands in Trinidad; and some of them, whose pecuniary situations may be more liberal than others, may desire to have a preference in the choice of the lots to be granted to them; let the intended grants be divided into two descriptions: one to be granted upon the condition of the *Grantees* choosing a lot suitable to his own views of settlement and cultivation, he giving a certain *small* sum per acre as a premium to obtain possession thereof, or a certain ground-rent for a term of years. And the other to be granted at the discretion of the Commissioners for Crown-lands, according to the number and description of the people to be settled thereon; and cer-

tain regulations may be adopted, to govern in some measure, those circumstances,

But the premium on ground-rent to be paid for those lands which the Settlers will be allowed to chuse, ought to be *funded* for two purposes: and first, for a bounty for certain encouragements to cultivators of certain articles;—breeders of stock, — women having large families of children, &c. to be hereafter noticed more particularly: — and secondly, to afford loans for the poorer settlers, in order to aid them while the first growth of their crops and stock is advancing.

This proposal brings me to the consideration of a description of Settlers who might be introduced, much to their own advantage as well as to the encouragement of the plan for *permanent relief*.

There are a great number of Planters in several of the old settled Colonies, who possess very valuable slaves with very worthless lands; and who in course are scarcely enabled by the labour of their negroes upon such barren lands, to pay the expences of their estates; and much less to support their families properly, under the present depressed state of West-India produce.

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But such has been the unprosperous connexion with West-India property for some time past, that even though such Planters may not be indebted to their British correspondents, the credit of West-India property is so completely destroyed, that no aid for new speculations will be given from Great Britain, and therefore these Planters cannot remove from their old establishments, whatever advantages may offer themselves in any new prospect; because they cannot defray the expence of transportation; nor, can they afford to abandon their buildings to build new ones upon any new lands which they might acquire in lieu of the old lands which they would abandon.

To assist these people to quit their unprofitable toil on worn-out, or naturally barren lands; the proposal may be made to them, that they shall be put in possession of fertile lands in the island of Trinidad, proportioned to the quantity of land they will abandon; or in proportion to the number of their families and slaves: and that they shall be conveyed from the old to the new possessions, free of the expence of conveyance; which may be effected by ordering the *transport-vessels* in the employment of Government, as they may disembark the troops occasionally sent to the Colonies, to take on-board

such families and their slaves, as may have applied, through the proper offices, for conveyance, to take possession of their appointed grants of land.

Next, as the loss of the buildings which they may abandon will be severely felt by those who have not the means of making new establishments; in order to render such losses not irrecoverable, let the *fund* formed from the premiums, or ground-rent, be partly appropriated in the giving of loans to a moderate amount, say £2000, to such persons whose families and slaves require erections to that amount; and less, in proportion, to those who have abandoned less, or whose situations require less. These loans to be returned after the first year, by annual payments of five per cent. without interest.

That the *temporary aid of small sums to commence settlements*, in islands where agriculture requires encouragement in order to promote its extension to the greatest advantage, *may* be adopted with a certain prospect of great benefit; we need only turn our eyes to the island of ST CROIX, where a *fund* for loans for such a purpose has been long established; and to which the highly-cultivated state of that country is to be attributed. This island which within a few



years past was but of little value, is now to be compared only to a garden: and to this superior degree of cultivation it has been brought, principally by British settlers; who not only obtained lands upon easy terms, but were assisted with negroes, mules, and implements of husbandry; and I believe even *cash* to erect or repair buildings: and such advances were included in a mortgage given to the Government upon the whole property, for an amount to be liquidated in a very gradual manner; so that the possessor of the estate might be able with certainty to repay it, besides providing for the expences of the estate, and the maintenance of his family. And thus, possessors of estates belonging to the Government were encouraged to extend the cultivation of the island, and at the same time were gradually liquidating their debt; and thereby realizing a property for their families. I believe the rate at which this is done, does not exceed *six-and-a-half per cent. per annum*, of which, *four per cent.* goes for interest upon the capital, and *two-and-a-half per cent.* towards the liquidation of the debt. The liberality of such a system is beyond dispute; and the beneficial effect both to the Cultivator and the Government is beyond doubt; because, individuals, who began to cultivate lands upon these terms, with

little, and in some instances with no capital, have become even *extremely* opulent; and the island, by its perfect cultivation, has become very valuable to the government.

The islands of ST THOMAS and ST JOHN, also belonging to the DANISH CROWN, are placed under the same liberal plan.

A system of this sort, though perhaps not extended to an equal degree of liberality, was adopted in the island of TRINIDAD, previous to its conquest by the British forces: and, even up to the time of that event, many Planters were indebted to the SPANISH government for the value of mules, and other aids, with which they were supplied to promote an extensive cultivation of this fertile country.

The adoption of such a plan, even upon the narrow scale that characterizes the mercenary views of a Spanish government, is evidence of a conviction, that it would be highly *beneficial*; which, added to the experience of its *successful* adoption in the Danish islands, ought to call forth the attention of the BRITISH government in their plans for the colonization and cultivation of TRINIDAD.

With this view, I would first recommend, that an *investigation* should be instituted into the debts of the Planters to the Spanish government, due on account of the advances which were made to them as described. This debt, owing from the settlers to the Government of Spain, became by the conquest, due to the Government of Great Britain; and as it may be presumed, that it has not been collected since the conquest, in-as-much as it was the mutual interest of the debtors to keep the secret, and of no advantage to any other persons to divulge it; so I conclude, that these debts are still owing, and due to the British government. But as there are yet residing in the Island, Officers of the Spanish government who must be well informed upon these points, information may be easily obtained relative thereto; so that proper methods may be taken to collect such sums as may be still recoverable: which *sums* added to the *premiums*, or *ground-rent*, before recommended, may form a *fund*: and this fund may be rendered still more equal to the accomplishment of the plan, for giving loans to assist new settlers, by the following means.

The impolicy of exacting the *three-and-a-half per cent.* upon our own manufactures and the produce of the Colony, being very evident; it

is to be expected, that it will be no longer expected, when a *Colonial Assembly* shall be called to raise taxes for the payment of the Colonial expences: and if the plan of growing provisions in the Colony *be not* adopted, the *three-and-half per cent.* would be equally impolitic upon American provisions also. But if the plan of devoting this island to the cultivation of provisions should be adopted, then the *three-and-half-per cent. duty*, being already paid upon American provisions will not be felt as a prohibitory duty upon them, and may be continued on those articles in order to the encouragement of *colonial provisions*: and the amount of the duties so collected, may be added to the other means for affording loans to new settlers, and thus *a very substantial fund* would be established to support the proposed plan for *permanent relief*.

But whether *a fund* can be established from such debts due to government, or from lands granted upon the condition of paying a low premium or ground-rent; nevertheless, *a fund* could certainly be formed from the collections of *three-and-half per cent.* upon American provisions; from which *fund*, loans might be given upon the plan of the Danish loan, with equally beneficial effects in the island of Trinidad: and certainly, upon the principle of forming *a provision-*

*plantation*, from which to supply the other Colonies, it deserves the most attentive consideration, as a great mean of *permanent relief* to the other Islands.

If these proposals be approved, a proclamation may be issued from the Governments of all our Islands, by the directions of the Secretary of State for the Colonial department, offering lands in the island of Trinidad to the persons who may chuse to abandon their exhausted or barren possessions; and conveyance, to those who require it; when such opportunities offer as have been before described: together with loans proportioned to the necessity of the cases of those requiring them; the re-payment of which, to be secured to government by mortgage of the lands granted, and the buildings, negroes, and stock, to be placed thereon.

Upon these terms, a great number of Settlers would offer themselves in almost every Island: many of whom now employ their gangs of slaves to very little profit, and cannot even support their families after feeding their negroes; and who are therefore becoming poorer every year by the sale of a part of their gang, levied upon by executions at the suit of creditors,

for supplies furnished for slaves, who do not earn the value of their food.

The Islands from whence such emigrations of white families and their slaves would mostly take place, would be *Barbadoes*, *Antigua*, *Montserrat*, *Anguilla*, the *Virgin Islands*, and the *Bahamas*: from these last, and from Barbadoes, the emigration would be great. Their emigration could not be injurious to the Colonies taken in the aggregate, because they would only remove from one Colony to another; on the contrary, it would be beneficial to the whole, so long as the emigrants were to be obliged to cultivate provisions, in the new settlement instead of sugar; which article they ought to be altogether prohibited from cultivating. And in another point of view, their emigration would not be injurious to individual Islands; for it could be only those whose negroes are employed on unproductive land, that would emigrate: and no one will deny, that the emigration of unproductive labourers is an advantage to every Colony, where the external source of subsistence is threatened to be cut off; and where, at the same time, the internal means are inadequate to the consumption. The emigration of families and negroes from such situations to a fertile settlement, would rather benefit than injure those Colonies, by

lessening the demand for provisions in the Islands they quit, and producing in the Island they go to cultivate, food for the Colonies which they abandon.

The prohibition, *for ever*, of the cultivation of the sugar-cane ought to be a condition in the grants of land; and the quantity granted ought not, at the most, to be more than *twenty* acres for each *white* person; and *ten* acres for each *free coloured* person; and the same quantity for each slave to the amount of every domestic and field negro, or their children born at the time of granting the lands to the owner of such slaves.

It would be found very advantageous to give this quantity for *children also*, as it would encourage families to settle in the island; and such Colonists are, in every point of view, preferable to the undomesticated; for besides being more orderly and industrious, their offspring become more healthy adults, after passing their infancy and youth in the same climate: and, forming early connexions, they promote the population of the country.

Every person owning more than *ten* working slaves, should be allowed to plant what he thought proper, (excepting sugar-cane), pro-



vided he always plant at least five acres in provisions for each person in his family, and for each of his slaves ; to do which, he ought to be obliged, in the conditions of his grant, under the penalty of its forfeiture.

But those Settlers who have not *more* than *ten* working slaves, ought to be prohibited from planting any thing but articles of food ; also under the penalty of the forfeiture of their grants. And thus the owners of large gangs would be enabled to employ their slaves to advantage, without encreasing the quantity of sugar in the market ; by cultivating COCOA, COFFEE, COTTON, and TOBACCO, according to the nature of the soil in their possession : at the same time that they would produce crops of provisions in their proper succession, while the other plantations would be coming to maturity ; and indeed upon the same ground : for the maize would grow amongst, and afford the necessary shelter to the young cocoa-plants ; and the plantain-tree is also necessary to shelter the coffee, more especially if planted on hill-sides.

But in order to secure an abundant supply of provisions for the *permanent relief* proposed ; all individuals, obtaining their twenty or ten acres, according to their colour ; as well as those

whose working-slaves amount only to the number limited, as before mentioned, should be prohibited from planting any thing but provisions; and in order to insure the *cultivation* of provisions on the small lots of land, in the possession of the lowest classes of individuals, (who, from being able to cultivate in a day as much as would subsist themselves for a week, would often be idle and unproductive inhabitants,) the Peons, free negroes, and Chinese, should each be made to pay, for his lot of land, a certain quarterly rent, to an amount equal to what he can produce from it above his own subsistence; in order to render daily labour necessary. And the rents of such lots may go into the *fund* before recommended for the necessary loans to be given to new Settlers; and for bounties to be paid for encouraging the growth of provisions, cattle, &c. and as the greatest number of Settlers would consist of such individuals, but more particularly those who have only a few negroes, or who have only means enough to purchase such a small number in order to obtain the grant of land; so the greatest cultivation of granted lands would be in articles of food: and no Island, in the possession of Great Britain, is so well adapted to this sort of cultivation, as this Island, on account of the facility with which its soil

can be tilled, in consequence of the absence of rock and gravel; as well as on account of the regularity of the rains, and the heavy nocturnal dews. The Planter may calculate with safety on the value of his crop in proportion to the quantity of land in cultivation; while in most of the other islands, much ground may be planted or sown, and yet little or nothing may be reaped from it, in proportion as the season may have been wet or dry.

As to the articles of provision, which this fertile Island may be capable of producing; we may speak with certainty of a sufficient number, to afford the great and *permanent relief* proposed: and as the PLOUGH can be used in Trinidad with as great facility as in Europe, as far as regards the freedom of the soil from *rocks* and *gravel*; so I think *the same grain* may be sown there with a great prospect of success; as it is a fact arising from accident, that some OATS, which were carelessly thrown out of a bag, vegetated and produced grain: and CLOVER seed, brought from America, was sown in 1806, and came out of the ground with great promise of success: but the result is no farther known to the author, as no letters have been lately received from the Planter who tried the experiment.

But from the moderate temperature of the rainy months, and the coolness of the nights, which in some parts of the country will admit of sleeping under a blanket, I doubt not that the same grain can be cultivated as in America and Europe.

The *superstratum* of this Island may be properly called "*true vegetable earth*," or that sort of earth which is best adapted to the nourishment of vegetables; as it is composed of putrid vegetable and animal matter to a considerable depth; and it is natural to expect it should be so, since it is probable, that from the creation of the world, the accumulation of putrifying vegetable and animal matter, has never been interrupted; nor that the soil has ever been disturbed: it must therefore be of the richest kind.

If the cultivation of WHEAT be attempted, the method of *setting* it will be the most likely to succeed; for, besides that it has been found to answer by producing two bushels per acre more than wheat sown, and that it is of a better quality, and affords a saving in seed-wheat of six pecks per acre, it would also employ the women and children as dibbers and droppers: and one dibber with three droppers, can set an acre in two days.

The method of **SETTING** being performed, by dibbing holes four inches asunder every way, and one inch deep ; while into each hole the child drops two grains of wheat, after which the holes are covered by a gate, bushed with thorns, and drawn by a horse.

As the seasons are so different from seasons in Europe, I am rather at a loss to direct the time for sowing; but I apprehend, that land prepared in September, might be set in October, and reaped in the following crop-time; that is in the dry months of March, April, and May; but this would be soon ascertained by the experiment.\* As in many parts of the

\* I have been informed that wheat is cultivated to advantage on the Continent of South America, in-so-much that *three crops* may be reaped from the same land *only once sown*: for, by allowing the roots to remain in the soil after reaping the crop, fresh shoots are put forth, which yield a second crop, though less productive than the first; and that a third crop may be obtained, in the same proportion less than the second: for instance, that the first crop may yield forty-five bushels per acre; the second thirty-five bushels; and the third twenty-five bushels per acre. In a country where the price of labour is high, this fact is of great consequence; therefore it would be of the greatest consequence in Trinidad, if wheat *will* grow there. And by such a method of cultivating it in a country where the soil is fertile, the summer eternal, and vegetation always luxuriant, *three crops* might be

Island there is a rich soil mixed with some sand, and I am informed the *Buck-wheat* is very productive in such a soil, that grain also might be tried with great prospect of success. The Indian corn, or MAIZE, is already produced in great quantities in Trinidad: and both the mountain and lowland RICE is produced by some industrious experimentalists. Hitherto, however, it has been esteemed most advantageous to attend wholly to one sort of cultivation, viz. Sugar, which being so much more valuable than provisions, the Planters have been more willing to cultivate it, and to purchase provisions with the proceeds of its sale. This is no longer the

reaped there in less time than is required for the growth of *two*, in countries that ordinarily produce wheat:

The average of three such crops as I have described to be reaped from the same land once sown, is thirty-five bushels per acre; which is a very fine crop, even if it were reaped only once from the same seed: but suppose that the quantities from which the average is taken are too great; let them stand at forty, thirty, and twenty, then, as the *three* crops will be reaped in the time that only *two* would be obtained in those countries where the land must be three times prepared and sown; the *three* may be calculated as *two* crops, which gives forty-five bushels per acre for each:—or if we must consider them as three crops, the average will even then be thirty bushels per acre, which is a good crop; especially when considered along with the saving of labour and time, amounting to two-thirds of each.



case. Sugar is not so valuable as it was, and the danger of being deprived of the usual supplies from America is now seen; so that the cultivation of maize will be now extended with advantage: and the growth of rice ought to become as general as the Maize: In addition to these, the GUINEA-CORN, which is produced in Barbadoes and other Islands with great success, ought to be attentively cultivated; as it affords a flour of a very superior quality: and, indeed, the impossibility of growing wheat would be no misfortune in a country that could so abundantly produce *Rice* and *Guinea-Corn*; for the flour of these grains mixed will make a very excellent Bread.

All the esculent roots are cultivated in this Island with advantage; but the *Yam* and the *Maniock* or *Cassava*, are the most valuable: and of the two the *Yam* is to be preferred.



The *Plantain* is even at present much relied upon. The BREAD-FRUIT tree would be still more valuable, as it is continually productive; and requires no attention after being planted where it is intended to remain. Its growth ought to be so encouraged, as, at the door of every negro's hut a Bread-fruit tree should be







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planted: for it is said, that one tree will produce vegetable food enough for one family. The cultivation of the Bread-fruit tree has been greatly successful upon some Estates in Trinidad; and therefore, there is no difficulty in propagating it very generally.

There is, also, another article of food, requiring very little or no attention in the cultivation, which is continually and abundantly produced; the *Pigeon-Pea*: and an instance of the little labour required to cultivate it, in proportion to its productiveness, has lately been communicated to me by a Gentleman from that Island: who relates, that thirty new slaves being purchased for the "Exchange Estate" about the time that the American-Intercourse Bill was in negotiation, it happened that the Americans discontinued their supplies of provisions: and the Attorney for this Estate, foreseeing the scarcity which succeeded, directed that eight of this lot of new slaves, who were less robust than the rest, should be employed in the easy task of sowing Peas, and in keeping the ground clear of weeds, until the pea-bush came to maturity; when it was found, that the Peas cultivated, by these *eight* inferior negroes, were sufficient to feed, for several months, the whole of the thirty

new negroes as far as amounted to the vegetable food necessary for them. The success of this economy had its influence upon the neighbouring Planters; but not until after the scarcity, which they had not provided against, made them feel the necessity of an internal resource for subsistence.

I need not, however, take up the reader's attention with cases or arguments to shew, that every sort of food, necessary for human subsistence, might be produced in this fertile Island, where all the *pleasant* seasons of the year are experienced in twenty-four hours; the killing cold of winter being alone absent. Morning, noon, and evening, afford a few hours of spring, summer, and autumn, every day.

It is objected to the seasonableness of this fertile Island, by those whose interest it is to recommend a preference of our more ancient colonies, that, clearing new islands of their forests renders them less seasonably supplied with rain: But I contend, that were the whole plain of Trinidad cultivated, instead of being a forest, yet this Island would not become what is called a "dry-weather country." The great ridges of mountains, and their forests, in the *centre* of the plain, and on the whole *north-side*

of the Island, will always sufficiently attract and break the clouds into plentiful showers of rain. But independently of these mountains and their forests, even if this Island were a cultivated plain, it would never want rains; because of its proximity to the continent, where rains are never deficient. And as a proof, that, on the South-American coast, mountains and trees are not necessary to attract showers from the clouds; it may be observed, that even at sea, out of sight of trees and land, but within the currents, the showers are as constant and as regular during the period of the rainy season, as they are on the continent itself.

With such seasonable weather and such an abundance of the richest land, if proper plans be adopted for its cultivation, TRINIDAD can produce *twenty-fold* the quantity of grain, that is now consumed by all the British colonies in the West Indies.

It appears by the return \* made to the House of Commons, May 5th, 1806, that in 1803, the

\* Sir W. Young's Common-Place-Book, p. 132.

following articles were imported from America into the West-Indies.

Corn - - - - - 647,853 Bushels.

Flour and Meal 431,504 Do.

Rice - - - - - 9,393 Do.

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Total 1,088,750 Do.

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Taking Indian Corn for the purpose of calculation, it may be stated, that an acre of good land in America yields 40 bushels of corn. In Trinidad, where the soil is so rich and the weather so forcing, an acre will produce more than 40 bushels of corn: but at least that quantity may be assumed. At this rate, the whole quantity of dry - provisions imported from America into our West-India colonies in 1803 would not require more than 30,000 acres of land to produce it, allowing for the difference of the return per acre in the different kinds of grain of which the total amount consists; and therefore the uncultivated lands in Trinidad would at this rate produce *fifty-fold* the quantity now consumed in all our West-Indian islands.

But under all the objections that may be brought against this calculation, and consider-



ing that it would be adviseable to grow Timber and other valuable articles, I am still warranted in stating, that Trinidad would produce at least *twenty-fold* the quantity of grain that is now imported from America.

Also the immense SAVANNAS of this island afford the immediate means of raising CATTLE equal to the supply of all the other colonies. But even if these *natural meadows* were not sufficient to that amount, lands may be granted upon the condition of clearing them from *pasture* and *cattle-pens*. There are no difficulties in all these plans that have not been overcome every where: and why should British Colonists be less capable of overcoming them, than the North and South Americans, and the people of the Island of *Porto Rico*; upon whom they have hitherto been dependent for subsistence.

To stock Trinidad with every sort of living creature fit for food is more easy to be accomplished than it could be in almost any other Island, as the Spaniards are in the habit of bringing cargoes of live stock every week from the neighbouring parts of the continent within sight, and within four hours sail of Trinidad. Will it not then be unpardonably neglectful, and a most extraordinary instance of want of

providence, after experiencing the truly distressing *crisis* which the colonies now feel, if the means of *permanent relief* which this Island affords be not immediately adopted and actively carried into effect?

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It is also a matter of great moment to Great Britain to take into consideration, the possibility of rendering this great acquisition to the British territories, a means of becoming independent of America in respect of certain *other* articles that are as necessary to our *maritime support*; as the articles of food usually imported from America to our Colonies, are necessary to their subsistence.

The supply of HEMP, TAR, PITCH, TALLOW and TIMBER, so necessary for our navy, may become very deficient should we be involved in a war with Russia and America: and the inconveniencies to be apprehended from such an event, may have an influence upon our conduct towards those powers, very derogatory to our national dignity and national interests; when, from our dependence upon them for those supplies to a certain degree, these powers may assert rights, or endeavour to maintain political

positions incompatible with our naval superiority, and national honor.

TRINIDAD affords the means of rendering Great Britain independent of Russia and America for the articles before enumerated, at the same time that it will raise the means of subsistence for the West-Indian Colonies.

Three of these articles, viz. *Tar*, *Pitch*, and *Timber*, may be immediately obtained. *Tallow* will be produced in great quantity, if government will promote the raising of cattle on the *Savannas*, or even if sufficient numbers of cattle be imported from the neighbouring continent to graze upon these *Savannas*: and at least, an agent of government might be authorized to buy up all the *Tallow* that would be imported from the main land upon good encouragement being given for its importation. A ready-*cash* market, or even an opportunity to barter *Tallow* for our Manufactures free of the *three-and-a-half per cent. duty* now imposed on them, would produce an abundant supply of *Tallow*, even during the war-time: but by encouraging the breeding of cattle on the *Savannas*, and the grazing of those which might be largely imported from the neighbouring coast,

Tallow enough would ultimately be produced within the Island.

**TAR**, or rather a liquid *Bitumen* answering all the purposes to which Tar is applied, may be obtained from certain places in the neighbourhood of Point de la Br  a, where in states of the weather known to the inhabitants of that quarter it may be taken up by ladles to be put into proper barrels for conveyance to Europe.

But as to **PITCH**, it may be obtained in greater quantities than would supply not only *all the navy of Great Britain, but all the navies, and all the merchant-ships of all the world.* The **LAKE OF PITCH** in Trinidad is certainly an extraordinary phenomenon. I believe a philosophical account of it has been given, in the transactions of the Royal Society, by Dr Anderson of St Vincents. This Lake occupies a space at least a mile and a half in circumference; and a road to it from the sea-shore has been naturally opened by the overflowing of the Lake, forming a river of Pitch, the appearance of which exhibits small waves making their way into the Gulph of Paria.

This bituminous substance is in common use in Trinidad for various purposes. The ends of

*posts* to be planted in the ground, and the *tenons* and *mortices* of sugar-mills and other Erections exposed to the *weather* or to *vermine*, are protected from the destructive power of both, by being coated with this Pitch after melting it over the fire and pouring it off, or straining it, from impurities.

It is also used, and with the greatest advantage, to pay the bottoms of boats and larger vessels: and in the Gulph where worms abound and are fatal to vessels long remaining or constantly navigating there, this Bitumen is a most excellent defence, as from its peculiar pungent bitterness, or what some people call *rankness*, it is so noxious as to preserve the bottoms of vessels from the attacks of worms. Until very lately it was used by melting one-fourth or one-third of Tallow with three-fourths or two-thirds of Pitch; but as these two articles are different in their nature, they did not combine well: and therefore *Admiral Cochrane*, who is well acquainted with the subject, and I am informed, has industriously applied himself to it, very judiciously directs the *solid Bitumen* to be melted with a proper proportion of the *Petroleum*, in order that by the affinity of the two a more natural composition may be obtained for

use, besides that from the greater fluidity of this mixture while hot its vegetable and earthy impurities may be themore easily separated, the former floating upon the surface may be skimmed off, and the latter sinking to the bottom, the pure melted matter may be poured into proper receptacles. As an article of merchandize, it will never be attended to by private individuals, because the freight from the West-Indies to Great Britain, will raise it to a price above the price at which we can obtain Tar and Pitch from America and Russia. But in time of war, and even in peace, transport-ships, after disembarking their troops; and store-ships after landing their cargoes, may take in a lading of this article to supply not only all the naval arsenals in the West-Indies, but all our dock-yards in Great Britain.

The establishment that would be necessary upon the banks of this Pitch-Lake for the purpose of preparing the Pitch for use, would not require a great expence: and a cooperage for the barrels might be kept at work upon the spot, which could be supplied with STAVES, HOOPS, and HEADING from the adjoining forest. But as government is frequently defrauded while individuals are making fortunes, it would

be advisable to contract with a proper person to furnish this article at a moderate rate: and should moneyed men think they may otherwise turn their cash to more advantage, a loan might be given to a proper individual giving security for the amount, who might gradually refund to Government by receiving only a certain proportion of the amount, which would be annually due from Government, until the whole of the loan should be returned. Thus government would receive the advantage without incurring the risk of frauds and impositions.

That "the largest OAK-TIMBER is yearly diminishing, and more difficult to procure\*" is a matter of information which every Englishman will hear with great regret. It is also stated, that "twenty millions of *staves* would take more OAK than Britain could prudentially spare from its nurseries of timber for the navy.†"

It is therefore of favourable consequence to the Colonies, that proper measures being adopted, they might be supplied with LUMBER

\* Sir W. Young's Common-Place-Book, p. 35.

† Ibid.



also from Trinidad. Many Estates in that Island never purchase, from abroad, either STAVES, or HOOPS, or HEADING: and CEDAR SHINGLES, which are the most durable of all shingles, are split there in great quantities. All these articles are cut out of the Forests of that Island: and if on any Estate this economy has not been found to answer, it has not been because the materials were not good, but because they were not well worked up by skilful cutters.

TIMBER of the most massive size and most durable nature is procured for buildings of every dimension. Reports having been already made to Government upon this subject; it suffices to state, that Cedar boards and plank, and Cedar timber to any useful size, might be readily obtained in any quantity: and this wood is well known to be very valuable, both on account of its lightness, and the facility with which it is worked; as well as on account of its being noxious to the worm which is so injurious to the bottoms of ships. *Knee-Timber* of every dimension, and of the most durable wood, is also very abundant. And suitable Timber for Keels, Kelsons, &c. also abounds.

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HEMP which is an article of very great consequence, and the cultivation of which succeeds in all climates, would undoubtedly succeed in TRINIDAD. As a cold clay or stiff land does not favor this article, but as on the contrary, a strong rich land produces most abundant crops of it, the soil of this Island is peculiarly suitable for its cultivation. As it is produced in the various climates of Spain, Italy, England, Scotland, Russia, China, Egypt, North-America, and lastly, in some parts of South-America; there is no reason to apprehend that the climate of Trinidad should in particular be unfavorable to its growth. The hemp which this soil would produce would be of inferior quality fit for cordage, because of the richness of these new lands: the same fact is experienced in the sugar produced from new soil; but poorer lands are to be found which would produce the finer hemp for domestic purposes. I understand that hemp does not exhaust the soil like flax, and that with good management it may be repeatedly produced from the same spot. It will be found a beneficial plan even upon estates where sugar or any other article is already in cultivation, to plant Hemp round the cultivated land, as weeds will not grow in

its neighbourhood, and crops are preserved by it from insects.

A pamphlet from an ingenious pen \* affords me the following extract. "About six acres of land are required for producing a ton of flax; and five acres for a ton of hemp: so that, supposing we consume 10,000 tons of the former and 40,000 tons of the latter, which is quite as much as we do consume, it would require only 260,000 acres to be applied to the cultivation of these articles." "All the hemp, however, requisite for the independence of the navy, might be raised from 20,000 acres." These remarks are intended, by the author of that pamphlet, for Great Britain. But while an importation of foreign wheat is necessary for our home-consumption the cultivation of waste lands would be better devoted to the means of subsistence, while the lands of Trinidad, which may not be favourable to the growth of wheat, will produce all the hemp required for the ships of Great Britain, if it consumed five times the quantity which it is said to consume; and still there would be left, uncultivated, some hundred thousands of acres, even besides the

\* Spence's "Britain independent of Commerce," p. 62.

quantity before calculated for the growth of all the provisions that the West-India Colonies consume.

I conceive, that, the *Chinese* hemp-seed would succeed better in Trinidad than seed from this country : and as the encouragement of a new scheme depends so much upon the success of the first attempt, care ought to be taken to prevent the failure of the first experiment. And as this Island is of so much value to Great Britain in the different points of view in which it has been placed, Ministers ought to enter upon such a plan with liberality and perseverance.

By making the first experiments upon the great scale ; under the advantage of skilful directors, who should be interested in the plans proposed, success may be ensured. In order to effect such desirable ends ; let a suitable lot of land be chosen for a *large farm* to be cultivated, at the expense of Government, in *wheat, rice, hemp, and tobacco* ; and send out proper persons to erect *Steam-engines* to work a *flour-mill, saw-mill*, and any other machinery that may be contrived for the saving of animal labour. And where hands are necessary, let them be *hired* labourers, under the direction

of proper agriculturists from Flour, Rice, Hemp, and Tobacco countries.

Or if, as alluded to in the establishment for the pitch-lake, government should apprehend frauds and impositions from the persons employed: in like manner upon this occasion, give a loan to a liberal amount, to some person or persons who may give security for the sum of money, prescribing to them the plan, and leaving them to execute it.

When such modes of cultivation are found to succeed under such a plan, the example will be generally followed: but until Government shall give some such encouragement, these experiments will not be made; because private Individuals are generally backward to do any thing that by failure would involve them in ruin.

In order to get hired labourers into the habit of daily work, while the new settlement may be in preparation for extensive cultivation; and to convince them by punctual daily payment, that they are not expected to work at the uncertainty of ever receiving the earnings of their toil, which is too often the case; let *Peons* be encouraged to come from the Spanish main, to work with those already domiciliated in the

Island, upon fortifications, roads, and canals, instead of arbitrarily taking from the Planters their slaves, at times and under circumstances the most inconvenient and distressing.

Roads and canals will be absolutely necessary for the conveyance of timber into the Gulph of Paria, as well as to facilitate the conveyance of produce to the market, and provisions to the estates.

One CANAL has been already traced through a level country, from the Gulph to *Hislop town*, a new settlement upon the Eastern shore of the Island; this canal could be cut with the greatest facility through a soil that has no rock nor gravel perhaps in the whole distance through which the canal would run; the advantages of water-carriage would cause a rapid cultivation of the lands upon the banks of the canal. But *all this can never be carried into effect under the present system of that Island.*

AN ASSEMBLY of REPRESENTATIVES must be called; to raise, by proper taxes, the means of making *roads* and *canals*, and of paying the other *expences* of the Colony. And the *three-and-a-half per cent.* duty must be no longer im-

posed on any thing excepting American provisions, and not even on them if the plans which are proposed in this work be not adopted. I know that there are *Enemies* to the *liberties* of the *Colonists*, in the very persons who are *friends* to the *liberty* of the *slaves*. However inconsistent such principles may be with each other, yet it is a fact, that *those who would enfranchise the slaves, have recommended the enslaving of the proprietors*. The author of the "Crisis of the Sugar Colonies," while he recommends an alliance with, and a protection of the negroes of St Domingo in their revolted state, in the same book recommends Ministers not to give the freedom of election to the Colonists of Trinidad; and represents the colonial Assemblies in general to be worse than *useless* branches of the colonial Legislatures.

The merit of *originality* is not due to this author's recommendation to the minister on the subject of Colonial Assemblies; for STOKES'S "Constitution of the British Colonies" was published in 1783, and that book, in page 154, anticipates much of what the author of "the Crisis of the Sugar Colonies" recommends, relative to such a place as Trinidad, and the impolicy, as he considers it, of granting to that



Colony the freedom of electing their own Representatives.

That book also suggests the plan of devoting an Island wholly to the raising of provisions and stock: certainly Mr Stokes had not the island of TRINIDAD in his mind at the time he suggested this plan in his book, for he rather describes an island like PORTO RICO, when he says "an Island of *moderate* size and *naturally* defensible:" but, in respect of a good harbour capable of receiving and heaving down line-of-battle Ships, the Gulph of Paria offers such advantages.

When the author of "the Crisis of the Sugar Colonies" opposed the electing of an Assembly in Trinidad, and depreciated the Assemblies of the other Islands, the abolition of the slave-trade, so far from being accomplished, was almost despaired of. And, as it was very clear, that the members of those Assemblies were hostile to the abolition-act; so it is still more certain, that they *must be* hostile to the state of "*African freedom and African sovereignty*," to which the author of the Crisis says we might look forward "*with satisfaction rather than dismay*." This author therefore looks at the colonial Assemblies, and at the Councils too, as the only obstacles to

his great scheme for "African freedom and African sovereignty in the West Indies:"\* and therefore he is so desirous of preventing the establishment of representative Assemblies in new Colonies, and of annihilating those already established in the old Colonies. I will add no more on this subject, than a quotation from that able colonial politician, Brougham.

"As the general interests of the community have been sacrificed to fill the purses of a few individuals: so, the general interests of the Empire have frequently been made subservient to the most narrow-minded sort of ambition which can inspire any cabinet — the preference of excessive power over a *wretched* province, to a moderate dominion over an extensive and *flourishing* Empire."†

As I consider it impossible that Trinidad can, with justice, be any longer refused that eligible mode of legislating which is exercised in the other Colonies under a Governor, and Council, and an Assembly of representatives, freely elected by the inhabitants, I shall suppose this

\* "The Opportunity," by the Author of "the Crisis of the Sugar Colonies," p. 42.

† "Colonial Policy of European Powers," V. i. p. 105.

measure to be adopted, and consider the Legislature as vested with the power to establish and dispose of the *fund*, before alluded to, upon something like the following plan.

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*Ways and means* to raise a *fund* for loans and bounties, without drawing upon the Treasury of Great Britain.

1st. A low ground-rent of            per acre, to be paid by Settlers who are to be allowed the *choice* of their grants. And this ground-rent may be commuted by an immediate payment.

2d. Rents of lots to be let to free labourers, and to be paid quarterly, or oftener, at such a rate as may prevent them from being able to live independent of daily labour.

3d. Sums of money to be collected from Settlers who were indebted to the Spanish Government for aids given to them in mules, or implements of husbandry, or otherwise.

4th. Three-and-a-half per cent. to be continued to be collected on all American importations.

This duty being already collected, it will not be felt like any new Impost; and it is a proper

mean of encouraging the growth of provisions in the Island, at the same time that it will furnish the means of aiding Settlers to cultivate provision-estates. These means will form a very liberal fund, and the last mean will continually increase the fund for several years to come: besides, that after the first year or two, the loans will always be returning into the fund by annual instalments; so that in time, a *permanent fund* will be established, from which new Settlers may obtain loans, even after this Island shall arrive at such an extensive state of cultivation, as to produce so much provision as may annually lessen the demand for food from the United States.

#### LOANS to be given:—

1st. To Settlers who cannot afford to abandon buildings in the Islands they would quit, unless assisted with a *reasonable* sum to erect buildings on the granted lands.

2d. To poor individual Settlers for articles as follow, viz. for building their cottage, (which the *Peons* will undertake for forty dollars,) for one hundred feet of boards to make doors, windows, shelves, table, and seats; for locks, hinges, implements of husbandry, and a little live stock.

Also a monthly allowance of provisions until the first crop comes in.

**BOUNTIES** to be paid out of *'s fund.*

1st, *The rent* paid by free coloured or negro labouring people for their lots, *to be remitted* upon their marrying and having children, in the proportion of one-fourth part of the rent for each child: and for every one more than four children, a monthly allowance to be given from the fund until the first child is twelve years old; when it will be able to earn the means of its subsistence; so that always, the *rent* should be *remitted* for four children under twelve years old, and *allowance* should be *added* for any more than four children under twelve years. And the proportion of rent should begin to be paid again when the number of children under twelve years becomes less than four: and every child on attaining the age of *sixteen* should be entitled to a lot upon the same terms upon which the parents acquired their lots.

2d. A bounty to be paid; on every Ox, Cow, and Mule, of a certain age, to be bred in the Colony. The bounty upon cattle raised on private property to be double that to be paid on the

same bred upon Savannas, in order to encourage breeding upon farms. .

3d. A bounty to be paid for every Bread-fruit tree bearing fruit. But no more trees to be paid for than there may be persons belong to the lot upon which such bearing bread-fruit trees may be growing.

4th A bounty of                      per ton of Rice, Guinea corn flour, Indian-corn meal, and Farine de Manioc. Also, for black-eyed Peas, and for Beans. —Also, per acre of Plantains, and Pidgeon-peas: the number of plants upon each acre to be specified. — Also, per ton of Yams and Potatoes. — Also, a *double* bounty for Wheat-flour, Buck-wheat, Oats, and Barley.

5th. A bounty of                      per thousand bundles  
of cedar shingles:                      per thousand staves:  
   per thousand bundles of hoops.

6th. A bounty of                      per thousand feet of Cedar boards and plank; and per thousand square feet of Timber suitable for mills and houses: and *double* this bounty for plank and timber fit for Ship-building.

7th. A bounty of                      per ton of Hemp: and double that bounty per ton of Cordage and cable, manufactured in Trinidad, of the hemp being the growth and produce of that Island.

8th. A bounty of                      for the erection of every Steam-engine working a Sugar-mill, a Flour-mill, or a Saw-mill: and *twice* or *thrice* this bounty for a Steam-engine of a power equal, and applied, to *two* or *three* of these purposes at once.

9th. An annual bounty of                      per head, to the Proprietor of the greatest number of Infant-slaves of                      years old.

10th. An annual bounty of                      per head to the Proprietor who possesses the most numerous family of Children, being the children of one Mother.

11th. The annual hire of a slave, to be paid, out of the fund, to every Proprietor who allows the Mother of six children, under twelve years, to be free from all work, excepting the care of her family.

12th. An annual bounty of                      to the Proprietor of the *oldest slave* in the island: a second,



being in proportion a less bounty, for a slave of the first age below the oldest; and a third degree of bounty for the second age.

This bounty will form an honorable distinction between humane persons who *preserve* their slaves; and those inhuman masters, who, under the pretext of manumission *abandon* slaves in old age.

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Having now given the outline of the *permanent plan of relief*; I might, with propriety, close my remarks here: but the proposals I have lastly made for the encouragements of the poorer class of Settlers, and to promote population by encouraging the care of Mothers and Children, whether free people or slaves; suggest to me some remaining observations upon the comparative state of the *poor people of Great Britain, and the slaves in the West Indies*.

There is no doubt, that the poor people of Great Britain, and even the savages of Africa, would prefer death to the slavery which the latter have been made to endure in the West Indies. Such a preference is natural and right

in men who have been born in freedom, and have enjoyed the rights of personal liberty. To free-men, slavery must be the most dreadful of all events that can befall them. As far, then, as relates to sentiment, he must be a base wretch who would not prefer freedom even with poverty, to slavery though in chains of gold.

The *African* slave, therefore, has my most unfeigned commiseration, who has lost with his liberty, also his country, his family, and his friends; and who in his slavery does not enjoy even those comforts which the *Creole* slaves enjoy around him. But *Creole* slaves do not possess those sentiments of freedom. They are born, bred, and educated, in slavery, and know no more, than to imitate the humility and submissions of their parent slaves.

Slavery is as habitual to them, *though not so pleasant*, as freedom is to others: but, then, they never knew the sweets of liberty; therefore their want of it is not an evil equal to that, which is sustained by those who lose the liberty they once possessed.

The instances are very numerous of slaves, who, coming to this country and knowing that they are free here; yet, nevertheless, will not

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tarry here ; but *prefer returning to slavery in the Colonies*, where they can indulge their old habits, and associate with their families and friends. This fact distinguishes the case of one who has been born in slavery, from another, who, from a state of natural freedom, becomes enslaved. But, when we compare the slaves in the West Indies with the poor people of Great Britain, in respect of their dependence for the means of subsistence, *separate* from all considerations of civil liberty ; *the certainty of subsisting a family is in favor of the slaves*. In England, the employment of workmen often depends on a fashion, on weather, on peace or war ; and if any of these injure the manufactories or trade, the poor are not employed ; and the children, at least, must starve, sicken, and die. In the West Indies, whether crops are abundant or scanty ; whether sugars are at a high price, or low ; the negro is still allowed the usual rations : and if the Proprietor be even ruined, the Mortgagee, or new Purchaser, who takes possession, must feed the negroes. In the consideration of the *evils* of slavery, certainly, the obligation of the Proprietor, to feed and clothe the slaves, is, under all circumstances, a great alleviation of their misery : and though it is said, that poverty does not prevent the propagation of the human species ; yet, I contend,

that it at least prevents the *rearing* of children: and, therefore, population must increase faster among the slaves, if proper plans be adopted, than it ever can among the poor people of Great Britain, where no such plans can be adopted among them, to promote the increase of population. The objection to marriage among the poor, is the apprehension of a family of children. Single men, or women, can maintain themselves very well by their industry; but wretchedness begins with the offspring of marriage. What was sufficient for the subsistence of a man or woman when single, becomes deficient when children, who can contribute nothing to the domestic supplies, are constantly consuming them.

The effects of poverty upon population have been long ago commented upon by able writers; and lastly by Mr Malthus. But, for my purpose, it is only necessary farther to observe, that, even in the slavery of the West Indies there must be very bad management if population do not increase; since a family, however numerous, does not deprive the parents of any part of their subsistence; proportionate rations being allowed for all the children, and medical attendance and nurses being also employed at the expence of the slave-owner. But if these people were

*free*, the white people would be also *free* from the obligation by which they are now bound to support, in health and in sickness, the people who are now their slaves. The evils, under which these poor people do not now labour, but which they would have to encounter after having got rid of the evil of slavery, are, I am afraid, insurmountable objections to the advantages which are promised to them by *emancipation*: but these objections never appeared to me in such a strong light, until my attention was awakened to them by the Essay on Population.

To propose any thing towards the freedom of the slaves, without being able to *ensure* the safety of our dominion over them, as well as *more* domestic prosperity to themselves than they enjoy already, would be dangerous to our Colonial government, and would give them a degree of freedom, which, from their ignorance and servile habits, they would not perhaps derive a benefit from, equal to what they would relinquish to obtain it.

But, I am no defender of slavery. On the contrary, I subscribe to Mr LOCKE's opinion, that, "it is so vile and miserable an estate of man, and so directly opposite to the generous temper and courage of our nation, that it is hardly to

be conceived, that an Englishman, much less a gentleman, should plead for it." I doubt not, that the Colonists themselves would prefer hired labourers to the labour of slaves, if it were possible that their freedom could be accomplished *with safety* to the Colonial governments; *without ruining* proprietors; and, at the same time, *with certain benefit* to the poor people themselves: but these are the great, and I fear insurmountable obstacles. If there be any possibility of overcoming them, it must be by some such *gradual* plan as was alluded to in the House of Commons, April 2, 1792. And Lord Melville "thought a plan might be effected gradually, and without danger, by ordaining, that slavery should expire with the present race of slaves, and by giving their masters a restricted right to the services of their children, until the age of twenty-one, as a compensation for maintaining them in infancy."\*

s there are, however, some ingenious persons who raise objections to a more liberal state of the negroes, under *any* plan that may be proposed; I will endeavour to remove such objections. The most formidable author of such objections, is the writer of "the Colonial Policy

\* Political Essays, p. 140.

of the European Powers."\* He considers the negroes as constitutionally and habitually indolent, and that nothing but the lash will induce them to work. This last opinion is true, as it relates to them in a state of slavery. It is so natural that there should be a repugnance to labour, when it is not rewarded, that we need not attribute this repugnance to the nature of the negro in particular. Should *we* not work with equal repugnance were *we* as ill requited?

The negro will work industriously enough, when he works for himself, as is the case when he hires himself to those who will employ him on a Sunday, or when he cultivates his provision-ground on that day and Saturday afternoon; of which time, at certain seasons, he is also allowed to dispose. But, in general, even the two hours which are intended for rest and the noon's repast, are filled up by the negroes in most violent exertions to work their own grounds: and then, instead of proceeding in the sullen silence, which they observe during their slow dull movements in their master's work, they handle their hoe with the activity of willingness; and cheerfully accompany their labour with their songs; the burthen of which is frequently, their sanguine

\* Vol. ii. p. 412.



calculations of articles of gay apparel, or of domestic comforts, which are to be purchased by the produce of their industry. This is certainly more particularly the case with the Creole slaves, who know better than the poor African, the arts of West-India traffic; and having families and sick or aged relatives to assist, and youthful companions and fellow-servants to eclipse in finery of dress, they feel inducements to industry, which, the lost liberty, established melancholy, forlorn situation, and uninformed mind of the newly-arrived African savage does not admit of, and therefore they are not felt.

But the number of these unhappy wretches cannot now increase! those whose stubborn hearts and hardy bodies do not sink into the grave under such an accumulation of miseries, will, when they shall in time forget their woes, learn from their neighbours lessons of domestic economy, and will form family-connexions and acquire habits of industry. This *we* know is the result of association with the Creoles; and like the Creoles, they will in time have inducements to industry when it is their *interest* to work.

The objection to their freedom on account of the indolence which such climates beget, and

the encouragement to indulgence which the abundant productions that such fertile soils afford, may be obviated by not allowing them to produce for their own use the fruits of the earth. They must be labourers for the owners of the soil, and not cultivators on their own account, at least not to any amount sufficient to make them independent of daily labour for hire. They will still eat what they produce, but they will obtain it in the market from the white Farmer, the Gardner, and the Butcher, by the very money which they will receive from these persons as the value of their daily labour; and it will be in the wisdom of the colonial Legislature, to fix the price of daily hire at such a rate, that while it shall be sufficient to purchase daily food, it shall leave no more than enough to provide the little clothing which the temperature of such climates require, and pay for the occupancy of the cottages, which may be rented to them; and the dimensions of these cottages, if private property; the materials of which they are constructed, and the rent for which they are to be hired, should also be fixed by proper laws of the Colony; so that the poor should not be oppressed, rack-rented, nor even neglected. Thus there would be inducements to industry and no opportunity for idle indulgences. The indolence of the free negroes in the West Indies

arises from the circumstances which such a new order of things would remove. The price of labour is not now fixed by law; therefore by making exorbitant demands for work which must be done even at any rate, in order to carry on the business of a plantation, these free people are enabled to earn as much in one week, as will maintain them in idleness and dissipation for a considerable time afterwards: and as they have none of those inducements to save money, which are felt by the white people, such as a desire to give polished education to their children, to promote the aggrandizement of their families, — and to go to live in splendour in those countries where wealth can be so enjoyed; the free people therefore gratify such desires as their situation and habits give rise to, and return to work when the means of indulgence are exhausted. But their return to labour, even upon such a necessity, is a proof, that, were their wants continual, they would constantly work to supply them: and therefore the suggestion arises, of not allowing them to hold lands for cultivation; and of preventing them by law from extorting from their employers such exorbitant wages as is ruinously expensive to the latter, and instead of benefiting the working people, only encourages indolence and vicious dissipation; which are productive of disease and habits of life, that prevent the mul-

tipling population of this class of inhabitants in the Islands.

Mr *Brougham*\* is led wrong by *Malouet* from whom he quotes, that, "although many of them possess land and slaves, the spectacle, was never yet exhibited of a free negro supporting his family by the culture of his little property." This is not the case, for I could mention the names of many Negroes in the Islands, and particularly in Trinidad, who support large families by cultivating lands; some in provisions, others in cotton, and in Trinidad even in cocoa and sugar: and it can be proved, that in this Island the number of free people having freehold estates is considerable, some of them worth from ten to twenty thousand pounds sterling.

Voluntary labour for hire, though a refinement wholly unknown among the savage tribes of Africa, and though as unlikely to be known in the West Indies under the same circumstances that exist in Africa; would, notwithstanding, be so necessary to the very existence of these people under circumstances so different from those of Africa as these are which I propose, that voluntary labour would no longer be un-

\* Vol. ii. p. 416.

common. If negroes in the West Indies be allowed to hold lands for their own cultivation, there is no dispute about the possibility of their planting as much in a day, as will maintain them in idleness for a week; and under such circumstances it is not wonderful that they will indulge themselves while their crops are growing.

If they be allowed to fish and hunt, it is true, that on shores which abound in fish, and in new countries where game is also abundant, they will easily be able to feed themselves by sporting instead of labour. But under a proper state of colonial management the Legislature might prohibit such sports. No man should be allowed to have a net but by an expensive licence to be obtained from the Government of the country: fishing with lines should be unlawful, and liable to penalties and punishments: the possession of a fowling-piece, without a license, should be also punishable; and powder and shot should pay such a heavy tax as would amount to a total prohibition of its use among the inferior classes of people.

This last regulation would not only render daily labour absolutely necessary, but would also render the Colonies more secure from insurrection and revolt; for there cannot be a worse

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policy, than to allow arms and ammunition to be in the hands of this class of people, whose situation affords too many inducements for the use of such means, when opportunities for revenge are rendered inviting by the power to gratify it. \*

When cultivation, fishing, and hunting, are prohibited to the labouring and mechanical classes of the people, they must of necessity resort to daily labour for the maintenance of their

\* The remarks of Sir William Young, relative to the intercourse of black soldiers with female slaves, occur to my mind very forcibly, while stating the impolicy of allowing arms and ammunition to be in the hands of the negroes. Certainly the plan of having negro-soldiers in colonies where there are negro slaves merits the serious consideration of Government, as much as the *approbation* of black troops, expressed by the Author of "War in Disguise" in "the Crisis of the Sugar-Colonies" merits suspicion: for, in the event of that famine which the present state of the West Indies and the interrupted intercourse with America threatens, these war-like paramours of female slaves will know too well how to advise the contrivance and execution of those attempts at *emancipation*, to which the approaching *true crisis* of the Colonies may lead. And it is too much to be apprehended, that the negro-troops would be willingly instrumental in the progress of that "African Sovereignty" which the Author of "War in Disguise" tells us in his book called "the Opportunity," we "might look forward too with satisfaction rather than dismay."

families; and, as there is no excitement to industry so certain as necessity, upon this plan the excitement will be as constant as it will be certain: no intervals of idleness will be possible; and thus the objections to freedom upon the plea of *natural and habitual indolence* will be obviated.

Under the present system much labour is lost by feigned sickness: but, less labour will be lost in hospitals under such a new order of circumstances as I have described. A disposition, the very reverse of that which negroes now expose, will then affect them. While they toil without profit, their low-cunning suggests the expedient of pretended disease, and sometimes even the use of pernicious herbs and drugs to produce real maladies. But when the profit of their labour shall be their own; instead of *feigning* sickness, they will take pains to *preserve* health; because any interruption to their labour will be their own loss. Their *own* support will depend upon their *own* strength; and when they may value time as their own they will not waste it. It is true, that they will still be liable to the common calamities of human life: but they are liable to these now, with the addition of many uncommonly-afflicting events besides: and as to the ordinary occurrence of accidents and disease, these and the infirmities



of nature, infancy, and old age, may be provided for without any thing more than the present ordinary expence; and indeed, I believe at a rate far below it.

Every slave-holder, at present pays a medical attendant for the cure and care of his sick, lame, and infirm negroes. But, a sum by very much less than the annual expence which estates pay for medicine and attendance would support proper hospitals, to which medical men would be appointed by the free suffrages of the governors of such institutions: and those alone would be elected whose pretensions from talents, education, regular initiation into the profession, and long experience, render most eligible for such a serious charge; which, at present, is too often committed to ignorant pretenders and adventurers, who are imposed on the planters by mere accident, interest, or impudence.

Such Impostors abound in the Colonies: and the climate is too much blamed for the great mortality which is produced among the Whites and Africans by the timidity of some, the temerity of more, and the ignorance of most; and, indeed, the last is the general cause of both the former, in the practice of men to whom the lives and properties are indiscriminately en-

trusted, of those who *speculate* with both life and property in the unequal hazard to which they are thus unnecessarily reduced. It is much to be desired that hospitals were established, to which medical men would be appointed upon the same principles with those who dignify our public hospitals in Great Britain.

The *collieries*, *mines*, and *manufactories* in England employ great numbers of labourers, who are as incapable of defraying medical charges, and subsisting themselves during sickness as the slaves are. And the colliers, miners, and manufacturers hospitals are found to be the most cheap, comfortable, and useful institutions in relieving the numerous cases which occur among their labourers, and, indeed, the expence of any other mode of relief could never be sustained; so superior is the plan of public hospitals in point of economy, as well as in point of skill and humanity. On such a principle the inferior classes would have the assistance of the highest characters in the profession, instead of the lowest; and the white people would feel the benefit of that extensive experience which the practice of large hospitals can alone afford. These Planters hospitals may, even under the slave-system, be established with

equal advantage to the slaves and the Proprietors. But the previous suggestions are only adaptable to some future period, when a *safe plan*, for a better system to be accomplished in a new generation, shall be produced and carried into effect.

Although I am decided, in my opinion of the impolicy of an immediate, or, at any time, a sudden emancipation of the slaves in the West Indies, and of the difficulty and even impossibility of maintaining subordination and good order among them; and of their unwillingness to industry under their present lamentable state of degradation, and want of religious and moral education: yet, *it is conceivable*, that, *a new generation*, educated in religious humility, instructed in moral obligations, habituated to industry from infancy, and looking forward to the reward of labour in riper years, might be raised; and under proper colonial regulations, might render the Colonies prosperous and powerful.

How far distant the proper period for such an innovation must be; or how such an innovation *should* be attempted; and whether the negroes *will*, *comparatively*, be benefited thereby; are such momentous matters of consideration, that I will not venture to decide upon

them. But, at least, I will decide against the policy of the Author of "War in Disguise," since I cannot consider it "just nor rational," that we should "look forward, with *satisfaction* rather than dismay," to "*African sovereignty*" in the West Indies; whatever future events may effectuate towards "African freedom."

THE END.

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